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Communication from the Commission
Raising productivity growth: key messages 
from the European Competitiveness Report 2007
1. Introduction
This Communication presents the main messages 
from the European Competitiveness Report 20071. 
Its focus is on productivity, which is the key driver of 
competitiveness and welfare in the long term.
The Competitiveness Report was redesigned in 2006 
to contribute to a solid analytical underpinning of 
the microeconomic pillar of Lisbon strategy, while 
continuing to explore more speciﬁ  c aspects of the 
competitiveness of the European industry.
This year, after a review of recent developments 
concerning growth, productivity and employment, 
both at the level of the EU and in the main economic 
sectors, the Report reviews microeconomic reforms 
under the Growth and Jobs agenda from the point 
of view of their potential to raise productivity and 
focuses, more particularly, on skills as a competitive-
ness factor. The Report assesses the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of European industries and con-
cludes with a long term vision of European manu-
facturing so as to put the emerging trends and chal-
lenges in perspective and to check whether existing 
policies are consistent with them. The analysis in this 
report is underpinned by improved data availability 
– longer time series and the publication of the ﬁ  rst 
EU KLEMS2 datasets –, which allows new insights to 
be drawn.
1   Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2007), European Competitiveness 
Report 2007.
2   The EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts database research 
project aims to create a database on measures of economic growth, 
productivity, employment creation, capital formation and technological 
change at the industry level for all European Union member states from 
1970 onwards.
2.   Overall competitiveness 
performance
A widespread improvement of the European economy
The strength of the economic recovery in Europe is 
larger than was expected last year: the EU’s real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 3.0% in 2006 – the 
highest growth rate since the year 2000. This improve-
ment was supported by an acceleration in both pro-
ductivity and employment growth. The enhanced pro-
ductivity growth is underpinned by stronger growth 
in total factor productivity (TFP) (see box).
This improvement is widespread; nearly all the new 
Member States and Member States with relatively low 
GDP per capita and productivity levels are catching 
up in terms of economic and productivity growth. 
The pick-up is visible across the different sectors of the 
economy. Particularly, the role of services sectors in 
EU GDP growth is substantial, also given their large 
weight in the total economy. All manufacturing sec-
tors, with the exception of tobacco, grew substantially 
faster in 2006 than in the previous ﬁ  ve years, thus 
contributing to the up-turn in overall EU growth.
The EU-US productivity gap has started to diminish…
Data on the developments in the European economy 
in comparison to the US, which is taken as a bench-
mark of frontier productivity performance, conﬁ  rm 
that the labour productivity gap vis-à-vis the US shrank 
in 2006, after widening continuously over the last dec-
ade. This is signiﬁ   cant, not least since more recent 
data, available only for manufacturing3, conﬁ  rm that 
this development continued in the ﬁ  rst half of 2007.
3   Manufacturing and the whole economy display very similar, and synchro-
nous, patterns of productivity growth even if the productivity growth 
rates of the former are generally higher.
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In assessing this encouraging development, one 
should, however, not lose sight of the fact that 
labour productivity levels in the US remain some 
39% higher than in the EU when expressed as GDP 
per person employed and 26% (2005) higher in 
terms of GDP per hour worked. Analysis shows that 
this is mainly caused by differences in total factor 
productivity (see box), and secondarily, in the qual-
ity of human capital4. Moreover, a large share of the 
catching-up seems due to cyclical factors, including 
a deceleration in US productivity growth in 2006.
Sector level data give some additional insights 
into the comparison of productivity developments 
between the EU and US. For instance, they conﬁ  rm 
that the lower labour productivity growth in the EU 
economy in the last decade is mainly due to the 
poorer aggregated performance of the individual EU 
sectors and not to the sectoral composition of the 
economy (industry mix), which, actually, is slightly 
favourable for the EU. In particular, the EU-US growth 
differential reﬂ  ects poor services sector performance 
in the EU, particularly in retailing, distribution, and 
ﬁ  nancial and business services.
… with some indications that also factors other than 
the favourable cycle may contribute
While the reasons underpinning the widening of the 
EU-US productivity gap over the last decade were 
structural, it is still too early to say whether the recent 
narrowing of the gap is the product of purely cycli-
cal developments or the ﬁ  rst manifestation of a new 
pattern.
4   However, the EU uses more capital per worker which reduces the labour 
productivity gap with the US.
Analysis by the Commission services5 indicates that, 
while the upturn is essentially cyclical in nature, it 
is possible that there is also a structural component 
linked with past structural reforms enacted by the 
EU Member States, especially in the labour market. 
Sectoral productivity gains, such as in network indus-
tries, and the increase in the skill levels of the work 
force would also support such a view. Such a struc-
tural improvement in productivity can be expected 
to become visible in the future as the effects of recent 
reforms – particularly those generated through the 
renewed Lisbon strategy – start feeding through 
more strongly.
3. Drivers  of  competitiveness
Productivity and the microeconomic pillar of the Lis-
bon agenda
Raising the long–term economic growth potential 
by increasing productivity growth is one of the fun-
damental objectives of the renewed Lisbon strategy 
and an important response to the challenges of glo-
balisation, ageing, the rapid pace of technological 
progress and the need to combat climate change. 
The microeconomic policy pillar of the Lisbon strat-
egy covers many of the policy areas most relevant to 
enhancing productivity, such as:
–   Increased investment in R&D can signiﬁ  cantly 
increase productivity growth, especially if the ele-
ments of the knowledge triangle, R&D, innovation 
and education and training, are well integrated, 
including as concerns the provision of scientiﬁ  c 
personnel.
5   See  EU Economy Review 2007 and related Communication “Moving 
Europe’s productivity frontier”, forthcoming.
Box: The role of Total Factor Productivity
Total factor productivity is the main source of the productivity gap between the EU and the US. It is the 
part of productivity growth generated by intangible factors such as technical progress or organisational 
innovation instead of increased use of inputs, such as capital. This makes total factor productivity the 
most comprehensive measure of the efﬁ  ciency of an economy.
At sector level, an analysis of structural relationships among the different performance indicators sug-
gests that total factor productivity growth is the key driver of sectoral performance, whether this is 
expressed in terms of growth of value added, labour productivity, international trade, foreign direct 
investment or employment growth.
Among the policies most relevant to total factor productivity growth are those designed to foster 
technological progress, innovation and increased investment in R&D, the use of ICT, competition and 
product market reform. These policies are at the heart of the microeconomic pillar of the Lisbon strat-
egy, suggesting that the ongoing reform process can contribute signiﬁ  cantly to boosting total factor 
productivity and economic growth.
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–   ICT investment brings high returns in terms of 
productivity gains when accompanied by appro-
priate organisational changes and investments in 
skills.
–   Increased competition in open markets with an 
adequate regulatory framework tends to have 
positive effects on productivity and employment 
by improving allocative (static) efﬁ  ciency, produc-
tive efﬁ  ciency (work organisation), and dynamic 
efﬁ   ciency (innovative products and processes). 
However, the effect of competition on innova-
tion is more ambiguous, depending as it does on 
market structures and on the distance of market 
participants to the technological frontier. Compe-
tition is of particular importance for the countries 
and industries close to the technological frontier 
for maintaining their edge.
–   Stimulating entrepreneurship by easing the start 
and growth of companies as well as enhancing 
conditions for SMEs to use the potential of the 
Single Market allows new ideas to be transformed 
into value-added products and services and these 
to be traded internationally, with an important 
positive effect on productivity.
–   Signiﬁ  cant increases of output and consumption 
can also be achieved by reducing unnecessary 
regulatory costs such as overly heavy administra-
tive burdens, thereby freeing resources for more 
productive uses. The beneﬁ  ts will be felt particu-
larly by SMEs, where such overheads represent a 
higher proportion of their total costs.
–   Reducing corporate tax barriers and related com-
pliance costs and facilitating the restructuring of 
group companies foster the functioning of the 
Single Market. Adopting a Common Consoli-
dated Corporate Tax Base would also positively 
impact on the EU GDP.
Accelerated adaptation requirements call for mecha-
nisms facilitating transition between different jobs. 
More generally, EU cohesion policy plays in this con-
text an important role, by contributing to a better 
functioning of the internal market and supporting 
productivity and competitiveness improvements in 
the countries and regions whose development is lag-
ging behind or are affected by industrial restructur-
ing.
An assessment of recent reforms by the Member 
States in product and services markets as well as with 
regard to better regulation and SME policy reveals 
that, in general, notable progress has been made with 
reforms in these areas, although more still remains to 
be done. This progress is not yet fully reﬂ  ected in the 
data measuring economic performance.
Coordination matters
The governance of national reform policies in the 
EU is an important element of the Growth and Jobs 
Strategy. There are several reasons why the coordina-
tion of Member States’ economic reforms may bring 
additional beneﬁ  ts. While countries can learn from 
each other, joint efforts and coordination can stimu-
late the drive to reform and overcome national resist-
ance against reforms. Most importantly, coordinated 
implementation may create beneﬁ  ts which would be 
absent, had the reforms been pursued unilaterally.
The empirical analysis of international spillovers from 
national reforms presented in the Report conﬁ  rms 
that coordinated action produces, in many cases, 
beneﬁ   ts which are substantially superior to those 
derived from acting alone. For instance, roughly half 
of the potential increase of GDP generated by Mem-
ber States’ achievement of their R&D intensity targets 
would result from cross-border knowledge spillovers.
Additional beneﬁ   ts accrue from complementarities 
between policies. As an example, increasing skills and 
R&D raises real wages, which in turn should increase 
participation rates. Also, the reduction of adminis-
trative burdens, through lower mark-ups, has strong 
synergies with the employment target by helping to 
reduce equilibrium unemployment.
Trade openness and productivity go together
Increasing trade openness (trade volumes compared 
to GDP) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stocks 
illustrate the acceleration of globalisation. While in 
general global market shares have been redistributed 
in favour of the emerging economies, the EU27 has 
been relatively successful in maintaining its position. 
Between 1996 and 2005 the share of EU 27 in total 
World exports decreased from 23.3 to 22.0%, the 
US share decreased from 19.1 to 15.2% and Japan’s 
from 13.7 to 10.5%.6, 7
Trade performance of the EU in services was encour-
aging: the EU-158 more than doubled its export 
growth in services between 1996 and 2005, whereas 
its imports grew less fast. As a result, over a nine 
year period the EU-15 almost quadrupled its services 
trade balance. In the same period the United States 
services trade balance diminished by 26% to 50bn€ 
(the EU-25 balance in 2005 was 56.9bn€). In con-
6   Excluding intra-EU trade. “World” refers to an aggregate of countries 
which accounts for 86% of total world exports (in order to assure com-
parability of the shares across time by keeping the reporting countries 
stable).
7   These results, taken in isolation, are prone to over-interpretation, i.e. 
losses of export market share could lead to the conclusion of a competi-
tiveness decline where other factors (such as higher growth or consump-
tion) might be in play.
8  EU -27 or EU-25 services trade data are not available since 1996.
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trast, Japan reported a services trade deﬁ  cit of 30bn € 
in 2003.
Too often, globalisation is associated with job losses 
in sectors that lose out. The resulting social costs 
and anxiety are real and call for appropriate policy 
response. However, they should not lead to over-
looking the strongly positive effects that openness 
and integration into world markets have on a coun-
try’s economic performance. The Report illustrates 
the positive relationship between aggregate produc-
tivity and globalisation, using trade openness as a 
proxy, and summarises the empirical ﬁ  ndings on the 
relationship between productivity and globalisation.
The causality links are not always straightforward. 
More intense import competition spurs productivity 
which leads to improved competitiveness and higher 
exports. This, in turn, brings further efﬁ  ciency gains. 
Empirical work presented in the Report underlines 
the robustness of the relationship. This illustrates 
the power of the mechanisms in play: specialisation, 
scale effects, elimination of less efﬁ  cient ﬁ  rms and 
a greater ability to absorb technological advances 
and new ideas developed in the rest of the world. 
Taken together, these factors suggest that open-
ness to trade can play an important role in raising 
productivity growth. For instance, empirical analy-
sis indicates that, on average, a 1% increase in the 
openness of the economy, as measured by the ratio 
of imports to value added, results in an increase of 
0.6% in labour productivity in the following year. 
These results suggest that both increased intra-EU 
trade as a result of improving the Single Market and 
ambitious external policies – such as concluding the 
Doha Development Agenda, the new generation 
of bilateral free trade agreements, rebalancing the 
trade relationship with China, removing barriers to 
EU exports and a stepped-up market access strat-
egy – hold out the potential of signiﬁ  cantly contrib-
uting to productivity growth in the EU. It should 
be underlined, however, that the full beneﬁ  ts  of 
openness only accrue to economies that can eas-
ily redeploy factors of production between ﬁ  rms as 
well as from declining to growing industries. These 
are also crucial preconditions for managing the dif-
ﬁ  cult adjustment that will be necessary in speciﬁ  c 
sectors and regions that have a signiﬁ  cant impact 
on the public acceptability of globalisation. Further-
more, in order to seize the advantages of openness, 
the protection of intellectual property rights on an 
international level is crucial.
Skills upgrading as a competitiveness factor
Skills contribute directly to international competitive-
ness and productivity since a better educated work-
force augments the efﬁ  ciency of labour and raises the 
absorptive capacity of ﬁ  rms to more easily integrate 
new technologies and ideas. For example, empirical 
research indicates that raising the average duration 
of schooling by one year would increase productiv-
ity by 8 to 10% in the long run9. Skills upgrading is 
under way in all economic sectors, even in low-skill 
ones. Empirical analyses reveal that sectors employ-
ing a larger share of high or medium skilled work-
ers exhibit higher productivity growth while a high 
share of low skilled workers in a sector exerts a nega-
tive inﬂ  uence on productivity growth. Furthermore, 
skills matter for the speed of convergence towards 
the technology frontier. As might be expected, con-
vergence is faster in high skill intensive industries. 
Finally, a higher share of high and medium skilled 
workers spurs growth of exports.
At the level of individual industries, the analysis dem-
onstrates that the skill upgrading process within 
industries contributes more to the increasing demand 
for highly skilled workers than shifts of employment 
between sectors or industries. Nonetheless, there is 
also a general shift of employment away from low-
skill intensive industries towards medium- and high-
skill intensive industries, and this shift occurs across 
all groups of EU countries.
Against this background, skill gaps can be seen, 
ﬁ   rstly, as an adjustment problem, arising after an 
increase in demand for (or a decrease in the sup-
ply of) a certain skill. In such a situation the govern-
ment’s role could be to smooth the transition process 
whereas there seems to be limited scope for strong 
sector speciﬁ  c policies. Secondly, where skill gaps are 
due to the legacy of the past, policies should focus 
on measures to help the economy to reach a better 
mix of skills. But addressing the skill mismatch is not 
just a task for the government. Many more European 
enterprises will have to address the skill mismatch in 
their corporate strategies.
The efforts within the growth and jobs strategy to 
foster the accumulation of human capital, such as 
through a reduction in the number of early school 
leavers and the encouragement of academic enrol-
ment in mathematics, science and technology, 
should support the increasing demand for skills 
connected to skill-biased technical change. Higher 
employment rates, notably of women, will also help 
to reduce the skill gap. Whereas education policies 
mainly remain a national competence, the education 
of top researchers in the EU will beneﬁ  t from EU-wide 
initiatives such as the development of the European 
Institute of Technology and increased mobility of 
researchers.
9   Canton, E. (2007), Social returns to education: Macro-evidence, 
De Economist (forthcoming December 2007)
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4. Competitiveness 
of European industries
The state of play
Overall, the competitive performance of European 
industries, where SMEs play a considerable role, is 
strong. However, this masks a highly variable per-
formance at the level of individual industries, both 
across countries and between sectors. For the period 
since 1995, the EU exhibits low performance in terms 
of the growth of value added, labour and total factor 
productivity, while appearing quite healthy in terms 
of trade performance. Foreign direct investments 
expand rapidly in each direction, with outward for-
eign direct investment growing more strongly.
Assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses by 
sector, the sectors of mining and, among manufac-
turing industries, the production of leather & foot-
wear, clothing, textiles, nuclear fuel and tobacco 
are those presenting a decline not only in employ-
ment but also in value added. Conversely, apart from 
water transport, all the industries with the highest 
rates of value added growth in the European Union 
– communication equipment, ofﬁ  ce machinery and 
computers, as well as telecommunications and com-
puter related services – relate to the new information 
and communication technologies.
Compared to the US, the biggest gap in sectoral 
performance can be found in the manufacturing of 
ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers, wholesale and retail 
trade, air transport, and the ﬁ  nancial services. The 
latter three services sectors all appear to be rather 
sensitive to economies of scale and are likely to ben-
eﬁ   t from the larger integrated markets in the US. 
Conversely, the EU shows pockets of higher growth 
in selected areas of high-tech manufacturing, partic-
ularly pharmaceuticals, and the network industries.
Higher service content in European manufacturing
Taking the long view10 indicates that Europe, whilst still 
being among the richest regions on a GDP per capita 
basis, will be overtaken by some of the emerging econ-
omies in terms of overall economic size. This is due 
both to demographic factors and the relatively strong 
growth in productivity as the emerging economies 
catch up. By 2050 Asia will most likely have become 
the most important market and pole of growth.
The analysis shows that over the next decades, man-
ufacturing is set to continue to play a major role in 
10   On the basis of a literature review of foresight and futures studies, the 
backbone of which is three recent EU-wide foresight projects on the 
future of manufacturing in Europe FutMan, ManVis and Manufuture.
the EU economy, contributing directly to welfare 
and productivity growth and generating signiﬁ  cant 
demand for research and high skilled services which 
spills over to the rest of the economy11. At the same 
time, it is expected that manufacturing, deﬁ  ned in a 
narrow sense, will directly employ less people than 
today and will represent a relatively smaller part of 
the whole economy.
The trends on employment and relative size must 
not be confused with stagnation or decline. To a cer-
tain extent, they reﬂ  ect the effect of differences in 
productivity growth. Additionally, these trends are 
of a statistical nature, i.e. the fragmentation of the 
value chain results in activities previously classiﬁ  ed 
as manufacturing shifting to the services sector. The 
manufacturing industry with its related service sec-
tors will remain a key pillar of the EU economy in the 
21st century, not only because of its continued eco-
nomic weight but also because it is an integral part 
of the innovation system of a modern economy.
The analysis suggests that the most successful of these 
ﬁ  rms will act as leaders of global value networks, pro-
viding planning, marketing and R&D services and 
integrating components from outside sources. Thus, 
the service content of manufacturing and also of the 
whole package sold with the ﬁ  nal product is likely 
to increase further. This creates new revenue oppor-
tunities and valuable long lasting relationships with 
customers; however, it also increases the potential 
for outsourcing. Hence the existing statistical classi-
ﬁ  cations of activities in manufacturing and services, 
respectively, will become increasingly less relevant 
and new types of analysis of company and market 
developments will become necessary.
It is not clear to which extent the emerging technol-
ogies (electromechanical microsystems, advanced 
materials, bio and nanotechnologies) will realise 
their perceived potential, although it must be under-
lined that their potential is very signiﬁ  cant and could 
make a major contribution to productivity growth 
and innovation over the next decades. It is, how-
ever, likely that managing knowledge will become 
more important and the successful business models 
of the future will be those that perform better in this 
respect. Intellectual capital and intangibles are likely 
to become ever more important. This will probably 
lead to more complex organisational approaches, 
with a high degree of collaboration and network-
ing with suppliers, customers, competitors and an 
increased use of external sources of knowledge, such 
as research institutions and universities.
11   One Euro of manufacturing goods sold requires between 22 (Nether-
lands) and 36 cents (Germany) of inputs from market services (2000 
input-output data).
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These developments will put increased emphasis on 
the possession of skills. In particular, soft skills such as 
team working, learning, sharing and communicating, 
providing a service as well as a good and the ability 
to think in an interdisciplinary way will become cru-
cial, especially for SMEs wanting to participate in the 
global networks. These skills may become necessary 
even for serving local markets.
Dynamic specialisation, i.e. when given competitive 
strengths not only persist but tend to be reinforced, 
suggests that Europe will maintain strong positions 
in many medium-high and high technology sectors 
(chemicals, including pharmaceuticals, mechanical 
engineering, cars, aerospace, embedded electronics). 
This will necessitate important R&D efforts to con-
tinuously expand the technological frontier in these 
industries so as to keep competitive edge. High qual-
ity products in traditional sectors may also be strong-
holds, where technological innovation together with 
design and marketing play an important role.
Much will also depend on the ability of European 
ﬁ  rms to capitalise on the opportunities represented 
by global challenges, such as ageing and climate 
change. Since Europe will need to address these 
challenges early on, there is a real opportunity for 
establishing lead market positions in products such 
as those linked to health care, convenience, leisure 
and entertainment and environmental technologies.
The horizontal policy framework matters for manufacturing
By taking a more quantitative, model based approach, 
it is possible to evaluate the impact of policies that 
aim at improving the general framework conditions 
for competitiveness and their relative importance in 
such a long term perspective. The results of such an 
approach depend strongly on the speciﬁ  cations and 
assumptions of the model; however, they give useful 
indications on the direction and order of magnitude 
of the outcomes generated by policy changes. The 
key determinant of longer-term growth and pro-
ductivity is the degree of openness of the EU and 
world economy. Nevertheless, other structural policy 
reforms can have important effects.
The policies considered are upgrading skills, better 
regulation and less administrative burdens for ﬁ  rms, 
R&D and innovation, a more competitive Single 
Market and environmental policies, in the form of 
improved energy efﬁ  ciency. Their individual impact 
on GDP by 2025 is in the range of 0.5-0.6 % (skills12) 
12   The policy modelled is the achievement of the targets adopted in 2004 for 
2010 (10% maximum of early school leavers, at least 85% of 22 years olds 
with upper secondary education, 20% reduction of 15 years olds with low 
reading literacy achieving , at least 12.5% participation in Lifelong Learning 
and 15% increase of S&T graduates). Their economic effect will increase very 
gradually only, as successive, better educated cohorts enter the work force.
to3.0-3.5% (R&D), with the other structural policies 
in-between. Their cumulative impact amounts to 
around 8% to 9%.
Amongst the policies considered, R&D and innova-
tion policies and strengthening the internal market 
have the strongest and most positive impact on 
manufacturing. Improving the horizontal policy 
framework will help slow down the trend decrease 
in the relative size of manufacturing in Europe. The 
model-based results conﬁ  rm that with a favourable 
external environment some manufacturing sectors 
such as chemicals, rubber and plastics, combined 
machinery and equipment could approximately 
maintain their present shares in the EU economy. 
In terms of the EU share in world production, in the 
absence of improved framework conditions, there 
is no sector where the EU maintains its relative 
importance by 2025. In the presence of the above-
mentioned policies, sectors such as transport equip-
ment, wood and other manufacturing, energy carri-
ers, research and development services, chemicals, 
rubber and plastics, transport services and other 
business services maintain or almost maintain their 
share in global production. This analysis conﬁ  rms 
that the economic reforms are especially important 
for sectors exposed to trade, such as manufactur-
ing.
5. Synthesis
The key conclusion of this Report is to underline the 
central role that productivity plays as a source for 
growth over the long term. The disappointing pro-
ductivity performance of the EU over the recent past 
as well as the recent recovery is explained to a large 
extent by total factor productivity developments. 
This has clear policy implications, i.e. the importance 
of research and innovation as well as training and 
education policies and of economic reforms that 
enhance the general business environment and facil-
itate structural change and re-allocation of resources. 
Coordinated action in these areas produces, in most 
cases, superior beneﬁ   ts to acting alone. A major 
driver for increased economic efﬁ  ciency is compe-
tition, either through trade openness, a reinforced 
Single Market, especially in services, continuous lib-
eralisation of network industries or product market 
reform.
The future holds out the promise that the European 
manufacturing industry will continue to play a major 
global role in a context where the crucial assets will 
be knowledge and skills. The implementation of the 
policies and reforms referred to above will be central 
in realising this perspective.
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This is the tenth edition of the European Competi-
tiveness Report since the 1994 Industry Council 
Resolution established its basis by inviting the Com-
mission to report annually on the competitiveness of 
European industry. In this Report, competitiveness 
is understood as a sustained rise in the standards 
of living of a nation or region and as low a level of 
involuntary unemployment as possible. At the level 
of industrial sectors, maintaining and improving the 
position in the global market is the main criterion for 
competitiveness.
This concept of competitiveness does not necessarily 
entail a comparative perspective. However, the use 
of cross-country comparisons when assessing com-
petitiveness and the frequent use of the US as the 
reference point can be useful to the extent that the 
US can be considered to epitomise in many ﬁ  elds the 
“technology frontier”.
The Report approaches competitiveness issues from 
the viewpoint of economic theory and empirical 
research. Its ambition is to contribute to policy mak-
ing by highlighting relevant trends and develop-
ments, and by assessing in an analytical manner the 
expected outcomes of the various policy options. 
The Report’s main subject of interest is productivity 
growth and the factors affecting it.
After a review of recent developments concerning 
growth, productivity and employment, both at the 
level of the EU and of the main economic sectors, the 
Report reviews the state of microeconomic reforms 
under the Lisbon agenda from the point of view 
of their potential of raising productivity. It focuses, 
more particularly, on skills, as a factor for competi-
tiveness. In addition, the Report assesses the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of European industries 
with respect to the various dimensions of competi-
tive performance and concludes with presenting a 
long term vision of European manufacturing so as to 
put the emerging trends and challenges in perspec-




Recent developments of the European economy in 
comparison with the US, conﬁ  rm that the trend of 
an increasing economic growth and productivity 
gap which could be observed over the last decade 
has come at a halt. While the reasons underpinning 
this trend were structural, it is still too early, at this 
moment, to say whether this change is the product 
of purely cyclical developments or the ﬁ  rst manifes-
tation of a new pattern.
The real growth rates of the EU-27 Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) were both in the last quarter of 2006 
3.5% year-on-year) and in the whole year (3.0%) 
the highest since the year 2000.This improvement 
has been supported by both a higher productivity 
growth and a stronger employment growth. In this 
context, it has also to be noted that the enhanced 
productivity growth is mainly caused by an acceler-
ating growth of total factor productivity, i.e. the part 
of productivity growth that cannot be assigned to an 
easily measurable factor such as capital deepening or 
improved labour quality, but must be attributed to 
less tangible factors such as technical and organisa-
tional progress. In fact, this productivity component 
grew last year much faster than in previous periods.
These developments and the fact that the EU-27 produc-
tivity growth was last year for the ﬁ  rst time since 2001 
higher than in the US13, thus closing the EU-US produc-
tivity gap, are encouraging. On the face of existing evi-
dence, while the upturn is essentially cyclical in nature, 
it seems likely that there is also a structural component 
linked with past structural reforms enacted by the EU 
13   However, the deceleration of US productivity growth in 2006 contributed 
more in this result than the corresponding acceleration in the EU.
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Member States, especially in the labour market. Sec-
toral productivity gains, such as in network industries, 
and the increase in the skill levels of the work force also 
support such a view. Such a structural improvement 
in productivity can be expected to become visible in 
the future as the effects of recent reforms – particularly 
those generated through the renewed Lisbon strategy 
– start feeding through more strongly.
The fact remains, however, that in terms of produc-
tivity levels, productivity in the US remains much 
higher. The main source of the gap is total factor 
productivity, and secondarily, the quality of human 
capital, while capital deepening contributes towards 
closing this gap.
These macroeconomic developments are reﬂ  ected 
at sector level. All manufacturing sectors in the EU, 
with the exception of tobacco, exhibit substantially 
higher growth rates in 2006, thus contributing to 
the up-turn in EU growth in the last year. Even tex-
tiles and clothing, two sectors with negative growth 
over the last decade, have improved their perform-
ance, although they still show negative growth 
rates in 2006. However, GDP growth in the EU is 
concentrated in a few sectors, which account for a 
large share of total growth. Particularly, the contri-
bution of services sectors to EU growth is substantial. 
Among manufacturing, only two sectors (electrical 
and optical equipment and chemicals) can be men-
tioned, even if their contribution to GDP growth is 
much lower than the one of the top sectors.
As for the whole of the economy, labour productiv-
ity decelerated in nearly all sectors of the economy 
in the period 2000-2005. However, a change took 
place in 2006, when growth rates increased signiﬁ  -
cantly in comparison to the period 2000-2005 and 
even to the period 1995-2000.
Sector level data give some additional insights in the 
comparison of productivity developments between 
the EU and US. For instance, they conﬁ  rm that the 
lower labour productivity growth in the EU economy 
in the last decade was due mainly to the poorer 
aggregated performance in labour productivity 
growth of EU sectors and not to the sectoral compo-
sition of the economy (industry mix), which exerted 
a slightly positive inﬂ  uence in the results. Here too, 
the most recent data (available for manufacturing 
only) conﬁ  rm that the productivity growth differen-
tial in favour of the US becomes negligible at the end 
of 2006 and has turned positive since then.
Too often, globalisation is associated with job losses 
– or with some undeﬁ  ned and hypothetical opportu-
nities. The resulting social costs and anxiety are real 
and call for appropriate policy response to accom-
pany and anticipate transition. However, they should 
not lead to losing from sight the positive effects that 
opening up and integration into world markets have 
in a country’s economic performance, i.e. productiv-
ity gains from the resulting specialisation, from scale 
effects, from the greater competitive pressures that 
forces less efﬁ  cient ﬁ  rms out of the market, and from 
the greater ability to absorb technological advances 
and new ideas developed in the rest of the world. 
Taken together, these factors suggest that openness 
to trade can play an important role in raising the rate 
of productivity growth of an economy; with the full 
beneﬁ  ts of openness accruing to economies that can 
easily redeploy factors of production between ﬁ  rms 
as well as from declining to growing industries.
The Report illustrates the positive relationship 
between aggregate productivity and globalisation, 
using trade openness as a proxy for the later, and 
summarises empirical ﬁ   ndings on the causal rela-
tionship between productivity and globalisation. 
While the direction of causality can go both ways, 
of course, it is clear that with increases in the trad-
ability of services and with a growing fragmentation 
of production processes, companies can reconﬁ  gure 
their production networks to boost overall produc-
tivity and hence competitiveness.
Microeconomic reforms 
and productivity
Raising the long-term economic growth potential 
by increasing productivity growth is one of the fun-
damental objectives of the renewed Lisbon strat-
egy and an important response to the challenges 
of globalisation, ageing, the rapid pace of techno-
logical progress, the global increase in the demand 
for high-skilled labour and the need to combat cli-
mate change. If the European Union wants to sus-
tain its social model in the future, strong productiv-
ity growth is one important precondition for being 
able to do so. Reforms in pursuit of this objective are 
being undertaken mainly in the microeconomic pol-
icy pillar of the integrated strategy. Among the poli-
cies most relevant to TFP growth are those designed 
to foster increased investment in R&D and innova-
tion, the use of ICT, competition and product mar-
kets reform but, also, the quality of human capital 
and better regulation.
Thus the rationale for structural reforms rests in the 
role speciﬁ  c policies can play in raising productivity 
growth and potential output. How the respective 
roles look like and how effective they are remains the 
subject of an ongoing debate, although some con-
clusions can already be drawn:
•   Investment in R&D and innovation is conducive to 
boosting productivity, the more so if the elements 
ld711576Int.indd   14 ld711576Int.indd   14 19/12/07   13:15:28 19/12/07   13:15:2815
Executive summary
of the knowledge triangle, R&D, innovation and 
education and training, are well integrated.
•   ICT investment has high returns in terms of pro-
ductivity growth when accompanied by appro-
priate organisational changes, which ensure that 
ICTs are used efﬁ  ciently.
•   Increased competition on better regulated mar-
kets tends to have positive effects on produc-
tivity and employment by improving allocative 
efﬁ   ciency (static), productive efﬁ  ciency  (work 
organisation), and dynamic efﬁ  ciency (innovative 
products and processes) even though the effect 
on innovation is more ambiguous depending on 
market structures and on the distance of market 
participants to the technological frontier. Compe-
tition is of particular importance for the countries 
and industries close to the technological frontier 
for maintaining their edge.
•   Signiﬁ  cant increases of output and consumption 
can also be achieved by reducing the adminis-
trative burden and thereby freeing resources for 
more productive uses. In addition, well-designed 
tax policies may provide the correct incentives to 
better achieve the objectives of growth-enhanc-
ing policies.
An assessment of recent reforms by Member States 
in product and services markets as well as on the 
ﬁ   eld of better regulation reveals that, in general, 
reforms in these areas have made notable progress, 
even if this progress is not yet fully reﬂ  ected in the 
data measuring performance.
For instance, Member States have been strengthen-
ing their Better Regulation policies in recent years 
thus improving the quality of regulation and cutting 
back on red tape. The promotion of excellence in 
education and research is also pursued vigorously by 
many Member States together with sustained efforts 
to increase spending on R&D. Finally, Member States 
have made considerable progress in reducing start-
up costs for SMEs by facilitating procedures and set-
ting up one-stop-shops.
The coordination of national reform policies in the 
EU is an important aspect of the Growth and Jobs 
Strategy. There are several reasons why the coor-
dination of Member States’ economic reforms may 
bring additional beneﬁ  ts. While countries can learn 
from each other, joint efforts are stimulating to 
carry on reforms and coordination can also help to 
overcome national resistance against reforms. Most 
importantly, coordinated implementation may cre-
ate beneﬁ   ts which would be absent, had reforms 
been pursued unilaterally.
The empirical analysis of spillovers from reforms con-
ﬁ  rms that coordinated action in the areas mentioned 
above produces, in many cases, beneﬁ  ts  substan-
tially superior to those of acting alone. For instance, 
roughly half of the potential increase of GDP gener-
ated by Member States’ achievement of their R&D 
intensity targets would result from cross-border 
knowledge spillovers. Additional beneﬁ  ts are accru-
ing from policy complementarities. As an example, 
increasing skills and R&D raises real wages, which 
in turn should increase participation rates. Also, the 
reduction of administrative burdens, through lower 
mark-ups, has strong synergies with the employment 
target as it works through a reduction in equilibrium 
unemployment.
Skill problems in European 
Industrial Sectors
Educational attainment shows an upward trend in 
the EU countries, as well as in most other countries 
across the world. A better educated work force is 
conducive for a country’s economic performance. 
Human capital not only augments the efﬁ  ciency of 
labour, it can also help to create absorptive capac-
ity so that ﬁ  rms can more easily adopt technologies 
developed elsewhere. Both mechanisms would fos-
ter productivity and international competitiveness. 
For example, empirical research indicates that raising 
the average duration of schooling by one year would 
increase productivity by 8 to 10% in the long run.
The rising educational attainment and its contribu-
tion to competitiveness is also reﬂ  ected at sectoral 
level. Skills upgrading is under way in all economic 
sectors, even in low-skill ones. Also, empirical analyses 
reveal that sectors employing a larger share of high 
skilled or medium skilled workers exhibit higher pro-
ductivity growth while the share of low skilled work-
ers in a sector is associated with a negative impact 
on productivity growth. Furthermore, skills matter 
for the speed of convergence towards the technol-
ogy frontier. As might be expected, convergence is 
faster in high skill intensive industries.
The importance of skills can also be identiﬁ  ed within 
a growth accounting framework. In most countries, 
changes in the skill composition of labour input are 
responsible for more than half of the gross changes in 
the composition of labour input measured in terms of 
the difference between the indices of hours worked 
and of labour services supplied, where the latter takes 
into account age, gender and skills. This shows that 
skill upgrading made a relevant contribution to labour 
demand shifts and implies that there is a substitution 
process towards higher quality types of labour. 
The same can generally be said for individual indus-
tries. Here the analysis demonstrates that the upgrad-
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ing process within industries contributes more to 
the increasing demand for highly skilled workers 
than shifts of overall employment between sectors 
or industries. Nonetheless, there is also a general 
shift of employment away from low-skill intensive 
industries towards medium- and high-skill intensive 
industries, and this shift occurs across all groups of 
EU countries.
Against this background, skill gaps can be seen, 
ﬁ   rstly, as an adjustment problem, arising after an 
increase in demand for (or fall of supply of) a certain 
skill. In such a situation the government’s role could 
be to smooth the transition process. Secondly, skill 
gaps can also be due to a non-optimal mix of skills 
in the economy. In this case government interven-
tion might be needed to correct market failures or 
to improve institutions which prevent the economy 
from reaching an optimal mix of skills.
Case studies for six selected EU Member States on 
skill shortages in two of their industries, textiles and 
clothing, and mechanical engineering, show that skill 
shortages vary considerably across Member States, 
both in terms of their scale as well as in terms of rates 
of change, but greater problems are evident in the 
mechanical engineering industry. Skill shortages are 
usually most pronounced for technically skilled staff, 
and more acute for operatives than for ancillary staff. 
The causes of skill shortages in the mechanical engi-
neering industry seem to be of a structural nature, 
often related to qualitative discrepancies on labour 
markets. The textiles industry, by contrast, is con-
fronted with a low level of education among many of 
its employees, which limits the sector’s adaptability 
and the capability of workers to learn new skills.
The performance 
of European industries
In order to obtain a full picture of European com-
petitiveness, an in-depth analysis of sectoral compet-
itiveness for 52 sectors is undertaken. This analysis 
covers the relative strengths and weaknesses of Euro-
pean industries with respect to various dimensions 
of performance such as the growth of value added, 
employment, labour and Total Factor Productivity, 
international trade, and foreign direct investments. 
All in all, the competitive performance of European 
industries is highly variable, both across countries 
and between sectors. More speciﬁ  cally, competitive-
ness differs greatly depending on which dimension 
of performance is investigated. For the period since 
1995, the EU exhibits relatively low performance in 
terms of value added growth, labour and Total Factor 
Productivity growth, while appearing quite healthy 
in terms of sectoral proﬁ  tability and trade perform-
ance. Incidentally, the latter stands in sharp contrast 
with the US which lost market shares in almost all of 
its manufacturing industries.
Assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses by 
sector, the mining sector and the production of 
leather and footwear, clothing, textiles, nuclear fuel 
and tobacco show a persistent decline in terms of 
value added and employment. Conversely, almost 
all industries with the highest rates of value added 
growth in the European Union are associated with 
the new information and communication technolo-
gies, i.e. communication equipment, ofﬁ  ce machin-
ery and computers, as well as telecommunications 
and computer related services.
Compared to the US, the biggest gap in sectoral 
performance can be found in the manufacturing 
of ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers, wholesale and 
retail trade, air transport, and the ﬁ  nancial services. 
The latter three services sectors all appear to be 
rather sensitive to economies of scale and are likely 
to beneﬁ  t from larger integrated markets in the US. 
Conversely, the EU shows pockets of higher growth 
in selected areas of high-tech manufacturing, partic-
ularly pharmaceuticals, and the network industries, 
such as electricity, gas and water supply, water trans-
port, and telecommunications, which are apparently 
undergoing substantial restructuring processes.
Addressing the dynamics of labour productivity 
growth, the data conﬁ   rm a tendency of general 
catching-up, including many service sectors. This 
implies that countries with lower initial levels of 
labour productivity have on average achieved higher 
growth, whereas countries initially ranking at the top 
of productivity performance found it more difﬁ  cult to 
maintain high growth rates. However, pharmaceu-
ticals and the computer industry are exceptions to 
this rule. They are characterised by dynamic speciali-
sation, where given competitive strength not only 
persists but tends to be reinforced. Consequently, 
certain countries with an initially high level of pro-
ductivity in these industries also enjoy higher rates of 
labour productivity growth at a later stage.
An analysis of structural relationships among differ-
ent performance indicators highlights the trade-off 
between the growth of employment and labour pro-
ductivity in the short to medium term. This trade-off 
touches upon the choice between policies which are 
primarily directed at raising the labour intensity of 
growth, and policies aiming at raising productivity 
growth. Overall, among the variables investigated, 
Total Factor Productivity growth appears to be the 
central driver of sectoral performance. It exerts a 
positive impact on the growth of value added and 
labour productivity, inward FDI, and gains in inter-
national comparative advantage.
ld711576Int.indd   16 ld711576Int.indd   16 19/12/07   13:15:30 19/12/07   13:15:3017
Executive summary
Decomposing the entire variation in average sec-
toral performance between countries and indus-
tries shows that a relatively small portion of about 
12% is accounted for by ﬁ  xed country effects, i.e. 
differences in purely macro-economic conditions 
and the general business environment with equal 
impact on all industries. Conversely, ﬁ  xed industry 
effects explain almost one third of the total varia-
tion in performance. These effects refer to intrinsic 
differences between industries and are as such not 
likely to respond to different policies. However, ﬁ  xed 
industry effects do point toward the importance of 
structural change and the policies that enable it by 
raising the ability of labour and capital markets to 
reallocate resources efﬁ  ciently.
The majority of variation, then, is explained by coun-
try-industry interaction effects, i.e. by the particular 
performance of a country and an industry. This fact 
is testimony to the heterogeneity in performance 
and the variety of causative factors. It calls for an 
integrative policy approach, where horizontal and 
vertical perspectives are combined in order to adjust 
the business environment to the particular charac-
teristics and needs of the respective industries. And 
it conﬁ  rms the validity of the integrated approach to 
industrial policy put forward by the European Com-
mission in recent years, comprising as it does a wide-
ranging work programme of both horizontal and 
sectoral initiatives. The Lead Market Initiative that 
the Commission is currently developing serves as an 
example of such an integrated approach.
The Future of Manufacturing 
in Europe
While structural adjustment and relocation have 
been linked to manufacturing for decades, the char-
acter and speed of adjustment and its potential 
longer-term consequences appear to have taken on 
new dimensions in the current wave of globalisation. 
This fact has invigorated the discussion on how the 
manufacturing landscape will manifest itself in the 
near and longer-term future and which challenges 
may result for policy makers in Europe. 
Although opinions vary, a considerable degree of 
consensus appears to exist on which drivers can be 
expected to shape the future of manufacturing. These 
drivers encompass increasing international competi-
tion, the rapid pace of technological change, major 
socio-demographic trends such as the ‘greying’ of 
most of the industrialized world, salient environmen-
tal developments such as climate change and, last 
but not least, the regulatory environment and the 
values of the public. It is worth noting in this context 
that long term projections generally conﬁ  rm the role 
of Total Factor Productivity as the most important 
source of growth.
In terms of international competition, global mar-
kets will further integrate for both goods and serv-
ices, and new competitors are likely to enter, thereby 
intensifying competition and posing new challenges 
for incumbents. However, the emergence of devel-
oping countries such as China or India also offers 
new opportunities due to larger markets and even 
more scope for specialisation for individual compa-
nies. And while the per capita income gap between 
Europe and these countries will remain substantial, 
steep rises in income in some developing countries 
will clearly have implications for the types of the 
goods and services which consumers demand. 
As a consequence, relocations of production are likely 
to continue as companies endeavour to harvest the 
beneﬁ  ts of increasingly global production networks. 
But also new opportunities emerge for European 
manufacturers once the quality of the product as 
well as the quality of the supplier is of greater impor-
tance for customers. Against this background, close 
user-producer relationships, the available pool of 
high-skill labour and low political risks become major 
reasons for staying in, or even coming to, Europe.
Financial markets too are becoming more integrated 
and the inﬂ  uence of ﬁ  nancial markets and sharehold-
ers on corporate governance and corporate behav-
iour will increase, possibly favouring as some have 
argued short-term ﬁ  nancial goals at the detriment of 
strategic objectives and long-term competitiveness. 
But the jury is still out on whether these develop-
ments are on balance positive or negative, given that 
the necessary restructuring of underperforming ﬁ  rms 
may sometimes be facilitated by new people at the 
helm.
In terms of technological change, its rapid pace and 
the need of staying competitive in a globalising and 
increasingly knowledge-based world requires ﬁ  rms 
to focus even more on science, technology and inno-
vation in order to master the transition from resource 
based to knowledge-based manufacturing. Enabling 
technologies such as information and communica-
tion technologies, micro-systems, advanced mate-
rials, and bio-technologies and nano-technologies, 
will play a crucial role in maintaining technological 
leadership for Europe. Key is in particular the perva-
sive diffusing capacity of these technologies, which 
potentially affects future competitiveness across a 
wide array of sectors. 
The transition from resource-based to knowledge-
based manufacturing will also make knowledge and 
skills absolutely crucial to future growth and com-
petitiveness. Among these, particularly soft-skills 
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become more and more important as organisations 
are progressively globally networked while non-tech-
nological innovation, predominantly organisational 
innovation, bears added signiﬁ  cance on maintaining 
and improving competitiveness, both as an enabler 
and facilitator of technological innovation and in its 
own right.
In response to these challenges, new manufacturing 
paradigms are emerging, not only in Europe but also 
in Japan, on how manufacturing can transform and 
reinvent itself so as to face the future in a sustainable 
way. These paradigms often call for fundamentally 
different ways of production in view of an increas-
ing scarcity of non-renewable energy and natural 
resources as well as climate change. In addition, 
these paradigms champion the adoption of mass 
customisation, more and better quality services, 
more networking and collaboration and embracing 
globalisation.
On the shop ﬂ  oor, the new manufacturing paradigms 
will call for, and be transposed into, new or modiﬁ  ed 
business models, for which four major trends can be 
identiﬁ  ed. Firstly, large businesses become less verti-
cally integrated as they increasingly manage global 
production networks (e.g. car manufacturers). Sec-
ondly, together with mass-customisation a transition 
from products to services is observed, with manufac-
turing ﬁ  rms increasingly providing add-on services 
to their traditional products (e.g. photocopier manu-
facturers). Thirdly, ﬁ  rms increasingly diffuse intellec-
tual property (IP) beyond company and even coun-
try boundaries, as innovation becomes more open 
(e.g. ICT companies and open innovation leaders). 
Lastly, in particular small businesses have to compete 
in manufacturing networks and collaborate openly 
to address market challenges.
Future societal developments and consumer behav-
iour will also signiﬁ  cantly shape the setting for indus-
tries and ﬁ  rms. Thus an aging society is likely to induce 
demand shifts for both public and private goods and 
services. Furthermore, the decline of the labour force 
may induce skill shortages at a time when there is a 
growing need for skills. Environmental concerns are 
likewise important for the future of manufacturing in 
that the regulatory framework will have to respond 
to these concerns by becoming more stringent.
Much will depend on the ability of European man-
ufacturing ﬁ   rms to capitalise on the opportunities 
that global challenges, such as ageing and climate 
change, represent. Since Europe needs to address 
them early on, there is a real opportunity for estab-
lishing lead market positions in products linked to 
health care, convenience, leisure and entertainment. 
While the global response to climate change remains 
uncertain, energy efﬁ  ciency and recycling potential 
will be important value attributes. More generally, 
technologies that permit to operate within much 
stringer environmental constraints than today will 
offer lead market opportunities.
It is possible to push the analysis further by feeding 
the trends and drivers identiﬁ  ed in the review of the 
foresight literature into more quantitative, model 
based scenarios. The value of the latter is purely 
indicative as the number of possible scenarios is inﬁ  -
nite, however, considering alternative futures permits 
to be better prepared for unforeseen circumstances. 
By using a general equilibrium model to build the 
scenarios, those are made internally consistent. More 
importantly, this approach permits to evaluate the 
impact of policies that aim at improving the general 
framework conditions for competitiveness and their 
relative importance.
The two scenarios discussed differ across all the driv-
ers of change discussed above; to summarise them, 
scenario I is characterised by slower globalisation 
and technological progress processes and a slower 
growth of manufacturing production than in sce-
nario II. It results in a relatively larger European share 
in global production while in scenario II the geo-
graphical centre of global manufacturing production 
shifts to Asia.
The policies considered are:
• upgrading  skills
•   better regulation and less administrative burdens 
for ﬁ  rms
•  R&D and innovation policies
•   A strong competitive Single Market, including 
competition
• environmental  policies
Their individual impact on GDP by 2025 is in the 
range of 0.5-0.6% (skills14) to3.0-3.5% (R&D), with 
the other structural policies in-between. Their cumu-
lative impact amounts to around 8% (scenario I) to 
9% (scenario II). 
If the differences between the two scenarios in the 
macro effects of the individual structural policies are 
minor, the same cannot be said for their at sector 
level impact. As globalisation is an important driver 
that affects particular industries in different ways. 
The sectors which are already most open for inter-
national trade are also the ones mostly affected. 
These include textiles and wearing apparel, wood 
14     The policy modelled is the achievement of the targets adopted in 2004 
for 2010 (10% maximum of early school leavers, at least 85% of 2 years 
olds with upper secondary education, 20% reduction of 15 years olds 
with low reading literacy achieving , at least 12.5% participation in Life-
long Learning and 15% increase of S&T graduates). Their economic 
effect will increase very gradually only, as successive, better educated 
cohorts enter the work force.
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and other manufacturing, chemicals, rubber and 
plastics, electronic equipment, transport equipment 
and other machinery and equipment. Overall, the 
sectors food products and pulp, paper and publish-
ing are less inﬂ  uenced. These are sectors which are 
more domestically oriented, less R&D intensive and 
face less technological progress. Europe has no com-
parative advantages in textiles and wearing apparel, 
electronic equipment and basic metals. Chemicals, 
rubber and plastics, transport equipment and other 
transport and equipment will be the important man-
ufacturing sectors in Europe.
Of the structural policies fed into the model, improv-
ing skills, reducing the administrative burden and 
increasing energy efﬁ  ciency, have the least impact 
on manufacturing. R&D and innovation policies 
and strengthening the internal market on the other 
hand have the strongest and most positive impact 
on manufacturing. In the coming decades Europe’s 
share in global manufacturing production and trade 
will decrease more slowy. The structural policies 
decelerate further the relative decline trend of manu-
facturing in Europe, such that in some manufactur-
ing sectors such as chemicals, rubber and plastics, 
and combined machinery and equipment sectors 
the trend is almost cancelled out. In terms of the EU 
share in world production, in the absence of struc-
tural policies, under both scenarios, there is no sector 
where EU maintains its relative importance by 2025. 
In the presence of policies (i.e. achievement of tar-
gets) sectors such as transport equipment, wood and 
other manufacturing, energy carriers, Research and 
development services, chemicals, rubber and plas-
tics; transport services and other business services 
maintain or almost maintain, their global share.
All in all, the analysis suggests that the European 
manufacturing industry will still play a major glo-
bal role in a context where the crucial assets will be 
knowledge and the skills to manage it. Indeed, many 
sectors will be able to maintain their global share 
in this, much bigger than today, market. While the 
negative trends concerning manufacturing employ-
ment and the share of manufacturing in the total 
economy will certainly continue, these trends must 
not be confounded with stagnation or decline as 
new opportunities emerge and are exploited.
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Introduction
This is the tenth edition of the Commission’s Euro-
pean Competitiveness Report since the 1994 Indus-
try Council Resolution that established its basis. Com-
petitiveness in this Report is understood to mean a 
sustained rise in the standards of living of a nation 
or region and as low a level of involuntary unem-
ployment as possible. Maintaining and improving its 
position in the global market is the main competi-
tiveness criterion at the level of an industrial sector.
As in previous years, the Report approaches the 
issues from the point of view of economic theory 
and empirical research and its ambition is to con-
tribute to policy making by bringing to attention 
relevant trends and developments and by discussing 
analytically the likely outcomes of the various pol-
icy options. Its main subjects continue to be topics 
related to productivity, as the most reliable indicator 
for competitiveness over the longer term, develop-
ments regarding manufacturing industry and other 
microeconomic issues of the Strategy for Jobs and 
Growth.
Recent developments bring some good news, such 
as the end of the trend of a widening productivity 
gap with the US, taken as a benchmark of frontier 
productivity performance (Chapter 1). In addition, 
although hardly a new development, convergence 
among Member States in the form of productivity 
catching up continues. Reviewing trade performance 
brings in more good news: in spite of sometimes 
gloomy perceptions. Europe has, in general held its 
own in global markets. In addition, there is a positive 
relation between market openness and productivity 
growth, a message that merits to be underlined.
However, when levels of productivity are consid-
ered, Europe has still a long way to go. Taking into 
account the sectoral dimension conﬁ  rms that this is 
not so much a question of economic structure but of 
lower productivity in some important sectors such 
as air transport and retailing. The sectoral analysis 
also underscores the central role of Total Factor Pro-
ductivity (TFP) in explaining this gap, i.e. the part 
of productivity growth which must be assigned to 
factors such as technical and organisational progress, 
and cannot be attributed to improved labour quality 
or increase capital intensity.
The policies most directly relevant to TFP growth are 
those covered by the microeconomic pillar of the 
Lisbon strategy (Chapter 2): those fostering tech-
nological progress, the use of ICT, competition and 
product markets reform and infrastructures but, also, 
the quality of human capital. Coordinated action in 
these areas produces, in most cases, superior beneﬁ  ts 
to acting alone as an empirical analysis of spillovers 
from reforms conﬁ  rms. In general, Member States 
have made notable progress in engaging reforms in 
the microeconomic pillar, which adds to the good 
news, even if these reforms are not yet fully trans-
lated in the data that measure performance.
Against this background, it is worth noting that skills 
contribute directly to international competitiveness 
and productivity (Chapter 3) while skills upgrading 
is under way in all economic sectors, even in low-
skill ones. Incidentally, the latter is good news too, 
because it points to higher competitiveness and 
higher real incomes. However, imbalances such as 
skill shortages may occur in the short term, indicat-
ing that policies also have a role to play to smooth 
transition.
Competitiveness is a multifaceted target for which 
no single and fully comprehensive measure exists. 
To form a comprehensive picture, the Competitive-
ness Report assesses the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of European industries with respect to the var-
ious dimensions of performance, such as the growth 
of value added, employment, labour and multifactor 
productivity, international trade, and foreign direct 
investments (Chapter 4).
Taking the long view (Chapter 5) indicates that 
Europe, whilst still among the richest regions on a 
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GDP per capita basis, will most probably be passed 
by some of the emerging economies in terms of size. 
By 2050 Asia will most likely have become the most 
important market and pole of growth. It is worth not-
ing that long term projections, as speculative as they 
may be, likewise conﬁ  rm the role of TFP as the most 
important source of growth. Moreover, the future 
holds the promise that the European manufacturing 
industry will still play a major global role in a con-
text where the crucial assets will be knowledge and 
the skills to manage it. Indeed, many sectors seem to 
be able to maintain their global share in this, much 
bigger than today, market. However, the negative 
trends concerning manufacturing employment and 
the share of manufacturing in the total economy will 
continue. These trends must not be confounded with 
stagnation or decline. To a certain extent, they result 
from normal developments and reﬂ  ect the effect of 
different productivity growth rates and income elas-
ticities of demand for goods and services.
Of real concern, over the longer term, would be a 
growing differential in productivity growth with our 
main competitors. While such a gap persists today 
compared to the US, it is not a fatality. In fact, poli-
cies count and haven proven to do so. For instance, 
achieving the Lisbon targets in R&D, skills, admin-
istrative costs or making the Internal Market more 
effective, under alternative scenarios about the future, 
consistently brings in more favourable outcomes in 
terms of wealth generation and international com-
petitiveness. At the same time, these results are in 
line with the improved performance of the European 
economy that we can currently observe and that, 
most probably, can in part be attributed to recent 
reform efforts.
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A: General developments
Chapter 1. Key facts about 
competitiveness developments: 
growth, employment and 
productivity
1.1. Introduction
This chapter reviews recent developments of the 
European economy. The main point is the conﬁ  r-
mation of the encouraging signs already seen in last 
year’s report. The following section (Section 2) gives 
the big picture, the evolution of the main economic 
variables at country level that describe the current 
momentum of the European economies, i.e. growth, 
standards of living, employment and productivity. 
Section 3 focuses on the sources of the productivity 
gap between the EU and the US. Section 4 examines 
the sectoral dimension of these variables at EU level, 
presenting the contribution of the different sectors of 
the economy to the main macroeconomic develop-
ments. Finally, Section 5 explores some aspects of the 
relationship between globalisation and productivity.
1.2.   Recent macroeconomic developments: 
the big picture
1.2.1.  Economic growth and standards of living
The EU remains since mid 2005 on a brisk growth 
path, after having overcome a severe slow-down in 
2002 (see Graph 1.1). The real growth rates of the 
EU-27 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were both in 
the last quarter of 2006 3.5% year-on-year) and in the 
whole year (3.0%) the highest since the year 2000.
GDP per capita is a common indicator of the stand-
ards of living. In 2006, the growth rate of GDP per 
capita was higher in the EU-27 (2.6%) than in the 
United States (2.3%, see Table 1.1). In 2006 growth 
accelerated in 22 of the 27 Member States, com-
pared to the period 2000-2005, bringing the EU’s 
per capita growth at a rate which was nearly as high 
as in the period 1995-2000 (2.7%).
Within the EU, GDP per capita corrected for differ-
ences in price levels, through using purchasing power 
standards, vary from less than 40% of the EU-average 
in Romania and Bulgaria to 270% in Luxembourg. 
Average GDP per capita in the EU is about two thirds 
of that in the US. Most of the economies which have 
a GDP per capita level below the EU average con-
tinued in 2006 their catching up process in terms of 
higher-than-average GDP per capita growth.
1.2.2. Employment
GDP per capita growth is determined by total popu-
lation growth, employment growth and labour pro-
ductivity growth, with the last two components play-
ing the major part. As regards employment growth 
in the EU, the developments since 2000 conﬁ  rm the 
usual time lag of several quarters between overall 
economic growth and employment growth: while a 
strong recovery has taken place since the beginning 
of 2006, a slight upward trend had already been vis-
ible since early 2003 (see Graph 1.1). Employment 
growth in 2006 (1.6%, see Annex Table 1.1) was sig-
niﬁ  cantly stronger than the average during the previ-
ous years (0.5% between 2000 and 2005 and 1.0% 
in the period 1995-2000).
Countries which are catching up in terms of GDP or 
GDP per capita are not generally performing bet-
ter than average in terms of employment. In 2006, 
ﬁ  ve out of the twelve new Member States recorded 
employment growth at rates below the EU-average. 
Half of last year’s real GDP growth rate of 3.0% in 
EU-27 was generated by the increase in employ-
ment and the other half by productivity growth. This 
contrasts with the previous periods 1995-2000 and 
2000-2005 where the contributions from employ-
ment were clearly lower than those from productiv-
ity. This development seems to reﬂ  ect a change in 
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terms of the employment content of growth. Under 
unchanged policies it will however not be sustain-
able, given the growth dampening impacts of the 
long-term demographic developments.
The largely positive developments in employment 
are also reﬂ  ected in an improving employment rate, 
which reached in last year 64.4% in EU-27 (in EU-
15 it amounted to 66%, see Graph 1.2 and Annex 
Table 1.1). It is particularly the increase by one per-
centage point between 2005 and 2006 which is 
promising, while the improvement between 2000 
and 2006 by only 2 percentage points is rather 
moderate and indicates that reaching the EU’s 70% 
target by 2010 is unlikely. Due to the simultane-
ous decrease by around 2 percentage points of the 
US employment rate since the year 2000, the gap 
between the EU and the US could be signiﬁ  cantly 
reduced from about twelve to seven and a half per-
centage points.
1.2.3. Productivity
The growth of labour productivity i.e. output per per-
son employed – the other main component of GDP 
per-capita growth – picked up in the EU and in the 
majority of the Member States in 2006 compared to 
the ﬁ  rst half of this decade (1.5% vs. 1.2%, see Table 
1.2 and Graph 1.3). Productivity and employment 
growth accelerated simultaneously in 2006 for the 
ﬁ  rst time since 1997. On a quarterly basis, a distinct 
upswing of productivity growth can be noticed since 
mid 2005, and a slight upward trend since mid 2002 
(as shown by Graph 1.1). The recent increase is tak-
ing place in a context of positive investment growth 
and continued structural reforms in the Member 
States. It has to be noted also that the enhanced pro-
ductivity growth is underpinned by an accelerating 
growth of total factor productivity, i.e. the part of 
productivity growth that cannot be assigned to an 
easily measurable factor such as capital deepening or 
improved labour quality, but must be attributed to 
less tangible factors such as technical and organisa-
tional progress. In fact, the total factor productivity 
component grew last year by 1.1%, which represents 
an increase compared to previous ﬁ  ve-year averages 
2000-2005 (0.6%) and 1995-2005 (0.9%).
These developments and the fact that EU-27 pro-
ductivity growth was last year for the ﬁ  rst  time 
since 2001 higher than in the US15 are encourag-
ing. In terms of productivity levels, productivity in 
the US remains much higher. Expressed as GDP per 
employed person, US productivity is 38.6% higher 
than in the EU. The productivity gap is lower when 
expressed in terms of GDP per hour worked (26% in 
2005). Importantly, nearly all Member States with 
relatively low GDP per capita and productivity levels 
and all new Member States are catching up in terms 
15   However, the deceleration of US productivity growth in 2006 contributed 
more in this result than the corresponding acceleration in the EU.
Graph 1.1: GDP, employment and productivity growth in the EU-27
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Table 1.1: GDP per capita growth & per capita GDP level 
Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita (*)
2006 GDP per 
capita (in pps; 
EU-27=100) (**) 1995 – 2000  2000 – 2005  2006
Austria 2.8 0.9  2.7   127.8
Belgium   2.5  1.0  2.6   122.7
Bulgaria   -0.2  6.7  6.6   36.4
Cyprus   2.5  1.4  2.1   91.9
Czech Republic   1.6  3.7  5.9   78.9
Denmark   2.4  1.0  2.9   126.9
Estonia  6.7   8.6   11.6   67.6
Finland   4.5  2.3  5.0   117.5
France   2.4  0.8  1.4   111.0
Germany   1.9  2.0  0.9   108
Greece   2.9  4.1  4.0   88.5
Hungary   4.3  4.6  4.1   65.8
Ireland   9.2  3.4  3.4   145.3
Italy   1.9  0.1  1.4   103.4
Latvia  6.4   8.9 12.5   55.4
Lithuania   5.4  8.3  8.1   57.0
Luxembourg   4.7  2.2  5.2   267.3
Malta  3.9  -0.3   2.3   74.3
Netherlands   3.4  0.7  2.7   130.5
Poland  5.6   3.1 5.9   53.3
Portugal   3.7  0.1  0.9   73.2
Romania   -1.0  6.5  7.9   37.4
Slovakia   3.3  4.6  8.2   62.6
Slovenia   4.4  3.3  4.8   86.9
Spain   3.6  1.7  2.3   101.4
Sweden   3.1  2.0  3.8   120.7
United Kingdom   2.9  2.0  2.2   121.7
EU-27   2.7  1.4  2.6   100.0
US   2.9  1.4  2.3   153.4
Note: (*)   The GDP per capita measured is in prices of 2000. The ﬁ  gures represent the average annual growth rates between 
the GDP levels of the ﬁ  rst and the last years.
 ( **)   pps = purchasing power standards.
Source: Ameco, May 2007.
of productivity growth, which indicates an improve-
ment in their competitiveness. While productivity 
growth accelerated much more in Germany than in 
the other ﬁ  ve large EU economies, growth rates of 
more than 3% were recorded only in the new Mem-
ber States and Finland. However, the level of produc-
tivity per hour worked (the data for Romania are not 
available) is still particularly low in Bulgaria (30% of 
EU-25 average), the Baltic States (between 40 and 
45%) and Poland (45%).
Graph 1.4 shows that the trend decline in productivity 
growth which could be observed since the second half 
of the 1990s stopped in the second half of the year 
2003. While the reasons underpinning the widening 
of the EU-US productivity gap over the last decade 
were structural, it is still too early to say whether this 
recent change is the product of purely cyclical devel-
opments or the ﬁ  rst manifestation of a new pattern.
Analysis by the Commission services16 indicates that, 
while the upturn is essentially cyclical in nature, it is 
likely that there is also a structural component linked 
with past structural reforms enacted by EU Member 
States, especially in the labour market. Sectoral pro-
ductivity gains, such as in network industries, and 
the increase of skill levels in the work force would 
also support such a view.
16   See  EU Economy Review 2007 and related Communication “Moving 
Europe’s productivity frontier”, forthcoming.
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Graph 1.2: Employment rates in the EU
Note:   Employment rates are deﬁ  ned as the number of persons in employment aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population 
of the same age. EU-15 and EU-27 data for 2005 and 2006 are provisional.


























 2000  2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006
Target rate set at Lisbon for 2010
Graph 1.3: Average annual labour productivity growth per person employed
Note: For the period 2000-2005 the average annual growth rate is presented.
Source: AMECO, May 2007.
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Table 1.2: Growth of real labour productivity per person employed & 2006 levels of GDP per person 
employed (ppe) and GDP per hour worked (phw)
EU-27









(**) 1995 – 2000 2000 – 2005 2006
Austria 2.2 1.0 1.9 120.3 97.8
Belgium 1.6 0.9 1.9 134.0 127.5
Bulgaria -0.6 3.9 3.6 34.5 30.3
Cyprus 2.6 0.1 2.3 84.3 68.0
Czech Republic 2.3 3.4 4.7 70.4 52.5
Denmark 1.8 1.3 1.3 108.2 100.3
Estonia 8.2 7.2 5.5 63.1 45.0
Finland 4.3 4.0 5.8 112.6 95.5
France 1.5 0.8 1.1 122.7 115.9
Germany 2.2 1.4 2.3 106.6 108.5
Greece 2.8 3.3 2.7 103.3 74.6
Hungary 2.9 4.1 3.0 75.1 55.1
Ireland 4.4 2.2 1.7 134.1 119.7
Italy 1.1 -0.1 0.2 108.7 88.2
Latvia 5.9 6.4 7.0 52.2 40.3
Lithuania 5.9 6.8 5.7 57.6 45.3
Luxembourg 1.9 0.0 2.4 171.3 162.0
Malta 3.8 -0.5 2.0 86.4 72.9
Netherlands 1.5 1.5 1.8 113.6 120.0
Poland 5.8 3.6 2.4 61.6 45.1
Portugal 2.2 0.4 0.5 66.4 58.8
Romania 0.6 6.4 4.7 41.5 #N/A
Slovakia 4.8 3.0 4.0 70.0 58.4
Slovenia 0.6 6.4 4.7 83.3 69.6
Spain 0.3 0.5 0.8 99.6 87.1
Sweden 2.4 1.7 4.0 110.0 101.5
United Kingdom 2.4 2.0 2.6 112.5 98.8
EU-25 1.9 1.2 1.5 103.6 100.0
EU-27 2.1 1.2 1.5 100.0 #N/A
US 2.1 2.1 1.4 138.6 #N/A
Note:   (*)   The relative levels of GDP per person employed and per hour worked have been calculated on the base of purchasing 
power standards.
 ( **) Dta for Romania, the US and EU-27 are not available.
Source: AMECO. May 2007.
1.3.   Sources of the productivity gap 
between the EU and the US
As seen above, the productivity per person 
employed is about 39% higher in the US than in 
the EU. Regarding productivity per hour worked, 
the latest available comparable ﬁ  gures for the US 
(2005) indicate a gap of 26%. The gap per person 
employed is higher than the one per hour worked, 
because the number of hours worked per person 
employed is on average higher in the US than in 
the EU. This now raises the question of the sources 
regarding the gap in terms of productivity per hour 
worked.
A productivity gap per hour worked can be bro-
ken down17 into differences with respect to capital 
intensity, labour quality and total factor productiv-
ity: while capital intensity measures the capital stock 
17    A detailed quantiﬁ  ed growth accounting has been carried out for the 
period 2000-2005 by the Commission services in the framework of 
a working group of the Economic Policy Committee (working group 
of the Economic and Finance Council of the European Union). Brussels, 
6 March 2007, ECFIN/EPC(2007)REP/51206.
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Graph 1.4: Productivity growth in the EU-27
Note:   GDP per person employed. Growth compared to the same quarter of the previous year. The line represents a moving 










































per hour worked, the quality of labour is captured by 
the educational attainment of those employed and 
total factor productivity (which indicates progress 
in terms of technological progress, knowledge and 
organisational changes) is a residual between total 
hourly labour productivity and the ﬁ  rst two compo-
nents. The computation of such a breakdown reveals 
that the EU has a negative gap compared to the US 
with regard to labour quality and total factor pro-
ductivity, with the latter much more important than 
the former, whereas capital intensity contributes 
towards closing the gap. The relatively high contri-
bution of capital accumulation in Europe is reﬂ  ecting 
to a certain extent its underutilisation of labour.
It is of high relevance for the EU economic policies 
to know that most of the labour productivity gap is 
caused by total factor productivity, while the qual-
ity of labour play a signiﬁ  cant but secondary part. 
Although there is no need to catch up quantitatively 
in terms of capital stock, more developed analysis is 
required to analyse the “quality” of capital stock and 
the possible existence of quality gap with the US.
In order to complete the picture on the sources of the 
EU productivity growth gap to the US, the considera-
tions on the respective levels and their sources need to 
be complemented by a comparison of the respective 
growth rates and their components. In this regard, it 
has ﬁ  rst to be observed that the growth rates of hourly 
productivity were in the period 2000-2005 on average 
0.6 percentage points lower in the EU than in the US, as 
illustrated by Graph 1.5, so that the existing gap regard-
ing the hourly productivity has obviously even widened 
since the year 2000. The growth gap is overwhelmingly 
generated by total factor productivity (growth gap of 
0.8 percentage points) while the growth difference in 
terms of capital accumulation is only slightly negative 
and the one on labour quality is even positive (which 
shows a catching up process of the EU in this ﬁ  eld).
While the absolute numbers in a growth accounting 
framework depend heavily on the speciﬁ  cation cho-
sen, there is no doubt that the EU has a comparative 
deﬁ  cit regarding the level of total factor productivity 
and that this deﬁ  cit has even signiﬁ  cantly widened 
between 2000 and 2005. On the positive side, the 
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acceleration of total factor productivity growth in 
the EU in 2006 (see Section 1.2.3) and the catching-
up process in terms of the quality of labour provide 
some encouraging signals.
The economic policy implications deriving from these 
observations are that the EU policies tackling total 
factor productivity, such as ICT, research, innova-
tion, competition, product market reform and better 
regulation policies, should be prioritised. They have 
obviously a high potential impact on overall labour 
productivity and the room for improvement regard-
ing this component is particularly high, as shown by 
the comparison to the US. 
1.4.   Growth, employment and productivity 
at sector level
The objective of this section is to review the contribu-
tion of the different sectors (from agriculture through 
non-market services) to GDP, employment and labour 
productivity growth, over the period 1995-2005 and 
to look into some aspects of the labour productivity 
differential between the EU and the US. Contrary to 
Chapter 4 of this Report, which carries out an in-depth 
analysis of the performance of European manufactur-
ing over the same period, the emphasis of the present 
section is on the latest developments.
1.4.1.  Economic growth seen from the sectors 
As seen in Section 2, the EU economy decelerated in 
2000-2005 relative to the second half of the 1990s. 
This deceleration is common to all sectors, with a 
Graph 1.5: Decomposition of average hourly productivity growth 2000-2005















few exceptions: health and social work; electricity, 
gas and water supply; construction; and education 
(Graph 1.6). In 2006 a change seems to take place, 
as growth, employment and labour productivity 
show a recovery relative to the previous years.
GDP growth in the EU is concentrated in a few sec-
tors, which account for a large share of total growth 
(Graph 1.7). Particularly, the role of services sectors in 
EU growth is substantial. Among manufacturing, only 
two sectors (electrical and optical equipment and 
chemicals) can be mentioned, even if their contribu-
tion to GDP growth is much lower than the one of 
the top sectors. The uneven contribution of manufac-
turing and services to GDP growth, and particularly 
the modest contribution of manufacturing sectors, 
is explained, to a large extent, by the substantially 
lower share of these sectors in the economy.
As indicated above, all manufacturing sectors, with 
the exception of tobacco, exhibit substantially 
higher growth rates in 2006, thus contributing to 
the up-turn in EU growth in the last year (Graph 1.8). 
Even textiles and clothing, two sectors with nega-
tive growth over the last decade, have improved 
their performance, although they still show negative 
growth rates in 200618.
18   In this section sectoral developments are tracked using two data sources, 
namely National Accounts and shor-term indicators (production and 
employment monthly indexes). The two are complementary in that 
National Accounts covers all sectors in the economy (from agriculture to 
non-market services) over 1995-2005, although for a relatively aggregate 
sectoral classiﬁ  cation (sections and sub-sections of NACE Rev.1 nomen-
clature of economic activities: 1 and 2 digit alphabetical codes respec-
tively). Short-term indicators cover 1995-mid 2007 with monthly data for 
a more detailed list of sectors (divisions, two digits, of NACE Rev.1).
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Graph 1.6: EU-27 value added growth 1995-2005
Source: calculated with Eurostat data.
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Graph 1.7: Contribution of sectors to EU GDP growth, 2001-2005
Source: calculated with Eurostat data.
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Graph 1.8: Annual growth rate of production of manufacturing sectors, 2001-2005 and 2006
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Although positive, EU employment growth in 2000-
2005 was lower than in 1995-2000 (Section 2). At 
sectoral level, most of the employment growth is 
explained by the performance of a small number of 
sectors (Graph 1.9). Business services, health and social 
work and wholesale and retail trade account for more 
than 80% of total employment growth over 1995-
2005. Manufacturing sectors contribute negatively, 
with the only exception of transport equipment.
The latest employment developments by sector, 
including 2006, can be measured only for manufac-
turing sectors. Contrary to what is seen in value added 
growth, employment shows a mixed picture, with 
much variation across sectors and time. However, in 
2006 employment in manufacturing improves, with 
higher growth rates than in the previous ﬁ  ve years 
(2000-2005) and even positive growth rates in sectors 
like instruments, metal products, electrical and non-
electrical machinery, and recycling (Graph 1.10).
1.4.3.   Productivity at sector level – recent evolution 
of the EU-US productivity gap
As for the whole of the economy, labour productivity 
decelerated in nearly all sectors of the economy in 
the ﬁ  rst have of the 2000s but recovers in 200619, in 
which growth rates are signiﬁ  cantly higher than in 
2000-2005 and even than in 1995-2000 (Graph 1.11). 
In general, the strongest growth in labour productiv-
ity takes place in manufacturing sectors. The services 
sectors that have above-the-average growth rates 
in 2000-2005 are electricity, gas and water supply, 
ﬁ   nancial intermediation, and wholesale and retail 
trade (data for all sectors can be found in Table 4.1, 
Chapter 4, for the period 1995-2004).
Sector level data from the EU KLEMS data set20 give 
some additional insights in the comparison of pro-
ductivity developments between the EU and US. For 
instance, they conﬁ   rm that the lower labour pro-
ductivity growth in the EU economy in the period 
1995-2004 and the two sub-periods considered, is 
due mainly to the poorer performance in labour pro-
19   Like for other indicators of sectoral growth in this section, labour pro-
ductivity developments for manufacturing sectors at two digit level of 
NACE Rev.1, covering up to 2006, are based on indexes of production 
and employment from Eurostat. Labour productivity calculated in this 
way tracks closely the more usual measure “value added per person 
employed”. Over the period 1995-2005 the two series show a similar 
proﬁ   le over time and the correlation coefﬁ   cient between the annual 
growth rates is 0.93.
20   The EU KLEMS database is the result of a three year, European Commis-
sion funded research project involving 16 European research institutes, 
which has recently become available for free public use at http://www.EU 
KLEMS.net. See Timmer et al (2007) for further details on the construc-
tion of the database.
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Graph 1.9: Contribution of sectors to total employment growth rate 2001-2005
Source: calculated with Eurostat data.
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Graph 1.10: Manufacturing employment annual growth rate 1995-2000 and 2006
Source: calculated with Eurostat data.
Recycling










Machinery & equipment n.e.c.
Chemicals
Printing & publishing
Pulp & paper products
Non-metallic mineral products
Mineral oil refining & nuclear fuel
Basic metals
Tobacco





-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2006
2001-2005
ld711576Int.indd   32 ld711576Int.indd   32 19/12/07   13:15:41 19/12/07   13:15:4133
Chapter 1. Key facts about competitiveness developments: growth, employment and productivity
Graph 1.11: Labour productivity annual growth (%) 2000-2005 and 2006
Source: calculated with Eurostat data.
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ductivity growth in EU sectors and not to the sectoral 
composition of the economy (industry mix), which 
exerts a slightly positive inﬂ   uence in the results 
(Graph 1.12)21.
The use of average annual growth rates in the two 
periods 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 is to a certain 
extent dictated by data availability regarding the EU. 
By focusing on manufacturing alone, one can obtain 
a ﬁ  ner view of developments over time and an indi-
cation of what might be happening in the near past 
by using short term indicators.
Graph 1.13 presents the evolution of the EU-US 
productivity level gap in industry, estimated with 
monthly production data, between January 1995 
21   The graph is based on the following simple decomposition of the labour 







eu;, where: Lp = labour productivity 
growth; SH = sectoral share in the total number of hours worked; i = sec-
tor. Relative to the US, sectoral performance measures the contribution 
to the EU-US gap of the different growth in labour productivity by sector. 
Industrial structure captures the effect of the different industry shares. 
The source used is EU KLEMS. EU labour productivity growth for “com-
puters and ofﬁ  ce machinery” and “electronic valves and tubes” has been 
calculated using the deﬂ  ator for France. This does not affect substantially 
the aggregated results because of the low share of these sectors in the 
economy. Yet the estimate of labour productivity growth in these sectors 
varies signiﬁ  cantly with the deﬂ  ator chosen.
and June 200722. It can be seen that the deterioration 
of the gap had already started at the beginning of 
the period but seems to have stabilised since 2003.
Manufacturing accounts for a small part of the EU 
total economy (17%). Yet the productivity perform-
ance of manufacturing is of interest in tracking devel-
opments in the whole economy. Indeed, Graph 1.14 
shows the labour productivity growth in manufac-
turing and in the economy at large exhibit a similar 
proﬁ  le (smoother for the whole economy, although 
productivity growth rates are, in general, higher 
in manufacturing. Manufactured goods are more 
tradable than services; the sector is more exposed 
to international competition, and more intensive in 
R&D. Therefore, productivity developments in man-
ufacturing are a good indicator for capturing the 
capacity of the economy to react and adjust to glo-
balisation challenges. This should not, however, shift 
the attention from the fact that productivity increase 
in services industries (72% of EU GDP) is crucial to 
improve competitiveness of the EU economy as a 
whole.
22    The series is calculated by applying labour productivity growth in “min-
ing, manufacturing and energy” to the gap in absolute values in 2000. 
The latter is calculated from the comparison for 1999-2001 presented in 
O’Mahony and van Ark (2003) for manufacturing in EU-14.
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Graph 1.12: Decomposition of the EU-US differential in labour productivity growth between 
sectoral performance and sectoral composition (structure) of the economy, 1995-2004
Source: calculated from EU KLEMS data.







Graph 1.13: EU labour productivity in industry(*) (US = 100), January 1995 – June 2007
Note: (*) Mining, manufacturing and energy.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ld711576Int.indd   34 ld711576Int.indd   34 19/12/07   13:15:43 19/12/07   13:15:4335
Chapter 1. Key facts about competitiveness developments: growth, employment and productivity
Graph 1.14: Labour productivity growth in manufacturing and the whole economy






























Growth rates (Graph 1.15) explain this development 
in EU-US industry productivity: since 2003 labour pro-
ductivity growth rates in the US have been decreas-
ing, while they were increasing in the EU23. Although 
labour productivity growth is still higher in the US, 
the relative performance of the EU improves steadily 
during these years. In other words, the growth dif-
ferential in favour of the US decreases and becomes 
negligible at the end of 2006.
However, this does not necessarily show a structural 
change in the EU performance relative to the US. 
As a matter of fact, US labour productivity growth 
leads EU’s and the lag in EU’s productivity growth 
explains partially the convergence in growth rates 
observed in the second half of the Graph. Yet, there 
is some persistence in labour productivity growth 
in the EU, which, nevertheless, might have attained 
a maximum at the beginning of 200724. The inﬂ  u-
ence of the business cycle on the relative labour 
productivity developments is shown in Graph 1.16, 
23   For each area the graph shows the growth rates calculated from both 
the original series and the trend series. The latter is obtained using the 
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁ  lter.
24   The interpretation of the latest data shown in the graph should be done 
cautiously due to the end-of-sample problem that characterizes the 
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁ  lter. 
which presents the growth differential25 in GDP and 
manufacturing labour productivity between the EU 
and the US, where, with the exception of the period 
2001-2003, the differential in GDP growth is mir-
rored closely by the differential in labour productiv-
ity growth. The correlation coefﬁ  cient between the 
two series is 0.32.
1.5. Globalisation  and  productivity
Openness increases productivity. By expanding 
exports, ﬁ  rms learn new technologies to compete in 
foreign markets and they could reduce unit produc-
tion prices from the expansion in production result-
ing from exports. Imports expose domestic ﬁ  rms to 
greater competition and forces less productive ﬁ  rms 
out of the market. More competitive ﬁ  rms can then 
better compete in international markets. Access to 
foreign inputs also improves the product mix of 
intermediate inputs raising productivity at the ﬁ  rm 
level. Foreign inputs could furthermore be of supe-
rior quality relative to domestic inputs resulting in 
another channel through which imports impact 
productivity. Imports could in addition provide an 
25   Growth differential in GDP and labour productivity is expressed as the 
growth rate in the EU minus the growth rate in US. Growth rates are 
calculated on quarterly data between “t-4” and “t”.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 1. Key facts about competitiveness developments: growth, employment and productivity
important access to new technology embodied in 
goods and services. The increase in productivity 
improves a country’s international competitiveness 
in price and quality boosting its exports.
Although not a new phenomenon the current wave 
of globalisation has enhanced the role of interna-
tional competition, i.e. competition from abroad 
and competition abroad, in determining a country’s 
prosperity measured by its productivity growth. The 
acceleration of globalisation in the last decades is 
illustrated by Graph 1.17, presenting the increases 
of trade openness across countries and regions 
between 1995 and 2005 and Graph 1.18 present-
ing Foreign Direct Investment stocks compared to 
GDP. Trade openness has increased by 8 percent-
age points in the EU-15 despite its size, and in the 
EU-10 by 34.5 pp. The ﬁ  gure shows the brisk pace 
of China’s integration into the world economy, dou-
bling its trade openness in only ten years. In fact, 
China’s contribution to world-wide growth in the 
more recent past has been impressive. China’s share 
in global output has risen from 1.7% in 1990 to 5% 
in 2005. Since 2000, the country has contributed 
about one third to overall worldwide GDP growth.
The increasing trade openness has been accompa-
nied by a strong rise in foreign direct investment 
Graph 1.17: Trade Openness, 1995-2005
Note: Exports and imports over GDP. China excludes Hong Kong. (*) EAC is East Asian Countries.
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(FDI)26. Graph 1.18 shows the increasing stocks of 
inward and outward FDI stock as a share of GDP for 
selected countries and regions. The high degree of 
internationalisation of the EU economy (both as a 
home and as a host region) is striking when com-
pared to that of the US. Interestingly, in comparison 
to the large inward FDI stock into China, outward 
FDI stocks from China are still small27. But the rising 
intensity of outward investment activities by Chinese 
enterprises signals a new stage in China’s integration 
to the global economy as Chinese tries to reduce its 
dependence on multinational corporations and is 
becoming a more proactive player28.
Given the growing size of globalisation, its effects on 
a country’s performance are of the utmost impor-
tance. The positive relationship between aggregate 
productivity and globalisation is depicted in Graph 
1.19. The data, covering OECD countries, reveal 
26   In 2005, inﬂ  ows of foreign direct investment rose by 29%. The rise in FDI 
reﬂ  ects cross-border mergers and acquisitions, higher growth in devel-
oped countries as well as strong economic performance in many devel-
oping economies.
27   Given that many large M&A deals by Chinese companies are ﬁ  nanced 
outside China, their outward investment might be underestimated 
(UNCTAD, 2006).
28   The decrease of the FDI stock over GDP ratio (both inward and outward) 
between 2000 and 2005 in China hides the fact that FDI inward stock 
in China increased by 64%, and outward FDI stock by 67%, during the 
same period. 
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Graph 1.18: FDI stocks over GDP, 1990-2000-2005
Note: China excludes Hong Kong. EU ﬁ  gures include intra-EU activity.
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Graph 1.19: Openness and Productivity
Note:   Openness is exports and imports over GDP. Labour productivity is real GDP per worker. Sample includes Australia, Belgium, Can-
ada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, and United States. For most countries 10 years averages are calculated (1960-1970; 1970-1980; 1993-2003). 
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that trade openness and labour productivity tend to 
move together29. A word of caution is needed here 
since while openness may increase productivity, the 
reverse also seems likely. Box 1.2 below summarises 
selected empirical ﬁ  ndings on the causal relationship 
between productivity and globalisation.
The same positive relationship is found when looking 
in detail at more disaggregated sectoral data. Graph 
1.20 plots labour productivity growth in manufac-
turing sectors in the EU against openness, deﬁ  ned as 
the ratio of imports to the value added of the sector, 
over the period 1995-200430. A ﬁ  xed effects panel 
regression of the labour productivity annual growth 
rate on the annual growth rate of the openness of 
each sector (lagged one period) shows a positive 
signiﬁ  cant  coefﬁ   cient for the variable openness31. 
On average, a 1% increase in the openness of the 
economy, as measured by the ratio imports to value 
added, results in an increase of 0.05 percentage 
29   Adding emerging Asian countries (e.g. China, Malaysia, Taiwan, Singa-
pore) reinforces the results. In contrast, in some less-developed African 
and Latin-American countries the relationship is weaker.
30   The graph is based on the stacked data of cross-sections (sectors) and 
time (annual data from 1995 to 2004).
31   The equation estimated is: Labour productivity growth (%) = 3.8 + 0.053 
Openness (-1) growth, with 26 cross-sections (sectors) and 208 observa-
tions. A regression using data for 16 countries over 1962-2003, provides 
an estimate of the same order of magnitude for the elasticity. In this case, 
openness is measured as the ratio (exports + imports)/GDP.
points in the labour productivity growth rate in the 
following year. These results should be taken only as 
a preliminary indication of the effect of the openness 
of the economy on sectoral productivity perform-
ance, as other determinants of labour productivity 
are not included in the regression and higher pro-
ductivity might also lead to more openness32.
Too often, globalisation is associated with job losses 
– or with some undeﬁ  ned and hypothetical opportu-
nities. The resulting social costs and anxiety are real 
and call for appropriate policy response to accom-
pany and anticipate transition. However, they should 
not lead to losing from sight the positive effects that 
opening up and integration into world markets have 
in a country’s economic performance, i.e. productiv-
ity gains from the resulting specialisation, from scale 
effects, from the greater competitive pressures that 
forces less efﬁ  cient ﬁ  rms out of the market, and from 
the greater ability to absorb technological advances 
and new ideas developed in the rest of the world. 
Taken together, these factors suggest that openness 
to trade can play an important role in raising the rate 
of productivity growth of an economy; with the full 
beneﬁ  ts of openness accruing to economies that can 
32   The use of imports as openness indicator should reduce the reverse cau-
sality problem between openness and productivity.
Graph 1.20: Labour productivity growth and openness in EU manufacturing sectors














































Opennes growth rate (%)
ld711576Int.indd   39 ld711576Int.indd   39 19/12/07   13:15:50 19/12/07   13:15:5040
European competitiveness report 2007
easily redeploy factors of production between ﬁ  rms 
as well as from declining to growing industries.
Gains through more efﬁ  cient production 
With the increase in the tradability of services and 
fragmentation of production processes, companies 
can reconﬁ  gure their production to boost their over-
all competitiveness. This has led to global produc-
tion systems and the development of international 
production sharing. While the range of activities 
suitable of international outsourcing has widened, 
the economic logic of these activities are similar to 
the well-known process of declining transportation 
costs which is contributing to increasing the range of 
goods subject to import competition. Once reduced 
to national dominion, the playing ground for reloca-
tion has now become a world wide ground.
Now it is easier for ﬁ  rms to move parts of their pro-
duction to foreign locations-a process referred to as 
offshore outsourcing or, more simply, offshoring. 
Numerous studies have shown the positive impact of 
outsourcing and productivity (see Box 1.1). 
But although international production-sharing is 
an increasing phenomenon, the scale of offshoring 
compared to the economy as a whole is still quite 
limited33. However, trends across regions differ mark-
edly. China, and to a lesser extent the new EU Mem-
ber States and South East Asia, are an important part 
of this process. The share of intermediate imports 
(goods) as a share of total imports in China has 
gone up from around 55% in 1992 to almost 75% 
in 2003. For the EU-10 the increase has not been as 
impressive but it reached almost 5 pp to around 60% 
during the same period. In fact, intermediate goods 
are the largest component of trade by stage of pro-
duction both in China and in the NMS-10 (exports 
of intermediates represented 38% of total exports in 
2003 in China and 54% in NMS-10); and trade deﬁ  -
cits in intermediates has gone up to 8% and 5,7% of 
GDP in China and NMS-10, respectively. In contrast, 
the share of intermediate goods in imports has been 
decreasing continually in Japan, the US and EU-15 
(for the EU-15 by 4pp to 50% in 2003)34, 35.
Gains through technology spillovers
The relocation of production activities also has ben-
eﬁ  ts for the host or insourcing economy. The ben-
33   Imports of intermediate manufacturing and services inputs (excluding 
energy) accounted for about 5 % of gross output in advanced economies 
in 2003( IMF 2007).
34  European Commission (2006).
35    Intermediate goods imported do not represent all activities offshored. 
Excluded are, for example, imports of ﬁ  nal goods used in domestic pro-
duction; imports of ﬁ  nal goods sold under the brand-name of a domestic 
ﬁ  rm; imports of goods that could potentially be produced domestically for 
export purposes but are produced abroad and exported to third markets.
eﬁ  cial effects for the host economy occur through 
a number of channels: imitation via the adoption of 
new production methods or management practices; 
higher competition in the domestic market due to 
the entrance of foreign ﬁ  rms; human capital spillo-
vers; “export-spillovers” through collaboration or 
imitation with the foreign ﬁ  rm so that domestic ﬁ  rms 
learn how to penetrate export markets. Graph 1.21 
depicts the change in the foreign direct investment 
inward output ratio and the change in the labour 
productivity for a sample of selected new Member 
States (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia) and the signiﬁ  cant robust correlation with 
a coefﬁ  cient of 0.51 (p-value of 0.02).
One of the main channels for productivity increases 
in the inshoring country come from technologi-
cal spillovers. Empirical evidence shows that for-
eign-owned ﬁ  rms tend to be more technologically 
advanced than domestic ﬁ   rms and have a higher 
propensity to innovate36. As shown in Graph 1.22 for 
a sample comprising Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia, the share of inno-
vative sales is higher for foreign-owned ﬁ  rms than for 
domestic ones. For these NMS countries, estimates 
from a probit model on the probability that a ﬁ  rm 
introduces a new product or production process 
show that foreign-owned ﬁ  rms are signiﬁ  cantly more 
likely to innovate than domestic ﬁ  rms37. Some stud-
ies suggest that the positive technology spillovers are 
stronger on a vertical, not horizontal level (thus asso-
ciated with intermediate trade and outsourcing). A 
possible explanation for this is that multinationals are 
able to “hide” their new technology from competi-
tors in the same industry but their (vertical) suppli-
ers proﬁ  t from their technology (Gorg and Greena-
way, 2004; Smarzynska 2004). Box 1.1 provides a 
selected summary of empirical studies corroborating 
the positive effects of globalisation via technology 
spillovers. 
1.6. Summary  and  conclusions
In 2006, the EU had its best economic growth per-
formance since 2000, supported by a simultaneous 
acceleration of employment and labour productivity 
growth. At the same time, the productivity growth 
differential vis-à-vis the US, which had bottomed out 
in 2003-2004, turned positive. These very encourag-
ing results, which are also reﬂ  ected at the sector-spe-
ciﬁ  c level, should n distract from the fact that there 
is still a very large productivity gap vis-à-vis the US, 
taken as a benchmark of the technological frontier.
36   Among others, Sinani and Meyer (2004), Gorg and Strobl (2001). 
37   Estimations using Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) micro-aggre-
gated data. Regressors include ownership, education level of work force, 
size, indicators of ﬁ  rm’s openness degree, country and sector dummies.
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Box 1.1: Empirical evidence on the link between Globalisation and Productivity
There are plenty of studies analysing the relationship between productivity and different forms of glo-
balisation. A growing body of empirical work has documented the superior performance characteris-
tics (including productivity) of international ﬁ  rms (i.e. FDI ﬁ  rms, outsourcing ﬁ  rms, exporters, but also 
importers) relative to only-domestic ﬁ  rms. The issue is whether good ﬁ  rms choose to go international 
or whether globalisation improves ﬁ  rm performance. Both theory and empirical evidence show that 
causality goes both ways.
Empirical evidence showing that ﬁ  rms exposed to international competition are different as there seems 
that more productive ﬁ  rms self-select into exporting and outsourcing include, among others, Bernard 
and Jensen (1999) who show that good ﬁ  rms become exporters (but that the beneﬁ  ts of exporting for 
the ﬁ  rm are less clear). Antrás and Helpman (2004) also show how high-productivity ﬁ  rms source over-
seas by engaging in FDI while low-productivity ﬁ  rms acquire domestic intermediates. Kurz (2006) ﬁ  nds 
that outsourcers are “outstanding” performers – larger and more productive organisations. Similarly, 
Tomiura (2007) also shows that international ﬁ  rms in general (FDI ﬁ  rms, outsourcers and exporters) are 
more productive than domestic ﬁ  rms. Muuls and Pisu (2007) ﬁ  nd that a process of self-selection applies 
also to importing ﬁ  rms. 
Overwhelming empirical support is found in the literature for the positive effects that globalisation can 
bring to a country in terms of productivity. Using trade as a proxy for globalisation many studies have 
found the signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  ts of international trade on productivity (e.g. Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), 
Miller and Upadhyay (2000)). A number of studies have focused on outsourcing and its effects on pro-
ductivity. For a sample of EU countries Egger and Egger (2006) ﬁ  nd a long-run positive impact between 
international outsourcing of goods and low-skilled workers productivity. Amiti and Wei (2006) ﬁ  nd that 
service outsourcing has a signiﬁ  cant positive effect on productivity in the manufacturing sector. Simi-
lar results have been found regarding the productivity impact of outsourcing on the Irish electronics 
industry by Görg et al. (2007). Mann (2003) analyzes the role played by international outsourcing of IT 
hardware in stimulating productivity growth during the last decade. She advocates a similar model of 
global competition for IT software and services that will deliver more cost-effective IT services and will 
prompt the next wave of productivity growth. ECB (2007) shows that changes in the sectoral shares in 
value added are related to changes in intermediate imports (from low-cost locations) for the EU area. 
This result is consistent with the story that industries that outsource production inputs could have ben-
eﬁ  cial effects in terms of value added. Positive results are found particularly for machinery and equip-
ment, vehicles, and electronic and communications equipment sectors. 
Finally, many studies have looked at the positive effects of globalisation on productivity via technology 
spillovers. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2001) ﬁ  nd that the transfer of production know-how improves over-
all productivity of FDI-receiving ﬁ  rms and to some extent also that of the other ﬁ  rms due to spillovers. 
Buckley et al. (2002) also ﬁ  nds that the presence of multinationals generates spillovers to locally-owned 
ﬁ  rms. Coe and Helpman (1995) estimates indicate that foreign R&D has beneﬁ  cial effects on domestic 
productivity, and that these are stronger the more open an economy is to foreign trade. Moreover, the 
estimated rates of return on R&D are very high, both in terms of domestic output and international 
spillovers. Sinani and Meyer (2004) disentangle the positive effect of technology transfer on the produc-
tivity of domestic ﬁ  rms from that of competition. They ﬁ  nd that the size of the spillover effect depends 
on the characteristics of incoming FDI and of the recipient ﬁ  rm. Spillovers have a positive or negative 
impact on the productivity of local ﬁ  rms depending on whether the negative competition effect out-
weighs the positive effect of demonstration and imitation, the training of employees, and the positive 
effect of backward and forward linkages.
The main source of this gap is total factor productiv-
ity, i.e. the part of productivity growth that cannot 
be assigned to an easily measurable factor such as 
capital deepening or improved labour quality, but 
must be attributed to less tangible factors such as 
technical and organisational progress. The policies 
most directly relevant to total factor productivity are 
those covered by the microeconomic pillar of the Lis-
bon strategy: those fostering technological progress 
(through more investment in – but also better uptake 
of the results of – R&D), the use of ICT, competition 
and product markets reform and infrastructures. The 
fact that the recent productivity upswing in the EU 
was fuelled also by an acceleration of TFP and that it 
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Graph 1.22. Share of innovative sales between 
foreign-owned and domestic ﬁ  rms
Note:   Sample includes manufacturing sectors in CZ, EE, 
HU, LT, LV and SK. Number of observations is 6349. 
The category “new products” represents new (or 
signiﬁ  cantly improved)-to-ﬁ  rm products (but not 
necessarily new to the market). The category “new 
market products” are new (or signiﬁ  cantly improved) 
not only to the ﬁ  rm but also to the market.





















was widespread across setters, including the services, 
leads to the suggestion that these reforms are start-
ing to bear fruit. However, it is too early to be able to 
conﬁ  rm the structural nature of this development.
In this context, it is worth noting that trade openness 
and competitiveness go together. While the causal-
ity link might be ambiguous, there are well visible 
productivity gains associated with the resulting spe-
cialisation, the scale effects, the greater competitive 
pressures that forces less efﬁ  cient ﬁ  rms out of the 
market and the greater ability to absorb technologi-
cal advances and new ideas developed in the rest of 
the world.
These results suggest that both increased intra-EU 
trade as a result of improving the Single Market and 
ambitious external policies – such as concluding the 
Doha Development Agenda, the new generation 
of bilateral free trade agreements, rebalancing the 
trade relationship with China, removing barriers to 
EU exports and a stepped-up market access strategy 
– hold out the potential of signiﬁ  cantly contributing 
to productivity growth in the EU.
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Annex Table 1.1: Employment growth and 2006 employment rate




15 to 64 years.
1995-2000 2000 – 2005 2006
Austria 0.7 0.3 1.4 70.2
Belgium 1.1 0.6 1.1 61.0
Bulgaria -0.3 1.5 2.4 58.6
Cyprus 1.3 3.0 1.5 69.6
Czech Republic -0.8 0.3 1.6 65.3
Denmark 1.0 0.0 1.9 77.4
Estonia -2.0 1.1 5.5 68.1
Finland 2.3 0.9 1.4 69.3
France 1.4 0.6 0.8 64.8
Germany 0.8 -0.2 0.7 67.2
Greece 0.6 1.3 1.5 68.6
Hungary 1.2 0.2 0.7 57.3
Ireland 5.7 2.9 4.2 63.0
Italy 1.0 1.2 1.7 58.4
Latvia -0.5 1.7 4.6 66.3
Lithuania -1.1 1.7 4.6 63.6
Luxembourg 4.1 3.1 3.9 63.6
Malta - 0.9 0.7 54.8
Netherlands 2.6 0.2 1.2 74.3
Poland -0.4 -0.6 3.3 54.5
Portugal 1.9 0.8 0.7 67.9
Romania -1.9 -0.3 2.8 58.8
Slovakia -0.8 0.6 2.3 59.4
Slovenia -0.4 0.5 1.2 66.6
Spain 3.9 3.2 3.3 61.0
Sweden 0.8 0.3 1.8 73.1
United Kingdom 1.3 0.9 0.8 71.5
EU-27 1.0 0.5 1.6 64.3
US 2.0 0.5 1.9 71.5
Source:   National accounts (EUROSTAT) for employment growth and structural indicators (EUROSTAT, Labour force survey) for 
the employment rate. Status: July 2007.
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B: Topical issues on the structural 
reforms agenda
Chapter 2. Recent microeconomic 
reforms in the European Union
2.1. Introduction
The renewal of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005 as the 
Partnership for Growth and Jobs focused the efforts 
of the European Union on more effective responses 
to the challenges of demographic change and glo-
balisation. The National Reform Programmes and the 
Community Lisbon Programme designed to carry this 
reform effort over the three-year cycle 2005-2008 
aim at increasing employment rates and productiv-
ity growth at the same time. This combined effort to 
act on labour supply and productivity growth should 
help ensure that the European Union will continue to 
have the wherewithal to sustain its social model and 
to secure the prosperity to which Europeans have 
grown used over the decades, and which in good 
measure has been the fruit of European integration, 
in particular the single market. 
Raising the long-term economic potential by increas-
ing productivity growth is one of the fundamental 
objectives of the renewed Lisbon strategy. Reforms in 
pursuit of this objective are being undertaken mainly 
in the microeconomic policy pillar of the integrated 
strategy, although reforms in the macroeconomic 
and employment policy pillars also impact produc-
tivity growth. It is in the microeconomic policy area 
where Member States identiﬁ  ed the largest number 
of key challenges in their 2005 National Reform 
Programmes. This chapter aims to provide a broad 
assessment of whether the types of reforms engaged 
by Member States since 2005 are likely to have the 
desired effects on growth in total factor productivity, 
given what is known about the relationship between 
microeconomic structural reforms and productivity 
growth38.
The results of productivity-enhancing structural 
reforms can rarely be captured in the short term and 
the measurement of their effects is complex. In view 
of that, the relaunch of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 is 
too recent to allow for a quantitative assessment of 
progress in the microeconomic pillar of the strategy. 
However, based on the literature on the relationship 
between structural reforms and productivity growth, 
it is possible to determine whether Member States 
and Community level are engaged in the right kinds 
of activities in the pursuit of productivity growth. This 
chapter ﬁ   nds that the priorities identiﬁ   ed and the 
reforms pursued by Member States and at Commu-
nity level under the Community Lisbon Programme 
in their majority target higher productivity growth. 
There is clear progress with the key reforms under the 
microeconomic pillar of the strategy. While it is too 
early for quantitative assessments, the most recent 
data on productivity developments presented in chap-
ter 1 seem to be consistent with a positive view of the 
structural reform effort to boost productivity growth.
Section 2.2.1 presents a literature review of the links 
between structural reforms and productivity growth 
and in Section 2.2.2 estimates found in the empirical 
literature on the likely quantitative impacts of certain 
types of structural reforms across the microeconomic 
pillar of the Growth and Jobs Strategy. In the light of 
these ﬁ  ndings, Section 2.2.3 looks at reform measures 
taken by Member States and at the Community level 
and assesses to what extent they promise an increase 
in productivity growth in the European Union in the 
years ahead. Section 2.3 considers the role of spillovers 
between reforms pursued by Member States individu-
ally as compared to joint reform action by all Member 
States in this context. Section 2.4 concludes.
38   The forthcoming The EU economy: 2007 Review (European Commission, 
2007) addresses the same issues more empirically.
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2.2.   Productivity Growth and Structural 
Reforms
2.2.1.  Preconditions for boosting productivity growth
Europe’s underperformance vis-à-vis the United 
States over the last decade or so in terms of per cap-
ita income and the question of how this underper-
formance can be overcome has been the subject of 
a considerable body of literature focusing on the role 
which structural reforms can play in raising potential 
output and productivity growth in European econo-
mies39. Differences in total factor productivity are 
generally regarded as the main variable for explain-
ing differences in par capita income across countries 
with similar capital intensity and labour input40. As the 
residual in the growth accounting equation, total fac-
tor productivity growth captures the overall increase 
in efﬁ  ciency achieved through technological progress 
and the improvement in production processes that 
cannot be attributed to capital deepening41.
The analysis of factors explaining cross-country dif-
ferences in productivity growth provides an impor-
tant point of reference for any reform agenda aiming 
to raise the long-term growth performance. Europe’s 
competitiveness over the long term can only be 
ensured through stronger and sustained productiv-
ity growth. To achieve higher productivity growth is 
therefore a key objective of the renewed Lisbon strat-
egy, the partnership for growth and jobs. The empir-
ical literature on structural reforms has produced 
numerous quantitative estimates of the potential 
impact of “Lisbon-type” reforms42 on productivity, 
economic growth, and employment. While produc-
tivity growth depends also on macroeconomic sta-
bility and well functioning labour markets, its imme-
diate foundation is the quality of the microeconomic 
business environment and the sophistication with 
which ﬁ  rms operate.
Michael Porter et al. (2006) present the microeco-
nomic business environment of the ﬁ  rm as the inter-
play of four elements: factor conditions (human 
and capital resources, administrative, scientiﬁ  c and 
technological infrastructure, natural resources), con-
text for ﬁ  rm strategy and rivalry, demand conditions 
(sophistication of demand), and related and support-
ing industries (quality suppliers, presence of clusters). 
Increasing productivity growth can be achieved to 
varying degrees by inﬂ  uencing these elements of the 
39   Aho et al. 2006; Cotis/Elmeskov 2006; European Commission (2005); 
Jimeno et al. 2006; OECD 2007. Pyythiä 2007; Sapir et al. 2003; Van Bart 
et al. 2006. 
40   See Aiyar/Dalgaard 2003, TFP revisited; Stiroh, Kevin J. (2001).
41   For an assessment of the empirical evidence on growth see Temple 1999. 
The New Growth Evidence.
42   See Boxes 3.2.1 – 3.2.4 below. For an overview of estimates on the impact 
of Lisbon-type structural reforms. Much of this material was contained in 
Dierx et al. (2005): The economic costs of non-Lisbon.
business environment through appropriate policy 
measures, but it ultimately depends on the sophisti-
cation of the companies.
Catching up with the United States on productivity 
growth – past trends
The basic types of policies required to boost growth 
and employment in Europe have changed consider-
ably over time, and the recent widening of the gap 
between the United States and the European Union 
in terms of productivity growth are in part a reﬂ  ec-
tion of an insufﬁ  ciently rapid adaptation of policies 
in Europe. This becomes clear when looking at the 
broad trends over the past 50 years. Aghion (2006) 
points out that Europe’s success in achieving sus-
tained economic growth during the post WWII era 
was associated mainly with policies of capital accu-
mulation and the imitation or adaptation of innova-
tions made elsewhere43. The economic institutions of 
the time were well suited to support this catching 
up process through incentives based on limited com-
petition in product markets, a focus on education 
below the tertiary level, and labour market arrange-
ments favouring the accumulation of experience 
within ﬁ  rms rather than labour mobility.
Once the catching up process was complete by the 
1980s, capital deepening and the imitation of inno-
vations produced elsewhere were no longer sufﬁ  cient 
to boost growth, and home-grown innovation was 
needed. Michael Porter et al. (2006) describe such 
transitions in more general terms as moving from 
the investment-driven phase of economic develop-
ment to the innovation-driven phase. They attribute 
an economy’s difﬁ  culties in making such transitions 
to the “wholesale transformation of many interde-
pendent aspects of competition” that is required to 
advance to the next level and to the complication 
that previously successful strategies may no longer 
be efﬁ  cient under the new circumstances.
The role of efﬁ  cient ICT use
The widening of the gap in productivity growth 
between the United States and Europe since the 
mid-1990s has been attributed to a large extent to 
innovations in the ICT sector and their rapid spread 
across the entire economy in the following years. 
Contrary to the United States, Europe has not been 
able to keep up with regard to the production but 
also with regard to the use of ICT across all sectors 
of the economy. The services sector in particular has 
lagged behind in Europe vis-à-vis the US in terms of 
productivity growth since the late 1990s44. Van Ark 
43 Aghion  (2006).
44   Bloom et al. 2007; Gordon (2004); Kox and Rubalcaba (2007); Van Ark 
(2005); Van Ark et al. (2006).
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(2005) has shown that the productivity gap in ICT 
using sectors has widened sharply since 1995.
It is however interesting to note, that capital deepen-
ing in ICT has accelerated in all the 26 OECD mem-
ber countries investigated in van Ark (2006), even in 
those countries where productivity growth remained 
slow. This seems to suggest that increases in ICT 
investment as such do not guarantee stronger total 
factor productivity growth, but that general frame-
work conditions, such as the degree of competition 
prevailing in a market and the general conditions for 
restructuring the productive sector, are likely to be 
of more fundamental importance for the innovative 
capacity of an economy. 
This view is supported by Crespi et al. (2007) who have 
analysed the relationship between productivity growth, 
ICT investment and organisational change based on 
ﬁ  rm-level panel data for the United Kingdom. While the 
authors present a note of caution in view of measure-
ment and data issues, their ﬁ  ndings are consistent with 
previous studies which have shown that ICT investment 
has high returns in terms of growth accounting, when 
organisational change is omitted from the equation45. 
These returns fall sharply once organisational change is 
taken into account. The authors also ﬁ  nd that periods 
of above-average ICT investment tend to be associ-
ated with slowdowns in TFP growth in the short run. 
These results are consistent with the suggestion that 
ICT investment and organisational change together 
boost productivity and that in the absence of organi-
sational change higher ICT investment would imply a 
slowdown in measured TFP growth.
The relationship between competition and innova-
tion
Europe needs to boost its innovative capacity contin-
uously in order to raise productivity growth and to be 
able to sustain its standard of living in the face of the 
challenges posed by globalisation, ageing societies, 
as well as changes in technology and skill composi-
tion of demand for labour and climate change. The 
empirical literature on structural reforms and pro-
ductivity supports the view that the focus of public 
policy on areas crucial for future productivity growth 
– such as investment in R&D, ICT, and higher educa-
tion – where the United States have outperformed 
the European Union, is not in itself sufﬁ  cient,  but 
that framework conditions and the right incentives 
for economic actors are decisive in raising productiv-
ity growth, and that in absence of such conditions all 
other efforts would go to waste.
45   See also Bresnahan, Brynjolfssonand Hitt 2002 as well as Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt 2003.
The importance of well functioning and competitive 
markets as an essential foundation for a good busi-
ness environment are generally recognised and well 
understood today. Increased competition tends to 
have a positive effect on productivity and employ-
ment by improving allocative efﬁ  ciency (static), pro-
ductive efﬁ  ciency (work organisation), and dynamic 
efﬁ  ciency (innovative products and processes). Crespi 
et al. (2007) cited above with regard to the posi-
tive productivity effects from ICT investment when 
accompanied by organisational change also conﬁ  rm 
the fundamental role of a competitive environment 
for productivity. When measuring competition by 
lagged changes in market share they ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  rms 
having lost market share in the previous period are 
signiﬁ  cantly more likely to introduce organisational 
change in the current period. 
Crespi’s ﬁ  rm-level analysis conﬁ  rms the well estab-
lished positive correlation between competition 
and productivity and explains one mechanism at 
work in bringing this about, i.e. the direct impact 
of increased competition on organisational change. 
This study based on UK ﬁ  rm-level data also seems 
to conﬁ  rm ﬁ  ndings by Bloom et al. (2007) accord-
ing to which US management practices are gener-
ally of better quality than European ones, although 
Germany and Sweden perform almost as well as the 
US. Both studies ﬁ  nd a positive correlation between 
intense competition and better management prac-
tices both in terms of quality and productivity.
While the positive correlation between competition 
and productivity is well established, the effect of 
competition on innovation, which has been a focus 
of theoretical and empirical research in economics, 
is not quite as clear cut. Many economic studies 
indicate that there is a relationship between mar-
ket structure and innovation, though the direction 
of the effect is not consistently the same (for litera-
ture surveys, see Ahn 2002 and Symeonides 1996). 
The effects of demand and market structure may 
vary in signiﬁ  cance for different types of innovations 
depending on whether regulatory protection meas-
ures are in place.
When considering the effect of competition on inno-
vation it is important to distinguish between new 
entrants and incumbent ﬁ  rms, as well as pre- and 
post-innovation market structure. In the traditional 
Schumpeterian model innovation happens through 
new ﬁ  rms entering. Less competition in the market 
increases incentives for innovation, given that the 
expected returns to innovation (and market entry) 
are higher if competition is lower. For incumbent 
ﬁ  rms, lower levels of competition can be conducive to 
innovation if capital markets are imperfect and R&D 
has to be funded with ﬁ  rm’s internal resources.
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On the other hand, intense competitive pressures 
may provide ﬁ   rms with incentives to innovate in 
order to avoid bankruptcy. Where competition is 
intense, the incentive to innovate may also arise from 
attempts to gain competitive advantage over rivals. 
In this case the post-innovation market may be less 
competitive than the in pre-innovation market.
Aghion et al. (2005) suggest that competition 
may provide both incentives and disincentives to 
innovation, depending on the proximity of ﬁ  rms 
to the technological frontier. The joint presence of 
both effects is presented as resulting in an inverted   
U-shaped relationship between innovation and the 
degree of competition. Innovation in this model is a 
step process – ﬁ  rst the company has to catch up with 
the technological leader before becoming a leader 
itself. Therefore the quality of competition also mat-
ters: only companies which are sufﬁ  ciently close to 
the frontier of productive efﬁ   ciency will innovate 
since for them innovation produces considerable 
rents. Thus when ﬁ  rms have relatively equal produc-
tion costs (neck-and-neck competition), innovation 
increases with competition as the effect of ﬁ  rms 
trying to overtake competitors dominates. When 
companies are far behind the technological leader 
an increase in competition will reduce incentives to 
innovate as it reduces post-innovation rents.
In addition to producing innovations, the adoption 
of new technologies by non-innovators is essential for 
improving productivity in the long run. The process 
of technology adoption has attracted less attention 
in the economics literature but ﬁ  rms appear to follow 
broadly similar considerations of costs and returns 
when choosing to adopt existing technologies. 
Vandenbussche et al. (2006) ﬁ   nd that growth-
enhancing policies might change once countries 
move closer to the technological frontier. Stringent 
protection of intellectual property can be more 
important for productivity growth in countries close 
to the frontier which are more heavily engaged in 
innovation rather than imitation. Given the public 
good aspects of knowledge, protection of intellec-
tual property can be necessary to retain the incen-
tives for innovation.
Different sectors across the EU vary widely in terms of 
their distance to the respective technological frontier. 
A one-size-ﬁ  ts-all approach to regulation and inno-
vation would therefore be inappropriate. Instead, a 
sector-by-sector approach is preferable when deter-
mining the appropriate course of action. When aim-
ing to provide the right incentives for innovation, 
it is important to take account of industry-speciﬁ  c 
characteristics and of the prevailing efﬁ  ciency levels 
in each country. Some countries may still ﬁ  nd them-
selves in a position where the adoption of technolo-
gies produced elsewhere would still be considered 
as appropriate in some sectors, while improving the 
conditions for the creation of new technologies may 
be the policy of choice for others. Both adoption and 
creation of technologies are efﬁ  ciency  improving, 
but the impact of regulation and competition might 
be different in each case. 
The topic of regulation and innovation is the sub-
ject of several ongoing policy debates. The Com-
mission recently presented a Patent Communication 
“Enhancing the patent system in Europe” (European 
Commission, 2007A). A more comprehensive Intel-
lectual Property Rights (IPR) strategy that will com-
plement the Patent Communication is planned for 
2008. A second example is the Better Regulation 
agenda, which should foster competition and pro-
mote competitiveness. Work on strengthening the 
Internal Market and the new framework for the Inter-
nal Market in goods should contribute to the func-
tioning of the EU’s single market. Finally, the Com-
mission’s 2006 Annual Progress Report concludes 
that European standard-setting must be accelerated, 
particularly in fast-moving markets, whilst ensur-
ing inter-operability. The Commission will conduct 
a review with the standardisation organisations, 
industry and stakeholders and issue an action plan 
in October 2007.
The role of product market regulation for competi-
tion and innovation
Most empirical evidence suggests a negative rela-
tionship between the intensity of regulation and 
indicators of economic performance such as innova-
tion or productivity. There is however some degree 
of ambiguity concerning the effect of product mar-
ket regulation on ﬁ  rms’ innovative activity. Care is 
especially warranted in case of sectors which rely 
heavily on R&D and where spillovers in that area are 
potentially large. Schiantarelli (2005) points out that 
the availability of cross-country data and a deeper 
understanding of the nature of a country’s industrial 
structure and distance to the technological frontier 
are requirements of a more reﬁ  ned empirical assess-
ment of the interplay between product market regu-
lation and innovation. 
The OECD has conducted several studies on links 
between regulation and productivity, employment 
and economic growth. OECD (2007) ﬁ  nds  that 
labour productivity has accelerated since the mid-
1990s in lightly-regulated economies while it either 
grew more slowly or declined in highly-regulated 
countries46. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) analyse 
possible links between product market regulation 
46  See OECD (2007), p. 147.
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and total factor productivity growth in the OECD 
area over the past two decades. Their results suggest 
that lower barriers to trade and less regulation have 
increased the level and rate of productivity growth 
by stimulating business investment and promoting 
innovation and technological catch-up47. 
Grifﬁ  th et al. (2006) in a study carried out for the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs suggest that product market reforms led to 
increased competition (reduced average mark-ups) 
which, in turn, positively impacted the incentives to 
innovate. They study the impact of product market 
reforms on innovation in the EU and ﬁ  nd that intensi-
fying competition tends to increase R&D investment, 
but mainly through increased innovative activity by 
incumbents rather than by new entrants48. Another 
study for the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs by Cincera and Galgau (2005) ﬁ  nds 
an insigniﬁ  cant relationship between ﬁ  rm entry and 
R&D investment as well as R&D intensity, which 
could suggest that ﬁ  rm entry is not a key transmis-
sion channel of product market reforms on R&D.
Aghion et al. (2005), whose theoretical contribution 
is discussed above, ﬁ  nd that their empirical analysis 
supports the “inverted U” hypothesis for the rela-
tionship between competition and innovation. Their 
data consist of a panel of UK companies in 1968-
1997. During this period, a number of reforms were 
implemented and there were considerable changes 
in the market structure. Their measure of innovation 
is based on patent data. Bassanini and Ernst (2002) 
use the OECD indicators of product market regula-
tion and investigate their effect on industry’s R&D 
intensity. Their cross-country evidence also suggest 
that product market reforms would have positive 
effects on innovation. They also conclude that labour 
market regulation can have effects on innovation. 
Conway et al. (2006) study the effect of product 
market regulation on the international diffusion of 
new technologies. They ﬁ   nd that anti-competitive 
product market regulation has a negative impact on 
the adoption of information and communications 
technology and on the location decisions of multi-
national enterprises. The review by Schiantarelli 
(2005) of a large number of cross-country studies 
on the macroeconomic impacts of product mar-
ket regulation concludes that less stringent regula-
tion has generally a positive effect on productivity 
growth and that most studies that include measures 
47   The regulation indicators used include OECD indicators of product mar-
ket regulation for 1998 and sectoral indicators available for a longer 
period of time. The OECD indicators are based on a large set of questions 
regarding different aspects of regulation which are then summarised into 
higher level indicators. See Conway et al. (2005).
48   The product market measure used by Grifﬁ  th et al. (2006) is an indicator 
constructed from the single market programme, but they also use the 
WEF/Fraser Institute measure of time spent on government bureaucracy 
by senior management.
of regulation directly in the regression tend to ﬁ  nd a 
negative effect of tighter regulation on total factor 
productivity or per capita output growth.
SMEs tend to be affected disproportionately by 
unnecessarily burdensome regulation and market 
failures associated with information asymmetries, 
such as those that may occur in the context of the 
availability of innovation ﬁ  nancing and venture capi-
tal. The high cost of patents in the European Union 
also tends to put a brake on the innovative capac-
ity of SMEs. SMEs have more difﬁ  culties than large 
enterprises with embarking on cross-border activities. 
Only 28% of small companies and 36% of medium-
sized ones trade cross-borders. Approximately 25% 
of SMEs claim to be prepared to do it even if they do 
not trade yet49. There is thus no doubt that SMEs hold 
considerable untapped potential for the European 
economy in terms of productivity improvements, in 
particular if the business environment were to facili-
tate their market entry (and exit) and faster growth.
Recent literature has conﬁ  rmed that higher levels of 
competition have a positive effect on management 
practices and thus on productivity. Using ﬁ  rm-level 
data on management practices in medium-sized 
enterprises for the US, France, Germany and the UK, 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2006) ﬁ  nd that poor man-
agement practices are more prevalent in the presence 
of weak product market competition. They tend also 
to be more prevalent in family-owned ﬁ  rms passed 
on from one generation to the next. The authors 
ﬁ   nd that these two factors combined can largely 
explain the difference in the quality of management 
practices, which is generally higher in medium-sized 
ﬁ  rms in the US than in European ones. These factors 
may also hold an explanation for the insufﬁ  ciently 
realised growth potential of European SMEs.
Labour market reform
The present chapter focuses on productivity-enhanc-
ing structural reforms in the product and services 
markets. It should not lead to underestimate the 
importance of structural reforms of the labour mar-
ket which are necessary to fully reap the beneﬁ  ts of 
the former. In particular, implementing the ﬂ  exicurity 
agenda has the potential to smoothen the realloca-
tion of the production factors and allow workers to 
progress in their work, thus permitting an increase a 
country’s productivity level (growth rate) while reduc-
ing involuntary unemployment. Moreover, ﬂ  exicurity 
is a good example of the need to develop an inte-
grated and comprehensive policy package, covering 
simultaneously ﬂ   exible contractual arrangements, 
comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effective 
49   Flash Eurobarometer “Business attitude towards cross-borders sales and 
consumer policy”, December 2006.
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active labour market policies and modern social secu-
rity systems. Indeed, by now it is generally accepted 
that ﬂ  exicurity is a very important instrument to pro-
mote more and better jobs by combining ﬂ  exibility 
and security for workers and companies.
2.2.2.  Likely effects of structural reforms
The previous section has given an overview over 
recent literature on theoretical considerations and 
empirical ﬁ  ndings on the relationships between pro-
ductivity, innovation, and competition as well as the 
role of ICT investment and ICT use in this context. It 
has also discussed the importance of the regulatory 
environment for productivity growth. This discussion 
has shed some light on where structural reforms may 
be most needed in Europe to improve the produc-
tivity performance and to bring about a signiﬁ  cant 
increase in TFP growth. This section presents some of 
the likely quantitative impacts of Lisbon-type reforms 
in the areas of R&D and innovation, internal mar-
ket and competition policies, and product market 
reforms based on estimates found in the empirical 
literature. Some estimates gauge the likely impact of 
actual legislative projects such as the Services Direc-
tive and the EU’s target to reach an R&D intensity 
of 3% by 2010. Others provide an orientation with 
regard to the potential economic effects of structural 
reforms that would render competition in European 
economies as intense as in the United States or bring 
about the dismantling of remaining internal market 
barriers. The estimates show which types of reforms 
promise the greatest rewards in terms of growth and 
jobs. This section also raises general issues that have 
emerged from the experience with the implementa-
tion of reforms since the renewal of the Lisbon Strat-
egy in 2005 and that are relevant for achieving some 
of the objectives reﬂ  ected in the estimates. 
R&D, Innovation, and ICT policies
The importance of increasing R&D investment for 
boosting productivity growth is well established. The 
European Commission has estimated that the impact 
of reaching the European Union’s R&D intensity tar-
get would lead to increases in total factor productiv-
ity of 0.8% and could boost real income by 3% (see 
Box 2.1). However, there is today a clear recogni-
tion that additional progress in this area will in part 
depend on better integrating the elements of the 
knowledge triangle: R&D, innovation and education 
and training.
Box 2.1: Investing in Knowledge and Innovation
Educational attainment
European Commission (2003A)
Reforms increasing by one year the average attainment of the population aged 25–64 would lead to:
–  a TFP level increase of 4% to 6% (with an additional 3% in the long run)
–  a GDP annual growth increase of approximately 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points
R&D Investment
European Commission (2004)
Measures to increase total EU R&D spending from 1.9% to 3% of GDP in 2010 (in order to reach the Lis-
bon target) when compared to a status quo situation (i.e. no increase in R&D spending) would lead to:
–  a GDP level increase of 1.7% by 2010 (0.25% per year).
TFP, employment and real income levels increase of 0.8%, 1.4% and 3% respectively by 2010
GDP level increases of 4.2%, 7.5% and 12.1% in 2015, 2020 and 2030 respectively
Wobst (2006)
If Member States achieve their targets for R&D investment by 2010, which would lift EU R&D intensity 
from 1.9 to 2.6% of GDP, R&D activities will rise by 50% in 2025 and will produce:
–  an increase of 2.6% in GDP on the basis of conservative assumptions.
European Commission (2007)
If Member States achieve their targets for R&D investment by 2015 and maintain the achieved R&D 
intensity over the medium to long term, GDP will increase by 4.1 % over the baseline and TFP by almost 
6%, by 2025 (results using the QUEST III R&D model).
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The relevance of improving the skill level was 
shown by European Commission (2003A). An aver-
age increase of one year in educational attainment 
would produce a level increase in TFP of between 
4 and 6%. The issue of a sufﬁ  cient supply of quali-
ﬁ  ed researchers may represent the most important 
bottleneck for boosting R&D and innovation in some 
countries. Apart from strengthening the integration 
of the knowledge triangle, overcoming the fragmen-
tation of regional, national and European research 
and innovation systems is also important to avoid 
duplication, to reach critical mass and to optimise 
spill over effects.
The importance of clusters for cutting edge techno-
logical development, innovation and productivity 
has been widely recognised. Their innovation and 
productivity enhancing effects may partly be attrib-
utable to the facilitation of new ﬁ  rms’ market entry 
which results from the presence of material and 
immaterial production factors in close geographic 
proximity. It is less clear how public policy can con-
tribute to cluster creation, except through provid-
ing propitious conditions for all elements of what 
Michael Porter calls the diamond structure of the 
microeconomic business environment50. One of the 
challenges in reaching the European Union’s R&D 
intensity target is how sufﬁ  cient private R&D spend-
ing can be induced.
Internal Market and Competition Policy
The importance of a functioning internal market and 
competition for the quality of the business environ-
ment generally and for productivity growth more 
speciﬁ  cally has been well established by   theoretical 
and empirical literature, as discussed in Section 2.2.1. 
Considerable beneﬁ  ts can still be reaped from dis-
mantling remaining barriers to the functioning of the 
single market, as is shown in European Commission 
(2007E), which estimates that their removal would 
increase GDP by 2.2% and induce the creation of 
2.75 million new jobs, which is equivalent to an 
increase in the employment rate by 1.4%.
Despite considerable progress being made towards 
integration in goods markets, considerably fewer 
service industries yet beneﬁ  t from a single EU-wide 
market. There is clear evidence that market integra-
tion in services has advanced at a much slower pace 
than in the goods sector. While services account for 
close to 70% of the EU-15 value added, they repre-
50  See Porter et al. (2006), Figure 3.
sent only some 20% of intra EU-15 trade. Price con-
vergence in services is also much lower than in the 
goods sector, even when the more tradable nature 
of goods is accounted for. In the service sector, weak 
competition is further illustrated by the low fre-
quency of price changes and the downward inﬂ  ex-
ibility of prices. Strengthening the internal market for 
services is therefore an urgent task.
Increasing competition through a pro-active compe-
tition policy and the completion of the single market, 
especially in services holds considerable economic 
potential. The Services Directive, which aims at facili-
tating the exercise of the freedom of establishment 
for service providers and the free movement of serv-
ices, was adopted in December 2006 but has yet to 
be implemented. A Copenhagen Economics study 
calculated that the Services Directive could create up 
to 600.000 extra jobs, while the welfare gains would 
amount to about 0.6% of GDP. 
The functioning of the single market is often hin-
dered by sector speciﬁ   c barriers. Market monitor-
ing exercises might hold remedies for some sector 
speciﬁ   c problems in the single market. Based on 
the analysis, there may also be scope for action at 
Community level through infringement procedures, 
competition policy, the legislative approach and the 
coordination mechanisms of the Growth and Jobs 
strategy to improve competition in sectors that are 
crucial for growth and jobs. 
The markets for retail banking, mortgage lending, 
insurance, pensions and long-term savings are still 
rather fragmented. Creating a strong and competi-
tive single market across all of these ﬁ  nancial services 
industries would increase competition and ensure 
efﬁ   ciency amongst service providers, increase the 
availability and reduce the cost of capital to non-
ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, provide a common high level of con-
sumer protection, ensure ﬁ  nancial stability, and cre-
ate a dynamic, innovative European market with top 
class regulation and regulators. 
Overall, completing the single market for ﬁ  nancial 
services will reduce the cost and improve the avail-
ability of ﬁ  nancing for investment and innovation. 
An independent London Economics study estimated 
the effect on the cost of capital for EU companies 
at about 0.5 percentage points and raising EU GDP 
by 1.1%51. The resulting increase in investment and 
R&D spending could have important dynamic effects 
in raising the growth rate of the EU economy.
51  London Economics (2002).
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Box 2.2: Improving the Functioning of the Internal Market & Competition
Removing remaining Internal Market barriers
European Commission (2007E)
The removal of remaining Internal Market barriers would double the effect the enlarged Internal Market 
had over the period 1992-2006 and bring:
–   a 2.2% increase in the EU-25 GDP and the creation of 2.75 million additional jobs (equivalent to a 
1.4% increase in total employment). 
Implementation of the Services Directive
Copenhagen Economics (2006A)
The implementation of the original proposal of the Services Directive would lead to:
–  the creation of 600,000 new jobs;
–  an increase in total consumption by 0.6%.
European Commission (2006F)
The implementation of the original proposal for the Services Directive would lead to:
–  a GDP increase of about 0.2%.
Product Market Regulation enhancing competition
Dierx et al. 2004
Product markets reform aiming at increasing competition would lead to:
–   a GDP increase (relative to its baseline level) of about 2% in the medium run (acceleration of output 
growth by almost a quarter of a percentage point annually over a period of 7 to 8 years).
IMF 2003
Competition-friendly product market reforms reducing the price-mark-up in the Euro area by 10 per-
centage points would produce:
–  a long term increase in the GDP level in the Euro area of 4.3%.
Bayoumi et al. 2004
Product market reforms reducing the price mark-up in the Euro area to US levels:
–  a GDP level increase in the Euro area of 8.6% (relative to its baseline level) in the long run.
Full market opening in network industries
Copenhagen Economics (2006B)
A full market opening in network industries for the EU-15 would result in an increase of:
–  between 1.0 and 1.6% increase in value added (equivalent to €80 to 130bn);
–  between 140,000 and 360,000 additional jobs.
Greater ﬁ  nancial market integration
London Economics (2002)
Greater ﬁ  nancial market integration producing greater efﬁ  ciency and competition would produce:
–  GDP and employment level increases of 1.1% and 0.5% respectively in the long run.
Giannetti et al. 2002
Greater ﬁ  nancial-market integration with efﬁ  ciency gains and access to a larger and deeper market 
should lead to:
–  a sustained increase in value-added growth in manufacturing increase by 0.8%-0.9%.
ld711576Int.indd   52 ld711576Int.indd   52 19/12/07   13:16:01 19/12/07   13:16:0153
Chapter 2. Recent microeconomic reforms in the European Union
The potential of such action is highlighted by the 
results of studies on the likely impact of broadly 
deﬁ   ned pro-competitive product market reforms. 
They suggest increases in the level of GDP of between 
2 and almost 9% relative to the baseline, depending 
on the degree of increase in competition effected by 
the reforms. Greater ﬁ  nancial market integration is 
estimated to lead to a level increase in GDP of about 
1% and of a similar increase in value added in the 
manufacturing sector. Its potential beneﬁ  ts for facili-
tating R&D investment and innovation have already 
been discussed.
Areas which appear to hold considerable poten-
tial for improvements in productivity are the retail 
and wholesale sectors52. Together they account for 
10% of the total value added of the EU economy 
and employ about 30.5 million people in the EU-25, 
which is about 15% of the total EU employment. 
The productivity gap between the EU and the United 
States is particularly pronounced in these sectors. 
Closing this gap could increase labour productivity 
growth in the EU, given that “more than 50% of 
the economy-wide productivity growth lead for the 
United States since 1995 is accounted for by these 
two sectors”53. Improved productivity in retail and 
wholesale markets is also critical for the competitive-
ness of manufacturing industries that rely on efﬁ  cient 
distribution networks. The productivity performance 
of distribution in the EU has signiﬁ  cantly lagged the 
US. The major reasons for this seem to be linked with 
restrictive regulation at several levels of government, 
resulting in limited competition. 
Competition in the network industries
The efﬁ  ciency of energy markets is of key importance 
to the overall competitiveness of the EU economy 
and the ﬁ  ght against global warming. High levels of 
competition, an enhanced regulatory regime and the 
removal of barriers to market integration will be nec-
essary to ensure that the investments in the energy 
system needed until 2030 are made. The electric-
ity and gas industries have a turnover of more than 
€500 billion and employ more than a million people 
in the EU. They provide direct services for consumers 
and essential inputs for other industries. Currently, 
the EU energy market is characterized by fragmented 
national markets with powerful incumbents.
Effective unbundling between energy generation, 
network operation and sales is important for creat-
ing an open and competitive energy market, where 
incumbent ﬁ  rms are prevented from using their net-
52   Retail and wholesale trade made the strongest contribution to US labour 
productivity growth between 1995 and 2002. See Van Bart (2005), p. 12. 
For an illustration of the productivity gap in the retail and wholesale sec-
tors see ECB 2006, ﬁ  gure 8, p. 21.
53   McGuckin; Spiegelman, and van Ark, Bart (2005), p.5.
work assets to make the entry of competitors more 
difﬁ  cult. The absence of effective separation may dis-
tort investment incentives, since integrated network 
owners have few incentives to invest in interconnec-
tions that would open themselves up to new com-
petition. National regulators will only be efﬁ  cient if 
they hold sufﬁ  cient powers and are independence 
from government. There are questions as to whether 
national regulators and regulations are fully appro-
priate to deal with cross-border issues. 
The insufﬁ  cient interconnection of national networks 
and the insufﬁ  cient integration of European energy 
markets hamper competition in some parts of the 
European energy markets. The implementation of 
the National Reform Programmes has not yet had a 
satisfactory impact on connecting the national mar-
kets. Effective energy market integration would have 
an important impact on growth and jobs though. A 
recent study by Copenhagen Economics estimated 
that the effects of market opening in electricity could 
reduce prices for electricity in the EU-15 by 13% and 
increase cross- border trade by 31%54. This would 
have signiﬁ  cant positive effects on consumers and 
producers further down the value chain, overall 
increasing EU GDP by 0.5-1.0% and creating some 
50,000-120,000 jobs55.
As Schiantarelli (2005) points out, the issue of how 
the effect of product market reform depends on the 
rules and regulations in labour markets as well as the 
regulatory structure and level of development of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector is not well researched. That the joint 
pursuit of reforms in product and labour markets can 
bring about synergies in terms of stronger effects on 
growth and jobs is undisputed. A combination of 
macro- and microeconomic structural reforms along 
with labour market reforms corresponds to the logic 
of the key objectives under the renewed Lisbon strat-
egy, which aims to raise and sustain productivity and 
employment growth at the same time, while main-
taining ﬁ  scal sustainability. Section 2.2.4 below anal-
yses in more depth the role synergies play for reach-
ing the objectives of the Growth and Jobs strategy. 
The European Commission (2002) has found that the 
interplay of pro-competitive product market reforms 
and of labour market reforms which increase the 
participation rate and facilitate employment-friendly 
wage setting could bring about a level increase in 
GDP of between 3 and 4% in the medium term, as 
well as an employment increase of between 5 and 
6 million. Studies for the Euro area estimate even 
stronger impacts on GDP from combined product 
and labour market reforms.
54  See Copenhagen Economics (2006), p. 4.
55   Impact Assessment on the Commission’s Energy Package. Forthcoming 
2007.
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The Business and Regulatory Environment, Product 
Market Reform, and Better Regulation
The empirical literature shows that the level of prod-
uct market regulation has an important bearing on 
economic performance via the channel of increased 
competition and the consequent effects on innovation 
and productivity growth discussed in Section 2.2.1 
above. The pro-competitive productivity-enhancing 
impact of product market reforms reducing the level 
of regulation comes about mainly through the facili-
tation of market entry or exit of ﬁ  rms.
Box 2.3 summarises the estimates of a number of 
studies on the effects of product market reforms, 
which show that lower levels of product market reg-
ulation are correlated with signiﬁ  cantly higher pro-
ductivity growth, output and employment. Cincera 
(2004) analyses the impact of increasing market 
entry rates of ﬁ   rms and ﬁ   nds that a one percent-
age point increase in entry rates would push up the 
growth rate of labour productivity by 2.2% in the 
short run, while the same increase in exit rates would 
have a considerably smaller effect on productivity 
with some time lag.
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005A) estimate that prod-
uct market reforms that bring the overall regula-
tory stance among OECD countries in line with the 
most liberal countries among them would lead to an 
increase in Total Factor Productivity by between 0.4 
and 1.1% per year for a period of 10 years. The Euro-
pean Commission (2006A) expects a level increase 
in GDP of 1.5%, which would be equivalent to 
€ 150 billion in absolute terms from a reduction of 
administrative burdens by 25%.
Smaller but not insigniﬁ   cant effects can also be 
expected from the reduction of corporate tax bar-
riers and related compliance costs. As Copenhagen 
Economics (2004) and Bettendorf et al. (2007) show 
providing a solution for the remaining tax problems in 
terms of double taxation and facilitating the restruc-
turing of group companies foster the functioning of 
the Single Market and the adoption of a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base where groups of 
companies would be able to compute the taxable 
base for all their EU operations according to a new 
common tax code applicable across the EU could, on 
the basis of preliminary estimates undertaken before 
the details of the proposal have been deﬁ  ned, have 
an impact on EU GDP of up to 0.15%.
2.2.3.  Structural reforms in the European Union
The previous section has presented some estimates 
for the potential impact on economic growth, pro-
ductivity, and employment of microeconomic struc-
tural reforms in the areas of investment in R&D, 
knowledge and innovation, improving the function-
ing of the internal market and enhancing competi-
tion, as well as reducing product market regulation. 
Some of these studies relate to concrete legislative or 
policy projects, which are being pursued in the con-
text of the renewed Lisbon strategy, such as the Serv-
ices Directive or policies to reach the national R&D 
spending targets. Others provide useful reference 
points in terms of deﬁ  ning expectations for Europe’s 
future growth potential if a coherent microeconomic 
structural reform agenda is being followed.
The partnership approach of the renewed Lisbon 
Strategy clearly attributes the responsibility for 
implementing policy actions both at the national and 
the Community level. While Member States outline 
their economic reform efforts at the national level 
in national reform programmes (NRPs), the Com-
munity Lisbon Programme covers policy actions at 
Community-level. Actions are planned at the Com-
munity level when they can complement, facilitate or 
strengthen policy actions envisaged at the national 
level. In such cases, purely national action is insufﬁ  -
cient because important cross-border externalities or 
economies of scale are concerned. The Community 
adds value to Member State action by:
(1)  providing a common legal framework to create 
a level-playing ﬁ  eld; 
(2)  using budgetary resources to supplement the 
resources of the Member States; 
(3)  leveraging its weight in international negotia-
tions;
(4)  coordinating Member State action to reap 
economies of scale and scope in policy areas 
with shared competences. 
This section looks at key areas of microeconomic 
reforms being implemented by Member States and 
at EU level since the renewal of the Lisbon strategy 
in 2005 and relates them to the discussion of the 
literature and the empirical estimates presented in 
the two preceding sections. The key challenges that 
were identiﬁ  ed by Member States within the micro-
economic pillar of the Growth and Jobs Strategy 
centre around the issues of R&D, innovation, and 
ICT policy (raised by 24 Member States), competi-
tion policy (17) as well as the business and regula-
tory environment (18) (see Graph 2.1). This indicates 
the Member States’ intention to focus on policies 
with the greatest potential of bringing about higher 
growth in total factor productivity. The environment 
is also an important key challenge in the microeco-
nomic area (12). 
The role of the policy measures under the Community 
Lisbon Programme (CLP) is to act where the beneﬁ  ts 
from a concerted, community wide intervention are 
clearly superior to un-coordinated national action. 
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Box 2.3: Effects of product market reforms (PMR)
PMR reducing levels of regulation
Salgado 2002
Product market reforms in OECD countries over the period 1985–1995 contributed to:
–   an increase of 0.2 – 0.3 percentage points in total factor productivity growth in the long run, while 
being weak in the short run
Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005A
Regulatory reforms aligning the overall regulatory stance with that of the most liberal OECD country 
could induce:
–  an increase the annual rate of TFP growth in continental EU by between 0.4 and 1.1% over 10 years.
Bayoumi et al. (2004)
Reforms aiming at reducing regulation in product and labour markets to US levels would increase com-
petition and reduce mark-ups in prices and wages over marginal costs while increasing the substitut-
ability of goods and inputs. These reforms would lead to:
–  a GDP level increase in the Euro area of 12.4% (relative to baseline) in the long run
PMR facilitating ﬁ  rm entry
Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003
Reducing barriers to entry in some European countries towards the OECD average:
–   entry liberalisation in service would boost annual multi-factor productivity growth in the overall busi-
ness sector by about 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points in certain countries;
–   indirect effects would boost manufacturing-wide annual productivity growth by 0.1 to 0.2 percent-
age points in certain European countries, most notably Germany, France, Italy and Greece.
Cincera & Galgau (2005)
Product market reforms increasing the current ﬁ  rm entry rate by one% lead to:
–  a contemporaneous increase in labour productivity by 0.60%,
–  an increase in employment growth of 2.67%.
Cincera (2004)
Reforms aiming at facilitating the entry and exit of ﬁ  rms lead to:
–   a 1% increase in the entry rate leads to a contemporary increase in output, employment and labour 
productivity growth rate of 2.2%, 2.7% and 0.6% respectively,
–   a 1% increase in exit rate reduces output growth rate of 0.8% (one year lag), while it increases 
labour productivity growth by 0.7% (2-year lag).
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005B)
Product market reforms that would reduce the level of state control and entry barriers to entry to the 
best OECD practice would:
–  increase long-term employment rates by between 1.3 and 2.5 percentage points (lower-bound estimate).
Reduction in administrative costs
European Commission (DG Enterprise) 2006A
A 25% administrative cost reduction may bring:
–  a real GDP level increase of up to 1.5% – equivalent to some € 150 bn.
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102 actions were announced in 2005 for the CLP. 
The actions were focused on:
–   making Europe a more attractive place to invest 
and work (51 actions); 
–  knowledge and Innovation (20 actions); 
–  more and better Jobs (26 actions). 
Therefore, up to 70% of the actions undertaken at the 
Community level focus on microeconomic reforms. 
Progress on the Community Lisbon Programme has 
been satisfactory. Most recent data show that by 
mid 2007 87 of the 102 announced in the CLP have 
been implemented. Behind these statistics the Com-
munity actions have complemented and facilitated 
signiﬁ  cantly the efforts of the Member States. Com-
munity ﬁ  nancing mechanisms such as the renewed 
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, the Com-
petitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme 
(CIP) and the 7nth Research Framework Programme 
(FP7) are complementing the funding of the growth 
and jobs strategies of the Member States. The bet-
ter regulation agenda facilitates the better regula-
tion efforts of the Member States and has positive 
effects on the economy by cutting unnecessary costs 
and removing obstacles to innovation. The services 
directives is an important step towards extending 
the internal market to services.
The recommendations and points to watch endorsed 
by the 2007 Spring European Council conﬁ  rm the 
European Union’s focus on productivity-enhancing 
policies. Country-speciﬁ   c recommendations in the 
microeconomic pillar focus almost entirely on R&D 
and innovation (8) and competition policies (6). 
While recommendations of this type reﬂ  ect impor-
tant concerns that all is not well with regard to per-
formance and reform implementation, the so-called 
“points to watch” represent a somewhat less formal 
hint that more action would be desirable and that 
implementation may be falling behind the objec-
tives set out in the National Reform Programme. In 
this latter category, R&D, innovation, and ICT poli-
cies (points to watch for 19 Member States), internal 
market and competition policies (17), and policies 
to improve the business and regulatory environment 
(22) receive the largest attention56. While this picture 
demonstrates the seriousness of the European Union’s 
focus on productivity-enhancing policies in the con-
text of its annual multilateral surveillance exercise, 
the large number of points to watch also suggests 
56   See the Council Recommendation of 27 March 2007 for the complete 
text of the recommendations for all three pillars of the Growth and Jobs 
Strategy, i.e. for macroeconomic, microeconomic, and employment poli-
cies. 
Graph 2.1: Key challenges by broad policy area
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that the implementation effort needs strengthening 
in the coming years.
In this context, it must also be emphasised that 
enhancing the productive potential is a long-
haul effort that will need to be sustained for years 
before its full results can be felt and systematically 
measured. The results of structural reforms can, in 
any case, rarely be captured in the short term. The 
measurement of their effects is complex for various 
reasons. Microeconomic reforms cover a large and 
heterogeneous range of sectors of the economy in 
a European Union whose Member States also dis-
play a large degree of heterogeneity. Quantitative 
indicators for most of the relevant variables needed 
to measure progress in the microeconomic area are 
only available with considerable time lags. Once they 
are available care must be taken to disentangle cycli-
cal from structural developments.
Given that the National Reform Programmes under 
the renewed Lisbon strategy were only launched in 
the autumn of 2005 and that their implementation 
is ongoing, it is not yet possible to provide a rigor-
ous assessment of the reform outcomes. The Com-
mission’s Annual Progress Reports provide an assess-
ment of progress in the implementation of reforms. 
The key areas of reforms programmed and being 
implemented by Member States do however pro-
vide a yardstick of whether and to what extent the 
right policy levers are being moved to bring about 
the desired effects on productivity. 
R&D, Knowledge and Innovation
The Member States of the European Union have 
committed themselves to reaching national targets 
on R&D spending in the aim to boost R&D intensity 
for the European Union as a whole to 3% of GDP by 
2010. The challenge is to provide the right framework 
conditions and incentives to leverage public R&D 
spending and bring about a large share of business 
R&D spending. Given the link between investment 
in R&D and innovation, pro-competitive structural 
reforms should in general also support conditions for 
reaching the R&D intensity targets at least in sec-
tors that are close to the global technological frontier 
(see also the discussion in 2.2.1).
The commitments made by Member States in terms 
of national R&D investment targets would bring the 
EU’s overall R&D intensity to about 2.7% of GDP 
in 2010 (see Graph 2.2). The commitments of the 
Member States are complemented by the adop-
tion of FP7, which increased EU level funding com-
pared to the previous programming period by 75%. 
Moreover, FP7 provides a framework and ﬁ  nancial 
support for major public-private partnerships which 
allow the generation of spill-overs and economies of 
scale. Also, the adoption of the new R&D and inno-
vation state aid framework allows Member States to 
further support R&D and innovation. While the envis-
aged level of 3% would probably not be reached for 
some time, an R&D intensity level of 2.7% would still 
represent a major improvement of almost one third 
compared to the average over the last eight years. 
Wobst (2006) has estimated that reaching this level 
of R&D intensity in 2010 would translate into a level 
change in GDP of 2.6% by 2025. Even if Member 
States were to reach their targets with considerable 
delay depending on the ambitiousness of the speciﬁ  c 
targets in relation to current R&D intensity levels, the 
GDP likely impact would still reach 2.4% by 2025.
It is conceivable that R&D spending growth may not 
have kept up with the acceleration in GDP growth in 
2006 and that R&D intensity might therefore have 
fallen, at least temporarily. While this is partly a sta-
tistical problem, there are more signiﬁ  cant  bottle-
necks for some countries in terms of matching their 
R&D intensity targets with the number of qualiﬁ  ed 
researchers available in the near term. The impor-
tance of ensuring the availability of a skilled work-
force cannot be overstated in this context. The prac-
tical need for a closer integration of the knowledge 
triangle becomes obvious in view of these concerns.
One of the key factors affecting Europe’s ability to 
innovate is the availability of ﬁ  nancing for innovative 
companies both for early stage seed capital, start-
up ﬁ  nancing and, as importantly, venture capital for 
any subsequent expansion. Given the known market 
failures affecting the availability of market ﬁ  nancing 
for innovative start-ups (the public good character 
of knowledge and information asymmetries), there 
is a clear justiﬁ  cation for action on behalf of govern-
ments and the European Union in facilitating access 
to ﬁ  nance, particularly for SMEs. Much can however 
also to be done through internal market policy aim-
ing at establishing an efﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial services sec-
tor in Europe.
Member States’ innovation policies combine a number 
of elements, among which support for innovative 
start-ups is prominent in many National Reform Pro-
grammes. Most Member States are working on improv-
ing the access to ﬁ  nance of innovative start-up compa-
nies for example through the introduction of seed and 
venture capital funds and loan-guarantee schemes 
for SMEs. At the EU level loan guarantee schemes for 
SMEs are provided at the order of € 1.1 billion under 
the new CIP programme (2007-13). This almost dou-
bles the amount of yearly funding compared to the 
current situation. It is expected that this will result in 
a funding of €30 billion for SMEs. Business incuba-
tors, business angels networks, and technology parks 
are also used to pursue this objective. In addition, in 
the context of Structural Funds programmes 2007-
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Graph 2.2: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as% of GDP – levels & targets
Notes:
(1)  IT, NL, RO, UK: 2004; AT, FI: 2006
(2)  IE; PL, UK: R&D intensity targets for 2010 were estimated on the basis of data provided by these countries.
(3)  IE: The target is 2.5% of GNP in 2013
(4)   EU-27: The EU-27 R&D intensity for 2005 was estimated by DG Research. The EU-27 R&D intensity for 2010 results from 
aggregation of the targets set by the Member States (including estimated targets for IE, PL, and UK, but excluding BG)
(5)  Member States have been ranked according to the current level of R&D intensity from left to right.
































































































































































































































2013, JEREMIE («Joint European Resources for Micro 
to Medium Enterprises»), a joint initiative between the 
Commission, the European Investment Fund and the 
European Investment Bank aims to provide improved 
access to ﬁ  nance for SME’s. It includes the supply of 
micro credit, venture capital, loan or guarantees and 
other forms of innovative ﬁ  nancing.
The promotion of excellence in education and 
research is pursued by many Member States also 
with a view to ensuring that there will be a sufﬁ  -
cient supply of researchers, which for many Mem-
ber States represents a serious potential bottleneck 
in reaching their R&D intensity targets. Among the 
measures taken in this area is the identiﬁ  cation of 
centres of excellence where public funding is being 
concentrated. In some cases, such as Denmark, this 
has also involved a certain degree of consolidation 
with the aim to have fewer but bigger universities, 
which are better capable to compete internation-
ally. Some countries also have policies to support 
existing high-performing clusters. Financial support 
of the Structural Funds has been used by Member 
States to assist a wide range of activities in relation to 
research, innovation and the development of skills. 
Of interest are also two successful science education 
reform initiatives, in Germany and France, aiming at 
addressing the decreasing interest of young people 
in key science and technology ﬁ  elds (European Com-
mission, 2007F). At EU level, the Commission’s pro-
posal to establish a European Institute of Technology 
(EIT) represents a challenging initiative to boost the 
innovation capacity of Europe and improve competi-
tiveness. The EIT will seek to integrate the three ele-
ments of the knowledge triangle (education, research 
and innovation) and to promote excellence, attract 
talent and integrate business expertise in all aspects 
of research and education.
While there are areas of notable progress, the efforts 
to increase R&D and innovation in the services sec-
tor, where the EU is signiﬁ  cantly behind the United 
States, have not yet gone far enough. Framework 
conditions to allow R&D-intensive SMEs to grow into 
large companies fast need further improvement. A 
comprehensive intellectual property rights (IPR) 
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strategy that fosters innovation and allows taking 
maximum advantage of the R&D potential of the EU 
is being developed. Efforts to overcome skill short-
ages in the ICT sector and to satisfy the demand for 
more qualiﬁ  ed researchers through a single, open, 
efﬁ  cient and attractive labour market for researchers 
need to be strengthened. This is an issue where the 
beneﬁ  ts of joint reform efforts both in product and 
services markets and in labour markets are evident. 
Few Member States have so far formulated sufﬁ  ciently 
forward-looking policies regarding the availability of 
digital content and related policies (IPRs), digital skills 
requirements, standardisation, next generation net-
works, and security of electronic payments, privacy, 
and interoperability. Efforts to overcome skill short-
ages in the ICT sector and satisfy the demand for 
more qualiﬁ  ed researchers through a single, open, 
efﬁ  cient and attractive labour market for researchers 
need to be strengthened.
Internal Market Policies
The Commission is continuously monitoring and 
updating the community acquis that ensures the 
internal market. For example, a new package of 
measures aimed at improving the free movement of 
goods within the internal market was adopted by the 
Commission in 2007.
A review of the quality both of the reform plans and 
of their implementation in the area of internal mar-
ket policy shows considerable variation among the 
Member States. While the transposition deﬁ  cit in the 
EU has been reduced considerably, there are also 
deﬁ  cits in several Member States when it comes to 
ensuring high-quality transposition, implementation 
and enforcement of internal market legislation, the 
functioning of public procurement markets and, at 
the Community level, the development of a well bal-
anced framework for intellectual property rights. More 
progress is needed to remove the remaining barriers 
which hinder the free movement of capital, economic 
restructuring and the free movement of goods.
While the systematic implementation of the Services 
Directive should in due course lead to a fully opera-
tional Internal Market for services, the use of other 
policy instruments such as competition policy could 
support this. The integration of ﬁ  nancial markets, in 
particular in the area of retail ﬁ  nancial services, has 
so far remained inadequate. Another key area where 
progress in implementing the reforms has been insuf-
ﬁ  cient are measures to increase external openness. 
Competition Policies
As in the area of internal market policy, there is also 
considerable variation with regard to planning and 
implementation of reforms in the area of competi-
tion policy. Clearly, the level of ambition and proc-
ess in the area of competition reforms has varied 
– sometimes considerably – between Member States. 
The measures that were introduced in the National 
Reform Programmes and that have subsequently been 
implemented concerning competition policy have in 
general been rather broad in scope and have rarely 
been linked to concrete indicators or success crite-
ria. Most of the undertaken reform measures address 
network industries, followed closely by the enforce-
ment of competition policy in general. Issues such 
as state aid and competition in professional services 
have not ﬁ  gured prominently in the National Reform 
Programmes. Other measures relating to the ﬁ  eld of 
competition policy have been presented in the con-
text of better regulation or infrastructure policy.
The experience in the competition policy enforce-
ment area is largely positive, although there is scope 
for facilitating more private enforcement. While 
there are positive signs in the area of competition 
screening and removing obstacles to competition, 
these activities would need to be more comprehen-
sively set out and reported by the Member States. 
One of the implementation weaknesses in the area 
of competition policy is the insufﬁ  ciently  targeted 
and integrated approach. A more coherent policy 
approach would require also a deeper knowledge of 
the functioning of markets and the economy as a 
whole. Member States’ competition screening activi-
ties could be expanded and their results reported in 
the implementation reports.
The Commission has completed sector inquiries into 
a number of sectors, such as ﬁ  nancial services and 
energy, which are of key importance from a com-
petitiveness perspective. The inquiries aim at iden-
tifying obstacles to effective competition in order 
to allow the Commission to tackle these restrictive 
practices by an appropriate policy mix. As a result of 
the enquires a number of more speciﬁ  c competition 
enquiries have been opened already.
State aid
The picture on ‘less and better’ State aid is mixed. 
Policy deﬁ  cits and in particular implementation deﬁ  -
cits remain in certain key network industries (espe-
cially gas, electricity and rail). The Commission, in its 
assessment of progress, has made more comments 
in the area of competition policy than in any other 
policy area.
Network industries and services
Clear implementation deﬁ   cits still remain in areas 
such as network industries (notably gas, electricity 
and rail) as well as certain service sectors (in particu-
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lar professional services), where considerable oppor-
tunities for more growth and jobs are being missed. 
Competition in retail and wholesale sectors, where 
productivity differentials vis-à-vis the US are particu-
larly large, has not received the prominence on the 
reform agenda that it deserves. This is the case in 
particular when it comes to ensuring that retail mar-
kets are fair, open and transparent, and respond to 
consumer needs.
Financial Markets
A fully integrated ﬁ  nancial market is vital for the func-
tioning of modern economies and a key for EU’s glo-
bal competitiveness. The functioning of the market 
for ﬁ  nancial services in the EU reveals that although 
there is progress towards a fully integrated internal 
market, it has not yet been fully achieved.
One of the last important parts of the Financial Serv-
ices Action Plan still to be implemented is the Mar-
kets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). The 
MiFID together with the Market Abuse, Prospectus 
and Transparency Directives eliminate most of the 
existing barriers for the efﬁ  cient functioning of the 
Single Market in the securities markets sector. MiFID 
covers most of the ﬁ   nancial instruments in which 
European investors invest (only insurance products 
and plain vanilla deposits are outside the scope of 
the MiFID). It establishes a single set of rules appli-
cable in all Member States leaving very little room 
to national discretion. All European investors and 
ﬁ  rms have the same rights and obligations no mat-
ter where they are located – this will enhance the 
perception of the market participants of being part 
of a single integrated market. MiFID is in the process 
of being transposed by Member States and it will be 
fully operational on 1st November 2007.
Better Regulation policies
As part of their National Reform Programmes under 
the Strategy for Growth and Jobs, Member States 
have been strengthening their Better Regulation 
policies in recent years. Given that the formation of 
a fully-ﬂ  edged institutionalised Better Regulation sys-
tem can only be brought about by laying basic foun-
dations, gathering practical experience, and estab-
lishing the required institutions, Member States ﬁ  nd 
themselves at varying stages of this process depend-
ing on their starting points, the ambition of their 
programmes, and the degree of implementation.
Regulations have an important positive role to play 
in market economies. They are generally used to ful-
ﬁ  l legitimate policy goals regarding environmental, 
consumer or health protection, and for dealing with 
social equity concerns. A considerable amount of 
regulation is also undertaken for economic purposes. 
For instance, at EU level, legislation played an essen-
tial role in establishing the single market. Moreover, 
economic theory suggests that regulations should 
tackle externalities and correct other market failures 
such as information asymmetries, low levels of com-
petition or public goods. By dealing with market fail-
ures regulations can positively inﬂ  uence the sources 
of productivity growth.
Regulations are however also often found to have 
unwanted side effects that may pose unnecessary 
burdens on economic actors and constrain eco-
nomic activity through wrong incentives unrelated 
to the substantive purpose of the regulation and at 
times possibly in contradiction with it. To avoid such 
negative effects of regulation through a systematic 
approach toward lawmaking, governments in vari-
ous countries have begun to pursue various types of 
actions that are commonly referred to as Better Reg-
ulation. The aim is to strengthen the effectiveness 
and efﬁ  ciency of regulation in fulﬁ  lling its substantive 
purpose while systematically avoiding unnecessary 
side effects.
Better Regulation is thus the outcome of a compre-
hensive approach to reforming existing regulatory 
management practices on the basis of three build-
ing blocks: policies, institutions and tools (such as 
impact assessments on new legislative proposals and 
simpliﬁ  cation of existing regulatory framework). Bet-
ter Regulation aims to ensure that existing and future 
legislation is of high quality, i.e. that it is concise, 
straightforward, used only when necessary, and that 
the burdens it imposes are proportionate to its aim.
Better Regulation activities are a key ingredient in 
building and sustaining a good business environ-
ment, ideally through a systematic and institution-
alised effort. One may reasonably expect that the 
systematic application of Better Regulation policies 
would lead over time to leaner and less burdensome 
regulation. While this may be so, the concept of Bet-
ter Regulation must not be confounded with the 
notion of de-regulation. Levels of regulation have 
fallen consistently in recent years both in the United 
States as well as in the European Union57. This seem-
ing narrowing of the differences between regula-
tory approaches may itself be the consequence of 
increased competition between them in the context 
of globalisation.
The task of improving the EU regulatory framework 
is a shared responsibility between Member States 
and EU Institutions. According to national measure-
ments and information available to the Commission, 
approximately 30-40% of the administrative burdens 
on businesses stem for international and EU legisla-
57  Conway et al. (2005).
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tion. This division varies substantially, however, 
depending on the policy area.
There has been a progress across the EU in devel-
oping impact assessment systems with a majority of 
Member States introducing obligatory assessment of 
regulatory impacts. However, so far only the UK and 
Denmark carry out impact assessments covering all 
three dimensions of economic, environmental and 
social impacts, on a systematic basis, and make them 
publicly available.
Systematically mapping and measuring the costs of 
regulation will provide a clear picture of the most 
troublesome requirements and thus a good basis 
for removing the burdens where possible. Based on 
national measurements, it is expected beforehand 
that Company Law (including accounting and audit-
ing) will be amongst the most burdensome legisla-
tive areas in the EU. While simpliﬁ  cation and reduc-
tion of administrative burdens can help improve the 
existing regulatory framework, integrated impact 
assessments can analyse the most efﬁ  cient ways of 
designing new policies. 
All Member States acknowledge the role of better 
regulation in improving the business environment 
and reducing the administrative costs borne by busi-
nesses and a majority among them considers the 
business environment to be a key priority. 
Simpliﬁ  cation measures are being increasingly imple-
mented as a part of a simpliﬁ  cation programme or 
plan that unlike ad-hoc simpliﬁ  cation  measures 
establishes criteria for a systematic and continuous 
assessment of the existing legislation, preventing it 
from becoming obsolete, unnecessarily burdensome 
and costly for business, citizens and public admin-
istrations. Nevertheless, the implementation of sim-
pliﬁ  cation programmes has been in most cases only 
recently launched. Moreover, the absence of timeta-
ble and targets as well as lack of subsequent progress 
monitoring and evaluation of the results might slow 
down the materialization of economic impacts of 
these programmes. 
Among Member States there are varying degrees 
of advancement with regard to a systematic and 
institutional approach for simpliﬁ  cation.  Several 
Member States have begun or are about to begin 
systematic screening of legislation, albeit using a sec-
toral rather than a comprehensive approach. Many 
Member States are using a range of ad hoc simpli-
ﬁ  cation measures, such as improved e-government 
and administrative simpliﬁ  cation more generally. E-
government is already well developed in a number 
of Member States, where government services for 
enterprises and citizens are well developed, widely 
accessible and used. In most Member States public 
authorities are in the process of improving their use 
of ICT. In a few cases, these efforts are yet in the 
planning stage. 
As regards the reduction of administrative burdens in 
Member States, most Member States have adopted 
the Standard Cost Model58 as their methodology for 
measuring administrative costs. However, only six of 
them have actually conducted a baseline measure-
ment, while 11 are preparing partial measurements. 
Only six Member States currently envisage reduc-
ing administrative burdens by 25% or more. The 
evaluation of progress with regard to the reduction 
of administrative burdens has not yet advanced in 
many Member States. 
The task of improving the EU regulatory framework 
is a shared responsibility between Member States 
and the EU Institutions: The Commission’s rolling 
programme for simpliﬁ  cation is well on track and, 
for the period 2006-2009, no less than 43 new ini-
tiatives were added to the initial set of 100 initia-
tives. The bulk of the simpliﬁ  cation proposals tabled 
by the Commission are currently pending before 
the European Parliament and/or Council. The role 
of the co-legislator is critical for the timely delivery 
of simpliﬁ  cation objectives. The Commission will fur-
ther pursue and strengthen its simpliﬁ  cation efforts. 
A second progress report is planned for early 2008 
which will take stock of progress and enhance the 
programme with a new set of initiatives.
Moreover, the implementation of the 2007 Action 
Programme on the reduction of administrative bur-
dens has commenced. In parallel, the Commission is 
launching a dedicated website for stakeholders’ con-
tributions to the administrative burdens programme 
together with the creation of a high level group of 
independent stakeholders to provide further advice 
on its implementation.
SME and entrepreneurship policies
The European Commission assists European SMEs 
with a large number of instruments reaching from 
the provision of information and networking oppor-
tunities to the facilitation of start-up and venture 
capital ﬁ  nancing59 and, more generally, it promotes 
the implementation of the Think Small First principle 
58   The EU Standard Cost Model (EU SCM) is a methodology used to asses 
the administrative costs incurred by businesses as a result of legislation. 
According to the EU SCM, administrative costs should be assessed on 
the basis of the average cost of the required action (Price) multiplied by 
the total number of actions performed per year (Quantity). The average 
cost per action will be estimated by multiplying a tariff (based on aver-
age labour cost per hour including prorated overheads in a given coun-
try) and the time required per action. Where appropriate, other types of 
costs such as equipment or supplies’ costs will be taken into account. The 
quantity will be calculated as the frequency of required actions multiplied 
by the number of entities concerned.
59   See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sme/index_en.htm.
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in Community and national policies. In the context 
of the renewed Lisbon Strategy, the March 2006 
European Council formulated a number of speciﬁ  c 
targets that Member States should reach until end-
2007 in order to help unlock the business potential, 
particularly of SMEs60.
Member States are making important efforts in cre-
ating a favourable business environment for SMEs. 
SMEs representative are widely consulted in the law-
making process and involved in the preparation of 
the Lisbon progress reports. Speciﬁ  c  provisions  to 
alleviate the burden of legislation on SMEs are some-
times planned but they are not systematically pro-
posed in all countries.
Member States have made considerable progress in 
reducing the start-up times to less than one week. In 
most Member States it is already possible to register a 
company much faster than that. While start-up costs 
still vary considerably among Member States and 
considerable scope for further reductions in some 
countries, the progress made so far is signiﬁ  cant. In 
the past, both the costs and their variance among 
Member States were much higher. In 2002, the aver-
age cost of setting up a limited company was €830, 
with the highest cost in one country of €2,232, while 
company registration was already then completely 
free of charge in another (Denmark)61. The reduction 
of start-up times and costs already achieved should 
make ﬁ  rm entry into the market easier and thereby 
contribute to a better and more competitive busi-
ness environment conducive to improved manage-
ment practices and higher productivity. 
One of the concrete objectives set out by the 2006 
Spring European Council concerned the establish-
ment in all Member States of one-stop shops for start-
up companies62. The availability of a single contact 
point not only for the provision of information but 
also for processing company registrations in full would 
help facilitate start-ups and thereby market entry. 
The implementation is in many cases not yet at an 
advanced stage and it is unlikely that the target will be 
reached by most Member States by the end of 2007.
It appears that in some cases, the complexity of pro-
viding a one-stop shop for company registration that 
60   “The Member States should establish, by 2007, a one-stop-shop, or 
arrangements with equivalent effect, for setting up a company in a quick 
and simple way. Member States should take adequate measures to con-
siderably reduce the average time for setting up a business, especially 
an SME, with the objective of being able to do this within one week 
anywhere in the EU by the end of 2007. Start-up fees should be as low as 
possible and the recruitment of a ﬁ  rst employee should not involve more 
than one public administration point.” 2006 Spring European Council. 
Presidency Conclusions. (7775/1/06 REV 1), paragraph 30.
61  European Commission, 2002A.
62   The targets were speciﬁ  ed in European Commission, (2007C) Assessing 
Business Start-up Procedures in the context of the renewed Lisbon strat-
egy for growth and jobs. Commission Staff Working Document.
is easily accessible across the entire territory of the 
Member State has been underestimated, which may 
have led to a late start of implementation. However, 
serious efforts have already been made and signiﬁ  -
cant improvements can be noted in many Member 
States, including through a greater availability of 
online information for companies. The involvement 
of the chambers of commerce in a number of coun-
tries has apparently helped to speed up progress 
with setting up one-stop shops.
Facilitating recruitment procedures for the ﬁ  rst 
employee is another objective set by the 2006 Spring 
European Council in the light of their importance as 
a barrier to company expansion for many SMEs. 
Only few countries (e.g. Spain, Malta, and Portugal) 
have a special one-stop-shop system for recruitment 
or one-stop-shops for start-ups that can also take care 
of recruitment. Some few countries have procedures 
that are so simple that only one contact with a public 
administration is required (Ireland, Lithuania, Swe-
den). Belgium is a special case, in Belgium “social 
secretariats” take care of all employment related pro-
cedures for businesses, including the registration of 
new employees etc. However, these secretariats have 
to be paid by businesses.
In some countries at least the social security registra-
tion is organised as a one-stop-shop or one-window-
system, i.e. one branch of the social security collects 
the registration and distributes the information to 
the other branches (e.g. Germany or the UK where 
all procedures can be taken care of by the Treasury). 
On average there are still 2 ½ mandatory contacts 
and 3 procedures required. In almost all countries 
the social security organisations have to be informed 
about the new employment, often the employer 
himself also has to register. Frequent are also con-
tacts/registration procedures with the tax authorities 
(for payroll taxes). In several countries a notiﬁ  cation 
of the employment agency is necessary.
Finally Member States are taking measures to sim-
plify and make the public procurement rules more 
transparent and thereby also facilitate SMEs’ partici-
pation. Almost in all countries the access to informa-
tion on public tenders has been simpliﬁ  ed while sin-
gle electronic access points (webportals) containing 
relevant information on individual tenders and the 
tendering process are widely used. The simpliﬁ  cation 
of the procurement by introducing electronic pro-
curement is also under way in many countries.
Taxation reform
So far, academic research has produced mixed and 
ambiguous results on the impact of taxation on eco-
nomic growth at the macroeconomic level. This is 
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however not surprising given the technical difﬁ  cul-
ties of ﬁ  nding adequate variables able to summarize 
all the subtleties of tax systems. Instead, the effect 
of taxation on growth shall be rather looked at at 
the microeconomic level. This is because taxes have 
the potential to directly affect economic decisions 
and hence impact on the various channels that are 
conducive to growth. Taxation may have effects on 
investment and saving behaviours, on the incen-
tive to pursue R&D and innovation activities, on the 
attractiveness of countries of foreign direct invest-
ment, on entrepreneurship, on the incentives to par-
ticipate to the labour market or to get education, on 
consumption patterns, etc.
Recently, the European Commission, while fully 
recognising the sovereignty of Member States in 
choosing their tax system, has engaged in a broad 
reﬂ  ection with Member States through the European 
Policy Committee on the tax reforms that could be 
carried out to make our tax systems more growth-
enhancing. Some analytical work has also started at 
the OECD on the links between taxation and growth. 
This is also to be seen in the context of growing chal-
lenges of ageing and globalisation that are likely to 
put pressures on our social systems.
2.3.1.   Spillovers across Member States and 
Synergies across policy areas in the 
context of the Growth and Jobs Strategy
The success of the Growth and Jobs Strategy, with 
its emphasis on job creation and economic growth, 
relies on the implementation of the National Reform 
Programmes and the Community Lisbon Pro-
gramme. An important aspect of the strategy is the 
coordination of these national reform policies across 
Member States and with policies at EU level. Actions 
are planned at the Community level when they can 
complement, facilitate or strengthen policy actions 
envisaged at the national level. In such cases, purely 
national action is insufﬁ   cient because important 
cross-border externalities or economies of scale are 
concerned. An assessment of the beneﬁ  ts of coordi-
nation contributes to the full understanding of the 
gains to be reaped from the full implementation of 
the reforms envisaged under the Growth and Jobs 
Strategy.
There are several reasons why coordination of Member 
States’ economic reforms may bring beneﬁ  ts. Coun-
tries can learn from each other, joint efforts are stimu-
lating reform implementation, coordination can help 
overcome national resistance against reforms, and 
joint efforts may increase the beneﬁ  ts from reforms. 
This section focuses on this last reason. Thus, the cen-
tral question here is to assess the beneﬁ  ts for the EU 
Member States of jointly implementing the Lisbon 
reforms, compared with an alternative scenario where 
each country pursues these reforms unilaterally. Do 
structural reforms in products and labour markets in 
one Member State have externalities in other Mem-
ber States? Are there complementarities or trade-offs 
between reforms depending on the policy ﬁ  eld?
The spillovers associated with joint action in the EU 
are illustrated here with regard to four policy areas 
and assuming that Member States will reach targets 
set in these areas as planned: the 70% employment 
target, several skills targets (less early school leavers, 
more graduates from secondary education; increased 
reading literacy and more lifelong learning), a 2.7% 
R&D expenditure target, and a 25% decrease in 
administrative burdens on companies. 
To assess the magnitude of the spillovers associated 
with these policies a comparison is made between 
the outcomes resulting from simultaneous policy 
implementation by all Member States and the out-
comes when an individual Member State conducts 
these policies unilaterally. This approach allows an 
assessment of the beneﬁ   ts from coordination for 
each individual Member State. This comparison is 
made for each of the reform targets set out above. 
The exercise allows an analysis of the various inter-
country linkages and the identiﬁ  cation of the chan-
nels, the magnitude and the distribution across 
Member States of potential spillovers63. It also pro-
vides insights into potential synergies and/or trade-
offs between the different policies.
2.3.1.  Reforms leading to skills upgrading
The increase in skills implicit in ﬁ  ve targets set in the 
2003 Spring Council will increase signiﬁ  cantly human 
capital levels in the long run64. The impacts of this 
policy, especially those on employment, vary signiﬁ  -
cantly across countries. The effects of implementing 
63   The interactions between these Lisbon policies and the rest of the economy 
are complex. The effects of reaching a Lisbon target can only be meaning-
fully considered by taking account of these interactions which requires a 
formal analytical framework. The outcomes presented in this section result 
from simulations using WorldScan, an applied general equilibrium model 
developed at CPB (Lejour et al., 2006) and NiGEM, the macro GE model 
with rational expectations developed at NIESR (Barell et al., 2007). See 
Lejour and Rojas-Romagosa (2007) and Berell and Kirby (2007) for a full 
description of this exercise and a more detailed exposition of the results.
64   The May 2003 Council agreed on ﬁ  ve targets by 2010 (see European 
Commission, 2004) : EU average rate of no more than 10% early school 
leavers; at least 85% of 22 year olds in the European Union should have 
completed upper secondary education or higher; decrease by at least 
20% relative to 2000 the percentage of low-achieving 15 year olds in 
reading literacy; EU average level of participation in Lifelong Learning at 
least 12.5% of the adult working age population; total number of gradu-
ates in mathematics, science and technology (MS&T) in the EU should 
increase by at least 15% by 2010 and the level of gender imbalance 
should decrease. Jacobs (2005) presents the model used to incorporate 
the various aspects of skill-formation needed to simulate these targets. 
The model contains a cohorts’ structure to compute the impact of reach-
ing the targets on the skill structure of the labour force in the period 
2010-2040 and calculates a time path of the increase of labour efﬁ  ciency. 
See also Lejour (2007) for more details on this simulation. 
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the skills targets by 2010 materialize in the long run 
and by 2040 would represent an extra 2.1% increase in 
GDP of which 0.1 percentage point on average can be 
attributed to international. This means that spillovers of 
a joint EU-wide policy represent roughly a 4% increase 
in output and consumption. All countries would make 
consumption gains when acting together, and would 
experience an increase in real wages. The effect on con-
sumption is less than on output as the skills programme 
by increasing labour efﬁ  ciency increases the need for 
capital, and in an open economy this induces capital 
inﬂ  ows, matched by a current account deﬁ  cit to ﬁ  nance 
the capital accumulation, and net foreign assets fall. As 
a consequence income increases less than GDP. More-
over, simulations show that when countries act alone 
they may turn the terms of trade against themselves, as 
in Sweden and Finland where consumption falls when 
acting alone. There are clear gains from acing together 
as the terms of trade effect is moderated signiﬁ  cantly.
2.3.2.   Decreasing administrative burdens by cutting 
red tape
Output and consumption could increase by 1.1% to 
1.9% in the EU if a 25% reduction in administrative 
burdens were achieved jointly by all Member States. 
Across countries there is relatively little variance in 
terms of gains from the reduction in administrative 
burdens. Only a few new Member States would reap 
beneﬁ  ts larger than 3%. Variation in the impact of the 
administrative burden reduction is associated in part 
with the openness of the country, with a larger impact 
being felt in those countries whose economies are 
more open. The international spillovers for this simula-
tion are on average 0.1 percentage point in GDP and 
0.2 percentage point in consumption. In other words, 
acting together brings an extra 5% gain in GDP and 
an extra 10% in consumption relative to unilateral 
actions. The spillovers estimates are higher when the 
demand effects of higher employment elsewhere and 
the impact of lower import prices are signiﬁ  cant.
2.3.3.  Achieving announced R&D intensity targets
If Member States achieve the R&D intensity targets 
announced in their National Reform Programmes 
R&D expenditures in the EU will increase from 1.9% 
of GDP in 2004 to 2.7% in 201065. This could lead to 
an increase in output of 3.3% for the European Union 
as whole. Cross-border knowledge spillovers would 
account for roughly half of these gains66. In the new 
Member States and the Scandinavian countries out-
65   The results presented assume that the targets are reached in 2010. Given 
that this represents an overall increase of almost 50% important chal-
lenges lye ahead, notably that of attracting or training sufﬁ  cient research-
ers in such a relatively short period of time. 
66   The knowledge spillovers channel dwarfs other potential spillover chan-
nels, such as terms of trade effects, capital market effects and export 
demand increases.
put gains from spillovers caused by increases in R&D 
intensity brought about by other Member States are 
even higher than the gains they would reap from 
their own increase in R&D spending. These signiﬁ  -
cant spillovers are obtained as direct consequence of 
the huge increases in R&D expenditures implicit in 
the national R&D spending targets.
The high cost of ﬁ   nancing the R&D targets has 
dampening implications for consumption. Reﬂ  ecting 
the larger amounts of savings needed to ﬁ  nance the 
investment in R&D, the increase in consumption is 
only about half that seen in GDP rates. The importance 
of international spillovers is also clear in terms of con-
sumption. When Member States act alone, consump-
tion increases on average by less than one percentage 
point. When they act together consumption registers 
an increase of more than a 2 percentage points.
The scale of the increase in public spending and 
taxation is relevant for the level of real interest rates. 
That level would rise by more than 50 basis points 
in the European Union as a whole, if public spend-
ing on R&D were to rise as implied by the national 
targets. As the private sector capital stock depends 
on the user cost of capital, which moves with the real 
interest rate, the level of private sector capital and 
investment will be lower than it would have been in 
the absence of the increase in public R&D spending 
for the given level of output. This crowding out from 
increased government spending reduces the spillo-
ver from the increase in R&D signiﬁ  cantly.
2.3.4.   Labour market reforms leading 
to the employment target
Improving the employment performance is an 
important goal of the Growth and Jobs strategy. A 
target of 70% for the employment rate has been set 
for the EU as a whole for 2010. Employment policies 
are expected to act on two fronts: increasing labour-
market participation and lowering unemployment.
For most Member States, the spillovers associated 
with joint action add less than 0.5 percentage points 
of extra GDP. The most important channel for this 
effect is the knowledge spillover: through the increase 
in GDP caused by higher employment, R&D expen-
ditures increase as well and the output created by 
these extra expenditures also spills over to the other 
Member States through trade.
2.3.5. Policy  synergies
The claims that labour market reforms and product 
market reforms are complementary have been cor-
roborated by recent empirical studies67. The simula-
67  Bayoumi et al. (2004); IMF (2003).
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tions reported here indicate clear synergies between 
product and labour market policies. As an example, 
increasing skills and R&D raises real wages, which in 
turn should increase participation rates by around one 
percentage point on average across the EU. Also, the 
reduction of administrative burdens, through lower 
mark-ups, has strong synergies with the employment 
target due to a reduction in equilibrium unemploy-
ment. The attainment of the skills, administrative 
burden and R&D targets, will increase employment, 
and thereby ease the pressure on policy measures to 
reach the employment target. There are also clear 
synergies between the skills policy and R&D policies 
to the extent that without a sufﬁ  cient supply of M&ST 
workers additional R&D expenditures will increase 
wages for these workers but not output substantially. 
Overall, combined implementation of measures in 
the four policy areas discussed above brings an extra 
0.4  increase in output and 0.3 percentage point 
of consumption in the EU-27 relative to the sum of 
effects of the separate policies.
2.4. Conclusions
The European reform effort will boost productivity
Raising Europe’s the long-term growth potential by 
increasing productivity growth is one of the funda-
mental objectives of the renewed Lisbon strategy 
for growth and jobs. Along with the goal of simul-
taneously raising employment in the European 
Union, achieving higher productivity growth is part 
of a strategic response to the challenges entailed in 
globalisation and the demographic development 
in Europe. If the European Union wants to sustain 
its social model in the future, strong productivity 
growth is one important precondition for being able 
to do so. 
Many reforms in pursuit of raising productivity growth 
are being undertaken in the microeconomic policy 
pillar of the renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and 
jobs both by Member States in their National Reform 
Programmes and at the European Union level under 
the Community Lisbon Programme. In their 2005 
National Reform Programmes, Member States iden-
tiﬁ   ed the largest number of key challenges in the 
microeconomic policy area. This reﬂ  ects the realisa-
tion that stronger and sustained productivity growth 
is crucial for successfully facing the challenges posed 
by globalisation and ageing societies.
Enhancing the productive potential is a long-haul 
effort that will need to be sustained for years before 
its full results can be felt and systematically meas-
ured. The results of structural reforms can, in any 
case, rarely be captured in the short term and the 
measurement of their effects is complex. While the 
full effects of the reform efforts launched under the 
Growth and Jobs strategy will therefore only be seen 
in years to come, the analysis presented here sug-
gests that Member States and the European Union 
level are engaged in the implementation of microeco-
nomic structural reforms that hold, if seen through, 
considerable potential for raising total factor produc-
tivity in the European Union. The fact that Member 
States have identiﬁ  ed key challenges in policy areas 
where their productivity growth was comparatively 
low at the outset suggests that productivity growth 
is what they have in mind. The endorsement by the 
European Council of a set of country-speciﬁ  c recom-
mendations and points to watch which also reﬂ  ects 
these policy areas shows that the European Union as 
a whole is serious and ambitious about this agenda. 
It does however also indicate that Member States 
and the European Union level need to do much 
more if they want to reap the beneﬁ  ts of the reforms 
promised in their National Reform Programmes and 
the Community Lisbon Programme. It is nonethe-
less clear that important progress has already been 
achieved in areas that are of key importance for 
future productivity growth and that this should, in 
due course, produce tangible results. While it is too 
early for quantitative assessments, the most recent 
data on productivity developments presented in 
Chapter 1 seem to be consistent with a positive view 
of the structural reform effort by Member States 
and the European Union level to boost productivity 
growth.
Theoretical considerations and empirical studies on 
productivity growth and structural reforms
There is a rich theoretical and empirical literature 
on the preconditions for total factor productivity 
growth, the relationship between competition, inno-
vation and total factor productivity as well as the role 
of product market regulation in that context, and 
the factors behind the evolution of the productivity 
gap between Europe and the United States. While 
the positive relationship between competition and 
productivity is conﬁ  rmed by empirical studies, the 
interplay of competition and innovation is complex 
and the relationship largely depends on the proxim-
ity of ﬁ  rms and sectors to the technological frontier. 
The literature explains the widening of the produc-
tivity gap between the US and the EU since the mid-
1990s mainly in terms of the efﬁ  ciency of ICT use. 
Recent empirical studies seem to suggest that the 
productivity differentials between the US and the 
EU regarding ICT use may be attributable mainly to 
the concomitant presence of organisational change, 
which is found to occur more easily in environments 
with higher levels of competition. The importance 
for productivity growth of a well functioning and 
competitive internal market with external openness 
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is thus well established. Most empirical studies also 
suggest a clear negative relationship between the 
intensity of regulation and indicators of economic 
performance.
The empirical literature has also produced a wealth 
of estimates for the effects of structural reforms in the 
microeconomic area on productivity, employment 
and economic growth. The estimates serve to dem-
onstrate the potential impact of some of the reforms 
already launched, such as policies to reach the R&D 
target, and to illustrate the order of magnitude of 
possible effects of other types of reforms that could 
yet be implemented. They highlight the importance 
of investment in knowledge and innovation and in 
particular of incremental increases in educational 
attainment for total factor productivity. They also 
conﬁ  rm the pre-eminent role of competition and a 
functioning internal market for productivity, specify-
ing the likely beneﬁ  ts from the implementation of the 
Services Directive, from greater competition in ﬁ  nan-
cial markets and from full market opening in network 
industries. The intensity and quality of regulation is 
of great relevance for a good microeconomic busi-
ness environment and productivity growth. This is 
shown by a number of studies estimating the impact 
of pro-competitive product market reforms and the 
reduction of administrative costs on productivity and 
growth. Finally, a number of studies conﬁ  rm the the-
oretical claim that combined reforms in product and 
labour markets amplify their beneﬁ  ts.
Structural reforms pursued by Member States and the 
European Union level
With the re-launch of the Lisbon strategy as the part-
nership for growth and jobs in 2005, Member States 
have formulated reform policies in their National 
Reform Programmes based on the identiﬁ  cation of 
key challenges. The growth and jobs strategy also 
has a strong Community dimension, which comple-
ments and supports Member States’ reform efforts 
in responding to the challenges and opportunities 
of globalisation wherever collective EU-level action 
brings clear additional beneﬁ   ts compared to indi-
vidual actions at the national level. For the microeco-
nomic pillar the key challenges identiﬁ  ed focus on 
the areas of R&D, innovation, and ICT, on competi-
tion policy as well as on the business and regulatory 
environment. This focus clearly corresponds to pol-
icy areas which have great relevance for total factor 
productivity growth. 
While Member States pursue broadly adequate poli-
cies to raise R&D intensity, including through the 
promotion of centres of excellence and the facilita-
tion of innovative start-ups, there is still considerable 
further scope to increase R&D and innovation in the 
services sector. In the areas of internal market and 
competition policies, there is considerable variation 
in Member States’ reform plans. The implementation 
of the Services Directive should in due course lead to 
a fully operational internal market for services. Mem-
ber States’ reform measures to enhance competition 
concern in particular the network industries. Other 
areas of competition policy which also hold impor-
tant potential for growth and jobs, such as profes-
sional services and state aid, received considerably 
less attention. Experiences with competition policy 
enforcement are however largely positive. Mem-
ber States’ have made progress with their efforts to 
improve the business and regulatory environment 
through Better Regulation policies and the imple-
mentation of concrete measures envisaged by the 
2006 Spring European Council. The positive impact 
of the latter should be felt relatively soon, particularly 
by SMEs. 
The success of the renewed Lisbon strategy depends 
crucially on the implementation of the National 
Reform Programmes and the Community Lisbon 
Programme. An important aspect of the strategy is 
the coordination of these national reform policies at 
the EU level, where they are subject to multilateral 
surveillance. Section 2.2.4 on the role of spillovers 
has clearly demonstrated the value-added of Mem-
ber States acting jointly in the pursuit of structural 
reforms in the microeconomic pillar of the strategy. 
The comparison between individual and joint action 
has shown for each of the policy areas analysed that 
the overall beneﬁ  ts will be larger in the case of joint 
action. 
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Chapter 3. Skill problems in 
European Industrial Sectors
3.1. Introduction
There exists an intimate relationship between skills 
and productivity. At the individual level, a worker’s 
educational background has a strong impact on his 
or her wage (cf. Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2002). And 
at the aggregate level there is an emerging litera-
ture showing that average educational attainment of 
a country’s labour force is positively associated with 
aggregate productivity. In other words, human capi-
tal contributes to productivity, both at the level of 
individual workers and at the macroeconomic level. 
The other side of the coin of this widely established 
economic importance of human capital is that skill 
problems can have adverse consequences. Skill mis-
matches in the economy can lead to a situation where 
unemployment and unﬁ  lled vacancies co-exist. It is 
obvious that this entails a welfare cost for the unem-
ployed individual, for the industry who cannot fully 
realise its economic potential, as well as for society 
at large. Insights into and a deeper understanding of 
the nature of the skill problems could feed into the 
design of better human capital policies. This is in a 
nutshell the topic of this chapter.
The chapter provides new empirical evidence on 
the importance of skills for competitiveness of Euro-
pean industrial sectors, and looks into the process 
of skill upgrading. It should be noted that the chap-
ter concentrates on the manufacturing sector, while 
a comparable analysis for the service sector (which 
contributes a substantial part to value added in the 
EU, see also chapter 1) is left for further research. 
The chapter also reports the results of case studies 
in relation to two particular industries, textiles and 
clothing and mechanical engineering. The chapter 
ﬁ  nally provides a discussion on various types of skill 
gaps, and of the corresponding rationales of educa-
tion and training policies.
The main questions addressed here are:
–   What is the contribution of skills to competitive-
ness of European industrial sectors?
–   What is the nature of the skill upgrading process 
as witnessed in the EU?
–  How do skill shortages manifest themselves?
–   What is the role of education and training policies 
to combat skill shortages, and which interven-
tions could potentially increase welfare?
This chapter is structured along these four central 
questions. Section 3.2 recapitulates two phenom-
ena central in the analysis, namely the ubiquitous 
process of skill upgrading and the matching proc-
ess on labour markets. An aggregate perspective is 
chosen to set the general scene before turning to 
a lower aggregation level in the following sections. 
Section 3.3 presents new empirical evidence of the 
relationship between skills and industrial competi-
tiveness. It explores the relationship between skills 
and some performance indicators. The nature of 
skill upgrading is investigated in Section 3.4. In par-
ticular, it is studied whether skill upgrading mainly 
reﬂ  ects increasing demand for skills within sectors, 
or shifts towards more skill intensive sectors. Sec-
tion 3.5 reports the insights on skill gaps which have 
been obtained from case studies. The two industries 
chosen for these case studies are not the ones which 
usually get the limelight in the context of analysis 
of skill shortages, e.g. those in which ICT skills are 
particularly important. In fact they were deliberately 
chosen to show that the issue of skill shortages and 
the planning of skill acquisition and skill supply is also 
very relevant in industries which either experience 
an absolute reduction in employment levels or a fall 
in their employment shares, but might still be a sig-
niﬁ  cant source of income and employment in many 
parts of the EU. Section 3.6 ﬁ  rst identiﬁ  es different 
types of skill shortages, and then goes on to discuss 
roles for education and training policies. The chapter 
is winded up in Section 3.7.
3.2. General  background
Educational attainment (measured by number of 
years of attending school) shows an upward trend in 
the EU countries, as well as in most other countries 
across the world. This is illustrated in Table 3.1 for a 
selection of countries.
Between 1960 and 2000, China managed to increase 
average educational attainment from about two 
years to almost six years, while the other countries 
included in the table lifted education levels to ten 
years or more.
It is widely accepted that more years in formal edu-
cation enhances a person’s skill level. This not only 
refers to cognitive skills but also to a range of other 
skills (e.g. social skills and communication skills). A 
better educated work force is conducive for a coun-
try’s economic performance. Human capital not only 
augments the efﬁ  ciency of labour, it can also help to 
create absorptive capacity so that ﬁ  rms can more eas-
ily adopt technologies developed elsewhere68. Both 
68   There exist other beneﬁ  ts of education, which fall outside the scope of 
this chapter. For instance, there is a negative relationship between edu-
cational attainment levels and unemployment rates. Average unemploy-
ment in the EU27 among persons with low education levels (pre-primary, 
primary and lower secondary education) is 10.1% in 2006. Average 
unemployment for those with upper secondary and post-secondary non-
tertiary education is 7.3%, and average unemployment for persons with 
tertiary education is 4.1% (source: online database from Eurostat).
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Table 3.1: Development of number of years in formal education of the 15-64 age group 
1960 1980 2000
Belgium 7.39 9.24 10.84
China 2.26 4.10 5.96
France 6.73 9.34 10.73
Germany 9.52 12.65 12.95
Japan 9.48 11.20 12.61
Romania 7.22 8.31 10.00
United Kingdom 9.11 11.57 13.12
United States 10.18 12.19 12.63
Source: Cohen and Soto, 2001.
mechanisms would foster productivity and interna-
tional competitiveness. This is conﬁ  rmed in econo-
metric research. A typical result from these studies is 
that an increase in average educational attainment 
of the labour force by one year would increase pro-
ductivity by something like 8-10% (see for instance 
Cohen and Soto (2001), De la Fuente and Ciccone 
(2003) De la Fuente and Doménech (2006), Can-
ton (2007)). As an illustration, these estimates imply 
that a three year increase in educational attainment – 
which is a fairly representative number for the coun-
tries listed in the table – would yield a productivity 
gain in the order of 24-30%, an enormous effect 
indeed. In addition, the level of educational attain-
ment is found to impact on productivity growth (see 
e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005), Portela 
et al. (2004) and European Commission (2006)). 
Therefore, in light of EU’s growth and jobs strategy, 
actions to increase human capital complement the 
myriad of structural policies discussed in Chapter 2 
to strengthen the overall economic performance.
Against this background of increasing educational 
attainment, concerns about skill shortages are often 
expressed. Does the education system deliver the 
skills demanded by the market? Can people easily 
be re-trained to accommodate shifts in the needed 
type of skills? Skill gaps can emerge after an increase 
in demand for (or fall in supply of) a certain skill, but 
can also indicate a non-optimal mix of skills in the 
economy. Beveridge curves, i.e. the loci of unem-
ployment and vacancy rates, can give some insight 
into the importance of both types of skill gaps. Shifts 
along this curve reﬂ  ect the usual business cycle ﬂ  uc-
tuations, while shifts of the Beveridge curve point 
at changes that improve or worsen the matching 
process, and thereby affect the equilibrium level 
of unemployment. As described in Employment in 
Europe 2004 (cf. European Commission, 2004), the 
Beveridge curve shifted to the right in nearly all EU 
countries from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, 
indicating an increase in the equilibrium level of 
unemployment. After the mid-1980s, EU Member 
States can be divided into two groups: (i) those 
for which the Beveridge curve did not shift signiﬁ  -
cantly, and (ii) those for which the Beveridge curve 
has moved leftwards. Belgium, Germany, France, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden belong to the 
former group, whereas Denmark, Spain, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Hungary and the United Kingdom are 
in the latter group.
This latter group of countries has apparently been 
more successful in reducing structural unemploy-
ment. While an explanation of these observations 
with respect to Beveridge curves goes beyond the 
scope of this chapter, the corresponding analytical 
framework can serve as a useful point of reference 
in our discussion on skill gaps due to cyclical ver-
sus more structural factors. The sectoral approach 
adopted in this chapter can help to increase our 
understanding of labour market dynamics. Such an 
approach allows us to study employment changes 
within and between sectors, and this could provide 
guidance in shaping human capital policies. In par-
ticular, insight into the importance of employment 
shifts across sectors could shed light on the relevance 
of generic versus speciﬁ  c skills.
3.3.   Skills and competitiveness 
of EU manufacturing industries
3.3.1. Introduction
As mentioned in Section 3.2, there is a substan-
tial macroeconomic literature on the relationship 
between human capital and productivity growth (cf. 
Mankiw et al. (1992), Aghion and Howitt (1998), 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Vandenbussche et 
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al. (2006)). The more recent studies who are based 
on improved human capital data typically ﬁ  nd a sub-
stantial contribution of skills to productivity. While 
one would expect similar effects to be visible at sec-
toral level, this literature is less developed (see e.g. 
OECD (1996) and Grifﬁ  th et al. (2004)). In this sec-
tion evidence is presented of the impact of human 
capital (skills measured by educational attainment) 
on indicators of competitiveness. A ﬁ  rst indicator is 
productivity growth, where the underlying assump-
tion is that a better educated work force is better 
in adopting, implementing and even creating new 
technologies. A second measure of international 
competitiveness is success in foreign markets, i.e. 
exports. Higher export growth – compared to other 
countries – can be looked at as gaining competitive-
ness in world markets, driven by the dynamics of 
comparative advantages.
To study these issues the recently released EU KLEMS69 
dataset is used (see www.euklems.org). This dataset 
consists of a cross-section of eleven manufacturing 
industries (corresponding to NACE 2-digit aggre-
gates) and twenty-four European countries (not 
included are Bulgaria, Malta and Romania) over the 
period 1995-2004. The database provides data for 
growth rates of labour productivity (value added per 
hour worked) measured at constant prices. A detailed 
description of the methodology and data issues can 
be found in Timmer et al. (2007)70. These data are 
combined with information on educational attain-
ment levels using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data 
(available for the period 1998-2004). Sectoral aver-
ages of employment shares of different educational 
attainment groups (ISCED groups high, medium and 
low educated) are used over this time interval by sec-
tor to avoid data problems (like ﬂ  uctuations in shares 
due to small sample sizes and outliers).
The most striking fact is that in a number of countries 
growth rates of labour productivity in the more skill 
intensive sectors are indeed higher. This is especially 
the case for the cohesion countries Greece and Por-
tugal, and for all Eastern European countries except 
Cyprus. Most of these countries also show higher 
growth rates in the other sectors as well, pointing 
towards a catching-up process. In the advanced 
economies this pattern of higher growth rates in 
the skill intensive sectors is eminent mainly in Fin-
land and Sweden. Another measure of competitive-
ness is growth of exports which is typically higher 
69   The EU KLEMS database is the result of a three year, European Commis-
sion funded research project involving 16 European research institutes, 
which has recently become available for free public use at http://www.EU 
KLEMS.net. See Timmer et al (2007) for further details on the construc-
tion of the database.
70   It should be noted that the EU KLEMS project is ongoing, and further 
improvements can be made for instance in terms of coherence with ofﬁ  -
cially published ﬁ  gures from national statistical agencies.
in the skill intensive industries. This is especially the 
case for Eastern European countries like the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Estonia 
and Latvia.
3.3.2.  Skills and competitiveness at the industry level
This sub-section presents in a non-technical way results 
from an econometric analysis in which the growth of 
labour productivity at sector level is explained from 
the skill intensity in that sector (expressed as the 
share of workers with a certain skill level), and a set of 
controls. Among these control variables is the initial 
productivity gap, deﬁ  ned as the log of the productiv-
ity level in a particular sector and country divided by 
the productivity level of the leading industry-coun-
try pair. The results are presented in Table 3.2 where 
each of the skill types is included separately (speciﬁ  -
cations including the shares of two skill types simul-
taneously yield similar results). Industry dummies are 
introduced to account for industry speciﬁ  c character-
istics like technology intensity, innovative potential, 
etc. The ﬁ  rst regression model explains the growth 
rate of labour productivity from the initial productiv-
ity gap and the share of high skilled workers at secto-
ral level. The second and third models use instead of 
the share of high skilled workers the share of medium 
and low skilled workers as an explanatory variable, 
respectively (notice that simultaneous inclusion of the 
three skill variables is not possible as it would imply 
perfect multicollinearity).
First, a signiﬁ  cant effect of the initial gap on produc-
tivity growth is found. A larger productivity gap is 
associated with higher labour productivity growth. 
This catching-up effect is known as ß-convergence. 
The implied half-time of closing the gap is less than 
20 years. Second, there are signiﬁ  cant positive effects 
of the share of high skilled and medium skilled work-
ers on productivity growth, where the effect of the 
latter skill group is smaller and amounts to around 
half of the effect of the share of high skilled workers. 
These results suggest that a skilled labour force fosters 
labour productivity growth. This is in line with the 
earlier mentioned literature on the economic impor-
tance of human capital, and on the role of skills to 
increase the capability of adopting, implementing or 
creating new technologies (though the latter is mainly 
relevant for countries already near the technological 
frontier). The parameter measuring the effect of the 
share of low skilled workers is signiﬁ  cantly negative. 
According to these results, skill upgrading will have a 
positive effect on productivity growth.
Some extensions are presented in Landesmann et al. 
(2007). First, with respect to industry groups (identi-
ﬁ  ed by average skill intensity) one ﬁ  nds that conver-
gence is faster in the high-skill intensive industries 
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Table 3.2: Labour productivity growth and skills
Dependent variable: Growth rate of labour productivity
Initial productivity gap -0.041 *** -0.035 *** -0.033 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of high skilled workers 0.082 **
(0.020)
Share of medium skilled workers 0.040 ***
(0.001)
Share of low skilled workers -0.058 ***
(0.000)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
F-value 9.49 12.77 13.08
R squared 0.40 0.40 0.42
Observations 264 264 264
Note:   A least square dummy variable (LSDV) regression technique is applied. Industry effects are not reported. Numbers in 
brackets are p-values from robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicates statistical signiﬁ  cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.
Source: Landesmann et al. (2007)
Table 3.3: Skills and export performance
Dependent variable: Growth rate of exports
Share of high skilled 
workers
Share of medium 
skilled workers
Share of low skilled 
workers
Skill share 0.138 ** 0.066 *** -0.090 ***
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Growth rate of unit labour 
costs
-0.628 *** -0.394 * -0.370 *
(0.001) (0.056) (0.076)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
F value 9.33 11.13 11.76
R squared 0.27 0.27 0.30
Observations 263 263 263
Note:   A least square dummy variable (LSDV) regression technique is applied. Industry effects are not reported. Numbers in 
brackets are p-values from robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicates statistical signiﬁ  cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.
Source: Landesmann et al. (2007).
(machinery, electrical and optical equipment and 
transport equipment) with an implied half-time of clos-
ing the gap of about 15 years as against a half-time of 
more than 25 years in the low skill intensive industries 
(textiles, wood, other manufacturing and recycling). 
Second, the convergence process is studied in more 
detail by allowing for an interaction term between skill 
levels and productivity gaps. It is found that a skilled 
labour force speeds up the convergence process. If the 
sample is restricted to the EU-15 countries the interac-
tion term becomes insigniﬁ  cant as these countries are 
already close to the technological frontier.
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Another indicator of competitiveness is export per-
formance. This measures success in international 
markets. It is estimated whether a higher skill share 
has a positive effect on export growth, controlling 
for growth in unit labour costs. Export data are taken 
from the UN COMTRADE database and are measured 
at current US dollars. Unit labour costs are calculated 
as labour compensation divided by gross output in 
local currency units.
A higher share of high and medium skilled workers 
spurs export growth. The coefﬁ  cient of high skilled 
workers is again higher compared to that for the 
medium educated workers. The coefﬁ   cient of the 
share of low educated workers is signiﬁ  cantly nega-
tive. In line with intuition, the growth rate of unit 
labour costs relates negatively to export growth. 
To wind up, this part of the analysis has presented 
evidence for skill compositional effects on two types 
of competitiveness variables, (labour) productivity 
growth and export growth. Overall, the results are 
promising in that the share of high skilled turned 
out to be a signiﬁ  cant factor in explaining produc-
tivity and export growth. Furthermore, it was found 
that the share of high skilled is particularly important 
for the speed of catching-up. Finally, the ﬁ  ndings 
indicated that a higher share of high and medium 
skilled workers spurs growth of exports, whereas a 
high share of low skilled employees has detrimental 
effects.
3.4.  Skill upgrading in the EU
3.4.1. Growth  accounting
In the previous section we have established the eco-
nomic importance of skills for sectoral competitive-
ness in a regression framework. Next we study labour 
composition changes in light of the upward trend in 
educational attainment as highlighted earlier. Spe-
ciﬁ  cally, results from a growth accounting exercise 
will be presented. This exercise allows the inclusion 
of the contribution of changes in skill structures on 
the overall (value added or output) growth perform-
ance. This will consequently reduce the contribution 
of total factor productivity. We address these issues 
with a focus on manufacturing industries in a com-
parative perspective for a number of European coun-
tries, relying on the EU KLEMS database. This dataset 
includes results from a detailed growth accounting 
exercise for sixteen European countries (but also 
including Japan and the United States), cf. Van Ark et 
al. (2007). The countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Additionally, information on labour quality is avail-
able for the Slovak Republic whereas labour com-
position variables are not available for Luxembourg. 
In the following we summarise these results for the 
period 1995-2004 for which data are available for all 
sixteen countries (the series for the Eastern European 
countries only start in 1995). Further, the quality of 
the data has improved from 1995 on as all countries 
started to report according to the ESA’95 method-
ology. As already mentioned above, the EU KLEMS 
dataset includes data at a rather detailed industry 
level basically according to NACE 60 industries. How-
ever, for reasons of data quality and comparability 
across countries, growth accounting results are reli-
able only for a subset of these industries. We con-
centrate only on the manufacturing sector, for which 
a further breakdown to eleven industries is available 
and for which growth accounting results are possible. 
The methodology to estimate labour services closely 
follows the method introduced by Jorgenson et al. 
(1987) and is now commonly used in the literature. 
The various types of labour which are distinguished 
in the EU KLEMS database are by qualiﬁ  cation (high, 
medium, low), gender (male, female) and age (15-29, 
30-49, 50+) which in total gives 3 x 2 x 3 = 18 types 
of workers for the eleven industries mentioned above. 
A measure of labour input that takes into account the 
differences in productivity of these types of labour are 
called ‘labour services’.
The most important results with respect to changes of 
hours worked and the role of labour composition are 
reported in annex table 1. Non-differentiated labour 
input measured in hours worked was declining over 
the period 1995-2004 in all countries with the excep-
tion of Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Hungary. The 
decline was relatively modest in countries like Luxem-
bourg, Sweden and the Czech Republic but reached 
even 20% in the United Kingdom, Poland, Cyprus 
and Malta. The results for labour services, i.e. taking 
compositional changes of labour input into account, 
are similar. The magnitude of the changes is however 
smaller in the case of declines and higher in the case 
of increases of employment pointing to a substitu-
tion towards higher quality of labour. This composi-
tion change is positive in all cases with the exception 
of Hungary and the Slovak Republic over the period 
1995-2000. Over the whole period the difference of 
the two indices is between 3 and 6 percentage points 
and even higher in the United Kingdom with 8.4, 
Spain with 6.5 and France with 6.1 percentage points. 
Only small but still positive changes are observed in 
Italy and the Slovak Republic where the difference is 
about 1.2 percentage points.
At the more detailed industry level one can see that 
the labour composition effect, i.e. the difference 
between the change in labour services and hours 
worked, is in most cases positive in all industries (with 
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some exceptions); details can be found in Landes-
mann et al. (2007). Focusing only on low, medium 
and high skill intensive industry aggregates one ﬁ  nds 
that the index of hours worked in 2004 is on average 
lower in the low and medium skill intensive sectors 
compared to the high-skill intensive sectors (albeit 
there are some exceptions like the Baltic states) reveal-
ing a between shift towards more skill intensive sec-
tors. A similarly differentiated pattern across industry 
types is evident when looking at labour service indi-
ces. Graph 3.1 presents the difference of the index of 
changes in labour services and hours worked, i.e. the 
labour composition effect, in low, medium and high 
skill intensive industries71. The difference is positive 
in most cases, illustrating a process of substitution 
towards skilled workers. Notable exceptions are only 
Italy in the low skill intensive sectors and Hungary in 
the high skill intensive sectors. However, the pattern 
that this difference might be more pronounced in 
the skill intensive sectors is evident mainly in Finland, 
the Netherlands and Sweden.
Summarising, the labour composition (‘quality’) 
effect is positive for total manufacturing and also at 
the more detailed industry level in most cases. Over 
the period considered the differences between labour 
71   The low-, medium- and high-skill industry groupings are deﬁ  ned as fol-
lows. Averages of employment shares of different educational attainment 
groups (ISCED groups high, medium and low educated) are calculated 
over a longer time interval by industry. The industry groupings are then 
deﬁ  ned with respect to the share of high skilled workers. The low-skill 
industries include textiles, textile products, leather and footwear; wood 
and products of wood and cork; manufacturing, recycling. The medium-
skill industries encompass food, beverages and tobacco; pulp, paper, print-
ing and publishing; chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel; other non-metallic 
mineral; basic metals and fabricated metal. The high-skill industries are: 
machinery; electrical and optical equipment; transport equipment.
Graph 3.1: Labour composition changes 1995-2004




































































































































input measured in hours worked and the index of 
labour services is between 3 to 6 percentage points 
and even larger in some countries. Skill upgrading 
turns out to be one of the most important factors in 
explaining labour composition changes.
3.4.2.   Skill upgrading and employment shifts 
between sectors
Having established the importance of skill upgrading, 
we next trace this process in more detail by distinguish-
ing between two types of factors: changes in the com-
position of the labour force within industries (‘within 
effect’) and shifts in employment structures between 
industries which are themselves characterised by differ-
ent skill compositions (‘between effect’). Furthermore, 
we analyse and compare these processes of skill upgrad-
ing for different country groups, the more advanced 
EU-North economies, the Southern cohesion countries 
(EU-South) and the New Member States (NMS).
A simple decomposition algorithm is applied (cf. Ber-
man, Bound and Machin, 1998) which decomposes 
an aggregate change in skill composition (e.g. skill 
upgrading in the sense of a higher share of employ-
ees with tertiary degrees in the economy as a whole) 
into a ‘within sector’ (WS) change and a ‘between 
sector’ (BS) change.
Particularly interesting in this respect is whether skill 
upgrading takes place to the same extent in differ-
ent industry groupings, or whether skill upgrading 
is more pronounced in industries which are already 
characterised by a high initial level of skills. If employ-
ment shifts towards the sectors with a high initial 
level of skills one speaks of a sector-biased form of 
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skill upgrading. This should be distinguished from 
the within sector effect which shows the skill-bias of 
technical change which might take place in any sec-
tor of the economy. Skill up-grading in the economy 
as a whole will obviously take place as a combina-
tion of these two effects and will be more accentu-
ated when there is both within sector skill upgrading 
combined with a between sector bias.
We analyse the ‘within’ and ‘between’ effects of skill 
upgrading using Labour Force Survey data for the 
period 1999-2005 which allow a breakdown to NACE 
Graph 3.2.a: Summary for share of high-skilled in EU-North, EU-South and NMS-4 1
High education
Note: L=low-skill sectors, M=medium-skill sectors, H=high-skill sectors.
1     The analysis is restricted here to the NMS-4 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) as Polish ﬁ  gures at the 
NACE 2 digit level did not exist in the LFS statistics and the statistics for two of the Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania) are 
affected by classiﬁ  cation breaks of ISCED categories.







between within total skill shift
EU-North EU-South NMS-4
Graph 3.2.b: Summary for share of low-skilled in EU-North, EU-South and NMS-4  1
Low education
Note: L=low-skill sectors, M=medium-skill sectors, H=high-skill sectors.
1     The analysis is restricted here to the NMS-4 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) as Polish ﬁ  gures at the 
NACE 2 digit level did not exist in the LFS statistics and the statistics for two of the Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania) are 
affected by classiﬁ  cation breaks of ISCED categories.
Source: wiiw, calculated from Labour Force Statistics.
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2-digit industries. Graphs 3.2.a and 3.2.b presents the 
results for the industry aggregates where the mem-
ber countries have been grouped into EU-North, EU-
South (comprising Greece, Portugal and Spain) and 
the New Member States (NMS)72.
72   The grouping into EU-North comprising the older Member States with 
the exception of the Southern EU members Spain, Portugal and Greece 
(which form the group EU-South) and the New Member States (NMS) 
has been adopted in order to identify different patterns which might 
depend upon differences in income levels and of countries which have 
undergone dramatic processes of transition and a more recent entry into 
the European Union (in case of the NMS).
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The graphs show the total skill shift and the within 
and between effects for the three regions and dis-
tinguishing low-skill, medium-skill, and high-skill sec-
tors. In general, the upgrading process within indus-
tries (i.e. changes in the skill composition within 
industrial branches) contributes more to the chang-
ing demand for high- versus low-skilled people at the 
aggregate manufacturing level than shifts of overall 
employment between sectors or industries.
Looking at the between effects it is clear that in all 
regions, EU-North, EU-South and NMS-4, there is a 
clear shift of employment away from low-skill indus-
tries and towards medium- and high-skill industries. 
A more formal econometric test conﬁ  rms the pres-
ence of skill-biased technical change; details are pro-
vided in Annex 2. In fact, the strongest shift towards 
high-skill industries is in the NMS-4. This uniformity 
of between industry shifts is interesting as it conﬂ  icts 
with a traditional international specialisation story 
where some countries specialise in low-skill intensive 
branches and others in high-skill intensive branches.
Furthermore, the ‘within shifts’ are also clearly stag-
gered in that these shifts are highest in the group 
of high-skill branches, then in the medium-skilled 
branches and lowest (though also positive) in the 
low-skill branches. This pattern is also uniform across 
the three groups of economies and, in fact, most 
pronounced in the NMS.
It can be interpreted as evidence of a double-sided 
catching-up process, i.e. the most pronounced 
employment shifts towards high-skill industries 
take place in the NMS, and this is combined with 
the above-mentioned hierarchy of (within industry) 
upgrading processes which are strongest in the high-
skill branches.
Coming to the other end of the skill spectrum, namely 
the share of the low-skilled (those with lowest educa-
tional attainment levels), we do not observe the same 
uniform pattern across all country groupings. This is 
shown in Graph 3.2.b. In absolute terms (i.e. the per-
centage point decline in the shares of the low-skilled 
in the labour force), the within effects are larger in 
the EU-North and the EU-South than in the NMS 
countries. In the EU-North and EU-South the per-
centage point shifts are in the order of 7-8% points 
over the period 1999 to 2005, while in the NMS they 
are 2-3%. Furthermore, while in the EU-South and 
the NMS the shifts are again staggered in a similar 
way, i.e. in that the low-skilled industries experienced 
also the strongest shifts in employment composition 
away from the low skilled, followed by the medium-
skill and the high-skill industries, in the EU-North 
the pattern was different in that the strongest shifts 
were in the medium- and high-skill industries. This 
pattern is consistent with arguing that while there is 
pressure towards upgrading of skill structures in all 
industries, the pressure to reduce low-skill segments 
is highest in the advanced EU-Northern economies 
in the medium- and high-skill industries, i.e. those 
industries in which also the catching-up EU-Southern 
and NMS economies make their strongest inroads in 
terms of between and within shifts.
3.5.  Skill shortages in the EU: case studies
3.5.1. Introduction
Discussions of skill shortages often have a particular 
focus on expanding sectors, especially involving new 
job creation and ICT activities (see for instance Euro-
pean Commission (2007)). However, skill problems 
can also arise in sectors that are not expanding rap-
idly and even in those that are in decline. The sec-
tors selected for more detailed study here have been 
deliberately chosen to include industries that are not 
necessarily expanding in terms of net job creation but 
which, nevertheless, remain an important source of 
income and employment in many parts of the EU.
The industries in question are textiles and clothing 
(NACE sectors 17 and 18) and mechanical engineer-
ing (NACE sector 29). The focus is on skill problems 
in six selected EU Member States – Germany, France, 
the UK, Italy, Sweden and Poland – which are in 
some degree representative of the EU as a whole 
in illustrating the kinds of problems affecting these 
industries and which, moreover, are characterised by 
different education and training systems as well as by 
different labour market institutions.
National experts in each of these countries were 
asked to review surveys of employers of skills prob-
lems, assess the reasons for these problems, identify 
the jobs for which skill shortages are seen to be most 
acute, describe the broad features of education and 
training programmes which prepare people for such 
jobs and of any particular initiatives being taken by 
employers, government and others to resolve the 
skill shortages in question.
3.5.2.  The extent and nature of skill shortages
A ﬁ  rst general ﬁ  nding is that skill shortages vary con-
siderably across Member States in the two industries 
in terms of their nature and scale as well as change 
over time, reﬂ  ecting both:
–   the overall growth performance of the national 
economy and the underlying competitive 
strengths of the sectors concerned;
–   the quality of educational and vocational train-
ing arrangements – both public and private – and 
the extent to which existing systems are being 
adapted to meet changing demands.
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Skill shortages are apparent in both industries in 
most of the countries covered, but, as might be 
expected, signiﬁ  cantly greater problems are evident 
in the mechanical engineering industry. While statis-
tics vary considerably across countries, as well as over 
time, it is not uncommon for enterprises to report 
that 15-35% of their available job vacancies are ‘hard 
to ﬁ  ll’, either because of an absolute shortage of peo-
ple applying or because those who do apply lack the 
requested skills.
Skill shortages are almost always greatest for tech-
nically skilled staff, though not necessarily for those 
who might be regarded as possessing the highest 
skill levels such as managers, but more for those clas-
siﬁ   ed to the ‘associate professional or technician’ 
category in the ISCO classiﬁ  cation system. In other 
words, the shortages are generally more acute for 
operatives than for ancillary staff. In textiles, how-
ever, (especially in the UK) shortages are reported 
among lower level jobs, such as those in sales or serv-
ice areas, where the skills in short supply seem to 
have as much to do with personal attributes – such 
as communication skills – as with a lack of training 
as such.
Moreover, shortages of particular skills can co-exist 
with an apparent excess supply of people who seem 
to possess the skills in question, where the problem 
is not so much a shortage of a particular kind of 
worker but their technical competence to do the job 
concerned. An example is the apparent shortage of 
designers in textiles in the UK, which co-exists with 
a surfeit of designers graduating from colleges (the 
numbers graduating each year amounting to over a 
third of the number of designers at present working 
in the industry).
In addition, the way in which employers perceive 
skill shortages depends in part on the nature of the 
labour market and the importance attached to for-
mal qualiﬁ  cations. In the UK employers are likely to 
attribute recruitment difﬁ  culties to a lack of people 
on the job market with relevant experience, whereas 
in other countries, where job proﬁ  les are much more 
clearly deﬁ   ned, employers are likely to point to a 
shortage of people with the requisite qualiﬁ  cations.
3.5.3.  Causes of skill problems
As would be expected, the scale of skill shortages 
tends to vary markedly with the economic cycle – 
notably in Germany and Sweden. This reﬂ  ects move-
ments along the Beveridge curve as discussed earlier. 
However, even in periods of relatively low levels of 
economic activity, or pressure of demand, skill short-
ages in the machinery and equipment industry in 
particular remain signiﬁ  cant. In the UK, on the other 
hand, the extent of skill shortages both in the two 
industries covered and in other parts of the economy 
has remained relatively constant since 2001 or so, 
despite the apparent pick-up in demand.
The underlying causes of skill shortages in the 
machinery equipment industry in particular are gen-
erally recognised as being structural, arising mainly 
from insufﬁ   cient training being provided or the 
content of training, and education, failing to match 
job requirements. Although technological advance 
appears to be important in certain areas (there is a 
shortage of computer numerical control (CNC) engi-
neers, for example, in a number of countries), it does 
not seem to have been a primary cause of general 
skill shortages.
Weaknesses in the existing work force appear to be 
a cause for concern in a number of countries. These 
take the form in particular in the textile industry of 
a low level of education among many of the people 
employed, which limits their adaptability and their 
capability of learning new skills. They also take the 
form of an ageing work force, which may not only 
restrict the possibilities for adapting to new tech-
niques and new methods of working, but which 
presage potential skill shortages in the coming years 
as many employees are approaching retirement. 
Therefore, although there is the prospect of con-
tinuing decline in employment in textiles in most 
parts of the EU – though less so in the new Member 
States, which have experienced a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  ow 
of direct investment into the industry from other EU 
countries – the decline in the number of people who 
possess the technical skills to work in the industry, or 
are prepared to do so, is likely to be even larger. In 
machinery and equipment, where the prospects are 
at best for little or no growth in employment in most 
countries, demand for labour is even more likely to 
exceed the diminishing supply of people with the 
expertise required to perform many of the operative 
jobs in the industry.
The ageing of the work force in textiles has been 
accompanied by a change in the nature of jobs, with 
a shift away from production to ancillary workers – 
sales and marketing staff, designers, managers and 
so on – in part as a consequence of the relocation 
of manufacturing activities to low-wage countries. 
This is reﬂ  ected in the changing sex composition of 
the work force away from women towards men. In 
Sweden, in particular, less than half of the people 
employed in the industry in 2005 were women as 
against almost 70% 10 years previously, while in the 
UK, there was a reduction in the share of women 
from 60% to just over half. In Germany and France, 
the shift was less marked but the share of women still 
fell by 5-6 percentage points over these 10 years in 
contrast to an increase of 2-3 percentage points in 
the overall share of women in total employment. In 
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both countries, therefore, women now make up less 
than 60% of the work force in the industry in con-
trast to Italy, where they still account for two-thirds, 
with little sign of any change, and Poland, where 
they account for three-quarters (which is the same 
as in Portugal but still less than in other new Member 
States – 82% in Bulgaria, 85% in Romania and 86-
92% in each of the three Baltic States).
The difﬁ  culties both industries face is to replace the 
workers who will retire within the next 5-10 years, 
and, in particular, to attract young people into the 
industry. Since a number of years there has been a 
general shift away from vocational education and 
training towards more general academic studies. This 
tendency is evident not only at the upper second-
ary level but also at tertiary (university) level, where 
there has been a relative decline in enrolments in sci-
ence, engineering and maths programmes in many 
EU Member States over the past decade or so.
The difﬁ  culty is not only to raise the proﬁ  le of voca-
tional programmes in general and engineering 
courses more speciﬁ   cally, but to persuade young 
people to take up a career path in an industry which 
seems set to decline over the long-term, as compared 
with going into growing sectors where the long-
term prospects seem much more favourable. This is 
especially so in a context of increasing globalisation 
and the growing inroads into EU markets made by 
producers in developing countries, most notably in 
textiles but also in other parts of manufacturing.
3.5.4. Policy  responses
There is evidence of a common tendency to try to 
ensure that the needs of industry have a greater 
inﬂ  uence on education and training programmes.
In Sweden and the UK, considerable emphasis is being 
placed on changing the focus of secondary educa-
tion, on increasing the vocational element, though at 
the same time, in Sweden in particular, on increasing 
the level of general education included in vocational 
programmes. Conscious efforts are being made to 
strengthen the links between vocational education 
and training and the labour market, to involve industry 
more in the design of training programmes as well as 
in the provision of practical work place experience. This 
seems to go further in Sweden where there is a much 
stronger tradition of social partnership and cooperation 
between industry and regional and local authorities.
In Germany, there are also moves to reform vocational 
training arrangements and to make them more rel-
evant to labour market needs. In addition, attempts 
are being made to create incentives for older workers 
to remain longer in employment, especially in manu-
facturing and notably in mechanical engineering.
In Poland, a far more wide-ranging process of reform 
is underway to redeﬁ  ne job proﬁ  les in the market 
economy and to link education and training pro-
grammes more closely with these, to seek to ensure 
that young people are trained for the speciﬁ  c jobs 
on offer. The challenge is to match vocational edu-
cation and training with labour market needs while 
at the same time ensuring that people are able to 
adapt to changing demands over the longer-term 
as restructuring continues. The solution is in part to 
adopt a modular approach to the design of train-
ing programmes, so that different programmes have 
elements in common and that key competencies are 
taught in all cases. A major problem to overcome, 
however, is the seemingly ongoing exodus of young 
people once they have completed their education.
In France and Italy, reviews are being undertaken 
of the existing vocational education and training 
systems and of their links with the labour market. 
In Italy, the systems developed have very much a 
regional focus, with a concern to ensure that educa-
tion and training programmes meet the demand for 
labour from local employers. Such a focus, however, 
tends to ignore prospective changes in the structure 
of local economies and the possibility that students 
might take up employment elsewhere in the coun-
try.
3.6.  Skill gaps in the EU: the role 
for education and training policies
In this chapter empirical evidence has been provided 
on the relationship between skills and competitive-
ness. An important implication of these ﬁ  ndings was 
that shortages of skills (or skill gaps) might lead to 
appreciable welfare costs. If ﬁ  rms cannot attract the 
workers they need this may seriously limit their pro-
duction and proﬁ  t opportunities. Therefore, policies 
that succeed in improving the matching of workers 
and ﬁ  rms would increase welfare. Indeed, the previ-
ous section presented some policy responses to adapt 
education systems to market demands. This section 
further elaborates on the role of education and train-
ing policies in reducing or preventing skill gaps by 
exploring a number of policy options. Before turning 
to policy options let us ﬁ  rst discuss in more detail 
what is exactly meant by a skill gap.
3.6.1.  What is a skill gap?
The deﬁ  nition of the concept of ‘skill’ is not unam-
biguous. A skill could be thought of as a developed 
ability to perform certain tasks competently. We may 
distinguish among general and speciﬁ  c skills. Gen-
eral skills are skills that can be used in a large number 
of other ﬁ  rms (or sectors), and hence are portable 
across ﬁ  rms as individuals change jobs. Firm- (or sec-
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tor-) speciﬁ  c skills can be deﬁ  ned as skills that are only 
productive in the ﬁ  rm (sector) where the individual is 
employed, and which are not valuable in other ﬁ  rms 
(sectors). Whereas the distinction between speciﬁ  c 
and general skills is useful for analytical purposes, its 
interpretation is not very clear, neither theoretically 
nor empirically.
The concept of a ‘gap’ is also not clearly deﬁ  ned. 
First of all, we may distinguish quantitative gaps and 
qualitative gaps. A qualitative skill gap exists when 
the actual skill requirements for a certain type of 
skill deviate from the skills current workers with that 
type of skill (occupation) possess. A quantitative gap 
is deﬁ  ned as an excess demand for workers with a 
particular type of skill. In this paper, we deﬁ  ne two 
concepts of a quantitative skill gap.
3.6.1.1.  Skill gap as an adjustment problem
The ﬁ  rst concept deﬁ  nes skill gaps as an adjustment 
problem. Skill gaps may emerge after an increase in 
demand for (or fall in supply of) a certain skill. Exam-
ples of causes of (structural) shifts in skill demand 
are trends such as skill-biased technical change, out-
sourcing and deindustrialisation, whereas shifts in 
skill supply can be caused by demographic trends 
such as ageing of the population and shifts in inter-
national migration patterns.
A higher demand for skills will drive up wages and the 
market will reach a new equilibrium in which there is 
no quantitative skill gap. The path to the new equi-
librium involves adjustment costs. As long as (rela-
tive) wages can be ﬂ  exibly adjusted in an upward 
direction, there are no quantitative skill gaps in this 
deﬁ  nition. We have no reason to assume that wages 
will be upwardly rigid as employers will always be 
able to pay higher wages if they want to. In conse-
quence, skill gaps cannot exist in the form of excess 
demand, but there is a ‘gap’ between employment 
of a skill in the long-run and the short-run.
A typical characteristic of the labour market, how-
ever, is that it takes time to acquire skills. Therefore, 
in a situation of an unanticipated increase in demand 
for certain skills (or a drop in supply), it is likely that 
additional workers with the demanded skill are not 
available in the short-run; that is, the short-run 
supply of skills is inelastic. Workers will be able to 
receive higher wages in the short-term equilibrium. 
The higher wages will induce people to enrol in the 
demanded types of education (or induce workers in 
other sectors to retrain themselves) and the market 
will eventually reach the long-term equilibrium, in 
which wages are lower and employment of that skill 
is higher than in the short-term equilibrium.
It can be inferred that total welfare is larger in the 
long-term equilibrium compared to the short-term 
equilibrium. Hence, a smooth adjustment from the 
short-term to the long-term equilibrium will increase 
welfare. There may be a role for the government in 
facilitating a smooth adjustment process. This can be 
done by reducing or eliminating possible rigidities in 
education systems or labour markets, or barriers to 
international movements of workers or goods.
3.6.1.2.  Skill gap as a non-optimal mix of skills 
in the economy
The second deﬁ  nition of a quantitative gap deﬁ  nes a 
skill gap as a distribution of skills in the economy (in 
current steady state) which differs from the mix of 
skills which may generate a higher level of welfare. 
This deﬁ  nition of skill gaps implies that shortages as 
well as surpluses of certain skills may exist at the same 
time. Explanations for the occurrence of such gaps 
are market failures such as a lack of transparency or 
(policy-induced) institutions such as barriers to entry 
in labour or product markets. The market failures and 
institutions which prevent the economy from reach-
ing a welfare improving mix of skills coincide with the 
rigidities mentioned in the deﬁ  nition of skill gap as an 
adjustment problem (the ﬁ  rst deﬁ  nition).
3.6.2.   What is the role for education and training 
policies to reduce skill gaps?
This section discusses ﬁ  ve remedies to combat skill 
gaps:
(1)   Produce and distribute scenarios on skill prospects
(2)  Improve adaptability of education system
(3)  Stimulate general skills rather than speciﬁ  c skills
(4)   Shape comparative advantage by education policy
(5) Training  policies
Whereas the ﬁ  rst two options are targeted towards 
providing a smooth adjustment towards the long 
term equilibrium after shifts in skill demands (or 
supply), the latter three are targeted particularly at 
changing the skill distribution in the economy to 
obtain a higher welfare equilibrium. These policy 
options either attempt to facilitate movements along 
the Beveridge curve, or aim to shift the Beveridge 
curve to the left.
The ﬁ  rst option is to produce and distribute scenarios 
on the prospects of different skills. This type of infor-
mation gives students and trainees better opportu-
nities to decide which skills they prefer to acquire. 
Promoting transparency is a potential task of the 
authorities as lack of transparency is a market failure. 
An increase of transparency about the future labour 
market will facilitate a smooth adjustment of the 
labour market in cases of shocks. A concrete exam-
ple of a policy option to increase transparency is to 
extend the current practice of producing forecasts of 
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occupations to forecasts of skill demands in order to 
capture changes in skill demands within occupations 
as well, which seem to be rather important. Another 
policy option is to make the produced information 
on skill prospects more customer-oriented and less 
fragmented, that is, to improve the distribution of 
this information to the relevant actors (e.g. students, 
providers of education and training, ﬁ  rms). However, 
predicting the future situation on the labour market is 
a difﬁ  cult task. With the exception of particular occu-
pations where demand is to a large extent driven 
by demographic factors, such as teaching, there is 
a lot of uncertainty about the future labour market. 
Hence, it is important to make clear that most of the 
predictions about the future labour market are asso-
ciated with much uncertainty.
The second policy option is to improve the national 
education systems’ adaptability to shifts in skill 
demand or supply. This option also aims to facili-
tate a smooth adjustment of the labour market in a 
changing environment. Examples are apprenticeship 
or dual education systems in vocational education, 
removing barriers to entry for new private suppliers 
of education, and targeted grants for students to 
stimulate enrolment in particular types of education. 
Coordination of the (content and quantity of) edu-
cation programs between the business sector, edu-
cation authorities and national and regional govern-
ments may improve adjustment from the short-term 
equilibrium to the long-term equilibrium after shifts 
in skill demand or supply.
The third option is to stimulate education in general 
skills and discourage education in speciﬁ  c skills. The 
reason is a potential external effect, because students 
may insufﬁ   ciently take into account the possible 
social costs of unemployment (unemployment ben-
eﬁ  ts, public retraining costs), if they decide which 
type of skill they want to acquire. This argument is 
more important for speciﬁ   c skills than for general 
skills, since generalists are better protected against 
unexpected shifts in skill demands than specialists. 
However, there is no clear general case for education 
policies targeted at stimulating general skills and dis-
couraging the acquisition of speciﬁ  c skills. An impor-
tant reason is that there are no clear indications for 
an increasing uncertainty about future demand for 
skills due to technological progress or other changes 
in markets. In addition, in most countries, a certain 
amount of general skills is already taught (and pub-
licly ﬁ  nanced) during initial education, which may 
have already internalised the potentially (larger) 
negative externalities of investments in speciﬁ  c 
skills. Moreover, the beneﬁ  ts of this policy should be 
weighed against its costs, since workers with speciﬁ  c 
skills are expected to be more productive than gen-
eralists in the industry in which they are active.
The fourth policy option is to shape comparative 
advantages by education policy, for instance by sub-
sidising education of certain skills more than edu-
cation of other skills. The main argument for gov-
ernment intervention is the occurrence of external 
effects involved in the employment of the selected 
skills. Examples of these external effects are agglom-
eration effects (spillovers) and learning effects. 
In that case, multiple equilibria may exist, and EU 
countries may fall in a trap of a mix of skills which is 
below the welfare optimum in the absence of gov-
ernment intervention. Education policies that pro-
mote the supply of particular skills with the aim of 
shaping EU’s comparative advantages is an option 
in that case. However, this is a risky policy for several 
reasons. First of all, it is generally unclear whether the 
social returns of the selected skills exceed the private 
returns. Moreover, there is a risk that the govern-
ment may select the wrong skills after all. Further, the 
government takes risks of an uncoordinated race of 
countries to attempt to specialise in the same direc-
tion. Finally, selective policies often attract interest 
and lobby groups which will beneﬁ  t from selection 
of certain skills and which neglect the negative wel-
fare effects in the rest of the economy.
The ﬁ   fth option is to address the problem of skill 
gaps through training policies73. Sufﬁ  cient  train-
ing participation by employees is important to nar-
row qualitative skill gaps, that is, to assure that the 
skills of employees maintain updated to actual skill 
requirements by employers. Economic theory has 
identiﬁ   ed several possible reasons for underinvest-
ment by private parties in the market for training, 
of which poaching (general training) and hold up 
problems (ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c training) are the most promi-
nent ones. The market (e.g. social partners) may 
already provide various solutions to certain market 
failures, e.g. in the form of sector-based training 
funds. Moreover, authorities in the EU are already 
implementing various training policies, such as legal 
frameworks and co-funding schemes of employees 
and employers. Some of these policies carry risks of 
deadweight losses, in the sense that training invest-
ments are subsidised that would have taken place 
anyway. This risk particularly prevails when public 
funding schemes occur in the form of direct contri-
butions, which do not need to be matched by own 
contributions of ﬁ  rms or workers. Training policies 
should preferably be targeted at the marginal deci-
sion to invest in training. Little is known about the 
(cost) effectiveness of all these training policy instru-
ments. Further research on their effectiveness and 
small-scale experiments could contribute to more 
evidence-based policy making.
73   For a more elaborate discussion on vocational training policies, the reader 
is referred to chapter 4 in Employment in Europe 2007 (European Com-
mission, 2007b).
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3.7. Summary  and  conclusions
Educational attainment shows an upward trend in the 
EU countries. A better educated work force is condu-
cive for a country’s economic performance. Human 
capital not only augments the efﬁ  ciency of labour, 
it can also help to create absorptive capacity so that 
ﬁ  rms can more easily adopt technologies developed 
elsewhere. Both mechanisms would foster produc-
tivity and international competitiveness. Indeed, 
actions to increase human capital complement the 
myriad of structural policies discussed in Chapter 2 
to strengthen the overall economic performance in 
light of EU’s growth and jobs strategy.
Against this background of increasing educational 
attainment, concerns about skill shortages are often 
expressed. Does the education system deliver the 
skills demanded by the market? Can people easily 
be retrained to accommodate shifts in the needed 
type of skills? Skill gaps can emerge after an increase 
in demand for (or fall in supply of) a certain skill, but 
can also indicate a non-optimal mix of skills in the 
economy. Beveridge curves, i.e. the loci of unem-
ployment and vacancy rates, can give some insight 
into the importance of both types of skill gaps. Shifts 
along this curve reﬂ  ect the usual business cycle ﬂ  uc-
tuations, while shifts of the Beveridge curve point 
at changes that improve or worsen the matching 
process, and thereby affect the equilibrium level of 
unemployment. Both phenomena call for different 
policy responses. While in the former case the ration-
ale for government intervention is typically limited to 
smoothing the adjustment process, a more active role 
is warranted in the case of structural mismatches.
Some insight into the quantitative relevance of these 
adjustment processes can be gained by looking at 
sectoral data, as this may reveal the importance of 
skill upgrading related to increasing demands for 
skills within sectors versus skill upgrading due to 
employment shifts towards more skill intensive sec-
tors. More insight into these within and between 
shifts could feed into a country’s human capital pol-
icy, as it may for instance signal the importance of 
general versus speciﬁ  c skills.
This chapter has explored these issues in more detail. 
The ﬁ  rst part studies the importance of skills for com-
petitiveness, using the recently released EU KLEMS 
database at sector level. Two indicators for competi-
tiveness are employed, namely productivity growth 
and export performance. The econometric analysis 
revealed that sectors employing a larger share of high 
skilled or medium skilled workers show higher pro-
ductivity growth. In contrast, the share of low skilled 
workers in a sector exerts a negative effect on pro-
ductivity growth. Furthermore, skills matter for the 
speed of convergence towards the technological fron-
tier. Convergence is faster in the high skill intensive 
industries. A second performance measure is sectoral 
export growth. It is found that a higher share of high 
and medium skilled workers spurs growth of exports, 
while a high share of low skilled employees has detri-
mental effects on sectoral export performance.
The second part concentrates on the nature of skill 
upgrading. Growth accounting reveals that there is 
a substitution towards higher quality of labour. This 
raises the question to what extent skill upgrading 
of the employed labour force is due to changes in 
the composition of the labour force within indus-
tries and to what extent it is due to shifts in employ-
ment structures between industries which are them-
selves characterised by different skill compositions. 
The analysis has shown that the upgrading process 
within industries contributes more to the increasing 
demand for highly skilled workers than shifts of over-
all employment between sectors or industries. None-
theless, there is also a general shift of employment 
away from low-skill intensive industries towards 
medium- and high-skill intensive industries, and this 
shift occurs across all groups of EU countries distin-
guished in the analysis, i.e. the EU-North, EU-South 
and the New Member States. The latter phenom-
enon suggests that technical change is skill-biased, 
i.e. technical change is faster in skill-intensive sectors. 
A more formal econometric approach indeed con-
ﬁ  rmed the quantitative importance of this process of 
skill-biased technical change.
Such increasing importance of skills can create bottle-
necks when there are mismatches between demand 
and supply on labour markets. The third part dis-
cusses the issue of skill shortages in EU industries. A 
way to explore the underlying causes of such skill 
shortages is by performing in-depth studies of partic-
ular sectors. Case studies on skill gaps have been pre-
sented for two industries, textiles and clothing and 
mechanical engineering, for six selected EU Member 
States. Skill shortages vary considerably across Mem-
ber States, both in terms of their scale as well as in 
rates of change, but greater problems are evident 
in the mechanical engineering industry. Skill short-
ages are almost always greatest for technically skilled 
staff, and more acute for operatives than for ancillary 
staff. The underlying causes of skill shortages in the 
machinery equipment industry seem to be of a struc-
tural nature, often related to qualitative discrepan-
cies on labour markets. The textiles industry is con-
fronted with a low level of education among many of 
its employees, which limits the sector’s adaptability 
and the worker’s capability of learning new skills. 
With regard to policy responses there is evidence of a 
common tendency to try to ensure that the needs of 
industry have a greater inﬂ  uence on education and 
training programmes.
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Insights from these case studies can support the 
design of sector-speciﬁ  c or general policy responses, 
which is the topic of the ﬁ  nal part of this chapter 
on the type of actions to be taken to alleviate such 
skill mismatches. A profound understanding of the 
underlying problem is essential for the design of 
effective and efﬁ  cient policies. Skill gaps can be seen 
as an adjustment problem, arising after an increase in 
demand for (or fall in supply of) a certain skill. In such 
a situation the government can play a role in order 
to smooth the transition process. Secondly, skill gaps 
can also be due to a non-optimal mix of skills in the 
economy, in which case government intervention is 
needed to correct market failures or improve institu-
tions which prevent the economy from reaching an 
optimal mix of skills. Several policy options to reduce 
skill gaps were discussed. These include for instance 
promotion of transparency about future labour mar-
ket prospects, improvement of the adaptability of 
education systems, stimulation of general skills, and 
encouragement of training of employees.
As we have seen, most of the labour market dynam-
ics takes place within sectors, rather than across 
sectors. An issue for further research is whether this 
would support policies to strengthen the responsive-
ness of the education system to market needs and to 
focus more on speciﬁ  c skills. An alternative interpre-
tation is that between sector shifts are hampered by 
a too strong emphasis on speciﬁ  c skills in the labour 
force, which may call for an opposite strategy, i.e. a 
stronger focus on general skills which are more easily 
portable across sectors.
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Annex 1: Growth accounting
Annex Table 3.1: Index of hours worked and labour services, 1995=100
Hours worked Labour services Labour composition*
Country 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004
Austria 91.2 86.2 93.6 89.7 2.4 3.6
Belgium 97.5 89.0 100.3 94.0 2.8 5.0
Denmark 99.4 88.8 102.7 94.4 3.2 5.6
Finland 111.0 103.7 112.2 108.0 1.2 4.3
France 94.9 87.0 98.4 93.1 3.5 6.1
Germany 93.1 87.0 94.0 91.0 0.9 4.1
Irland 108.8 100.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Italy 101.0 100.2 102.0 101.3 1.0 1.2
Luxembourg 99.0 96.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 100.0 90.3 102.3 94.1 2.3 3.8
Sweden 101.3 94.2 104.1 100.1 2.8 6.0
United Kingdom 96.2 79.7 101.5 88.1 5.3 8.4
Greece 96.0 89.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Portugal 97.0 90.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain 121.1 118.4 123.4 124.9 2.3 6.5
Czech Republic 99.3 94.1 100.6 97.5 1.3 3.4
Hungary 110.6 102.1 109.5 107.0 -1.1 4.9
Poland 91.5 80.0 92.2 83.7 0.8 3.8
Slovakia 90.6 88.4 89.9 89.5 -0.7 1.2
Slovenia 90.9 87.8 95.5 91.8 4.6 3.9
Cyprus 84.1 76.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Estonia 82.1 92.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Latvia 88.4 87.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lithuania 88.8 87.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Malta 94.6 77.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: * Difference between index of labour services and hours worked in respective year.
Source: EU KLEMS database, March 2007; wiiw calculations.
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Annex 2: Skill biased technical change
To test the emergence of skill biased technical change, we follow the empirical strategy proposed by Haskel 
and Slaughter (2002). We estimate the relationship between the change in the relative wage bill (i.e. the 
labour income share in a sector relative to the total labour income share) and a skill intensity measure in the 
initial year, i.e.
Δωj = α + βBIAS    
Sj  
+ uj
                 
   —
                    Uj
where Δωj denotes the change in the relative wage bill, Sj and Uj denote the quantity of skilled and 
unskilled labour input (measured in hours worked); the subscript j refers to the industry aggregate, i.e. 
j=H,M,L. We have tested this speciﬁ  cation for the two types of aggregates of skills and also included different 
sets of dummies for countries and industries (we applied Least Squares Dummy Variable estimation). A posi-
tive parameter βBIAS indicates that technical change is concentrated in the skill intensive sectors. Results of 
these estimations are provided below.
Skill biased technical change
High skilled High skilled High skilled
Bias parameter 0.32 *** 0.49 *** 0.77 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country dummies No Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No Yes
F-value 17.89 70.37 31.39
R squared 0.24 0.85 0.87
Observations 48 48 48
Note:   p-values of robust estimation in brackets. *, **, *** indicates statistical signiﬁ  cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respec-
tively.
Source: Landesmann et al. (2007).
The results indicate that technical change was biased towards the high skill intensive sectors which – together 
with the skill biased nature of technical change – leads to an increasing demand for skilled workers. The 
econometric estimations conﬁ  rm that sector bias was indeed signiﬁ  cant as regards the high-skilled segment 
of the labour force74.
74  For a further discussion on the development of labour income shares, see European Commission (2007b).
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C: Competitiveness at sector level
Chapter 4. Analysis of the 
performance of European 
Industries
4.1. Introduction
Economic growth and the generation of income ulti-
mately depend on the competitive performance of 
individual enterprises. The competitiveness of these 
enterprises in turn depends on the relative abundance 
(and hence cost) of resources, as well as the incentives 
and capabilities to use them in a productive and sus-
tainable manner. Even though many determinants, 
such as macroeconomic stability, the corporate tax rate 
or the working of factor markets, are thus shaped by 
the general business environment, the relative intensity 
in factor use, the incentives to pursue opportunities, 
and the speciﬁ  c capabilities required for transforming 
them into successful business vary between sectors. As 
a consequence, countries differ greatly in their secto-
ral growth and performance. Within an identical mac-
roeconomic setting, they show considerable strength 
in some industries and weaknesses in others.
Based on the goals of the Lisbon agenda, the com-
parison of aggregate measures can only provide an 
incomplete picture of European competitiveness. In 
order to address its driving factors, enterprise and 
industrial policies require a deeper understanding of 
competitive performance and its varying sources at 
the level of individual industries. Within this context, 
this chapter focuses on the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of European industries as revealed by our 
measures of sectoral performance.
To organise the wealth of individual data into a man-
ageable amount of meaningful results, this chapter 
addresses the following questions:
Which are the best and least performing sectors in 
the European Union with respect to the selected 
indicators (i.e. growth of value added and labour 
input, productivity, proﬁ  tability, international trade, 
and foreign direct investments)?
In which industries is the difference in performance 
between the ‘old’ and new EU Member States most 
pronounced?
How do European industries compare to those in the 
US, and what is their contribution to the aggregate 
gaps in growth performance?
Additionally, the dataset is used for an integrated 
analysis of the different dimensions of sectoral per-
formance. In particular, it aims to shed light on the 
following questions:
–   Do the general dynamic characteristics of ‘catch-
ing-up’ or self-reinforced advantages (‘dynamic 
specialisation’) prevail among industries?
–   What are the major relationships between the dif-
ferent performance variables?
–   What kind of economic policies are the most indi-
cated to affect sectoral performance?
A major obstacle to a systematic empirical analysis of 
the driving factors of sectoral performance is the pau-
city of available data. In that regard, this chapter takes 
advantage of the very recent and notable advances 
that have been made in this arena, in particular the sec-
toral productivity measures provided by EU KLEMS75. 
Another advance in this area is constituted by the com-
pilation of EU industrial structure datasets76. However, 
the available data are still far from comprehensive. As 
the data for the different dimensions of performance 
come from different sources, these cannot be fully 
merged into one consistent sector disaggregation or 
75    The EU KLEMS database is the result of a three year, European Commis-
sion funded research project involving 16 European research institutes, 
which has recently become available for free public use at http://www.EU 
KLEMS.net. See Timmer et al (2007) for further details on the construc-
tion of the database.
76   EU Industrial Structure, 2007, European Commission, Directorate Gen-
eral for Enterprise and Industry, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enter-
prise_policy/competitiveness/2_indics/indics_compet.htm
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even cover in an entirely consistent way all Member 
States. The consequence is that the empirical analysis 
must largely adhere to the boundaries drawn by the 
data sources, even though from an analytical view-
point a more integrated mapping of relative strengths 
and weaknesses would be preferable.
The main databases used for the analysis here are 
EU KLEMS for measures on sectoral growth and 
productivity; and UN-COMTRADE and EUROSTAT 
for international trade. Finally, the data on foreign 
direct investments were collected from EUROSTAT, 
the OECD, UNCTAD and the WIIW.
Box 4.1: Measuring sectoral performance
Competitiveness is a multifaceted target for which no single and fully comprehensive measure exists. 
The multitude of objectives must be taken into account when striving for a ‘general’ picture  1. In the 
following, we assess the competitive performance of European industries along the following set of ten 
selected indicators:
Growth
–   The growth of value added indicates an economy’s success in creating income and thus its ability to 
increase material well-being. For given constraints with respect to a society’s non-economic goals, 
such as social fairness or ecological sustainability, it is probably the most straightforward target of 
economic activity.
–   The growth of employment or hours worked indicates not only success in mobilising productive 
resources, but also the ability to offer people jobs and participation. As labour input is also a cost fac-
tor in production, its growth is not unconditional. If it is meant to be sustained, the growth of value 
added and productivity must keep pace accordingly.
Productivity
–   Labour productivity is the ratio of output (either gross output or value added) to labour input (either 
employment or hours worked). Integrating changes in inputs and outputs into a single measure, it 
reﬂ  ects competitiveness more accurately than the aforementioned growth of output and employ-
ment. Here, we deﬁ  ne labour productivity as value added per hour worked.
–   Total Factor Productivity (TFP) additionally nets out the returns to all other inputs, i.e. capital (and 
intermediates in the case of a gross output speciﬁ  cation), and is therefore the most comprehensive 
measure of the efﬁ  ciency of operations. Total Factor Productivity is calculated as a residual, i.e. the 
gain in output which cannot be assigned to any measurable input  2.
Proﬁ  tability
For the individual enterprise, proﬁ  ts are the ultimate goal and incentive behind investing resources and 
undertaking effort. Proﬁ  tability thus signals how well corporations turn revenue into income that can 
be transferred to shareholders and owners. From the perspective of society at large, however, high 
proﬁ  tability can be an ambiguous objective. In particular, if proﬁ  ts are in excess of appropriate returns 
to effort, risk and innovation, these may indicate a lack of competition, which in the end turns against 
consumers and overall welfare.
–   The net proﬁ  t margin is the ratio of after-tax revenue net of extraordinary items (and associated taxes) 
to sales. Indicating the efﬁ  cient translation of sales into proﬁ  ts, the net proﬁ  t margin tells how much 
proﬁ  t is made for every dollar of revenue generated.
–   Indicating the efﬁ  cient use of assets to generate proﬁ  ts, the return on assets (ROA) is calculated as 
the ratio of after-tax proﬁ  t net of extraordinary items to assets. The ROA ﬁ  gure offers an idea of how 
effectively a company is converting its available investment funds into net income, both through 
debt and equity ﬁ  nancing.
1   For a discussion on the different concepts of competitiveness, see a recent special issue of the Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Vol.6, No.2, 
with contributions, among others, by Aiginger (2006), Grilo and Koopman (2006), or Kohler (2006).
2   This ‘growth-accounting’ approach was pioneered by Solow (1956, 1957) and further reﬁ  ned, e.g., by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) or Jorgenson, 
Gollop and Fraumeni (1987). For recent expositions, see e.g., Schreyer and Pilat (2001), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005), and Timmer, O’Mahony 
and van Ark (2007).
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Chapter 4. Analysis of the performance of European Industries
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a brief account of the performance of European 
industries with respect to growth and productivity. 
Section 3 turns to international trade and Section 4 
investigates the sectoral patterns of foreign direct 
investments. Section 5 considers the interrelation-
ship between the performance variables. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 summarises and concludes.
4.2. Growth  and  productivity
The empirical assessment starts with a joint inves-
tigation of the growth of value added, and labour 
input as well as labour- and Total Factor Productiv-
ity. Conceptually, these indicators are strongly inter-
dependent, and the available sectoral information 
stems from a single integrated dataset. 
There is much variation between industries 
(Table 4.1). However, the most consistent difference 
between the US and the ‘old’ EU Member States is 
the role played by TFP in value added growth. In 
almost all sectors the relative contribution of TFP is 
considerably higher in the US, especially in electrical 
machinery, post and communications and distribu-
tion (Table 4.2). On aggregate, the TFP contribution 
amounts to 1.1% in the US, but remains almost ﬂ  at in 
the ‘old’ EU Member States. More precisely, the TFP 
component accounts for only 5.8% of value added 
growth in the EU, compared to a share of 35.8% in 
the US77.
77   For a detailed account of the results from the EU KLEMS data, see van Ark, 
O’Mahony and Ypma (2007).
International trade
–   The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indicator measures trade specialisation. In this chapter, 
it is deﬁ  ned as the logarithm of the export to import relation of one sector divided by the export 
to import relation of all sectors3. Positive RCA values indicate comparative advantages and negative 
values represent comparative disadvantages of a particular industry.
–   Export market shares reﬂ  ect the capacity to respond to external demand or open up new markets in 
direct comparison to international competitors. They show how much of the total ‘world’ export is 
covered by the export of a particular country for each industry.
Foreign direct investments (FDI)
–   The ratio of inward FDI stock to value added indicates the contribution of FDIs to capital formation, 
stimulating value added and employment but also the acquisition of new technology and manage-
ment practices in the host market. In addition, it offers an indication of the attractiveness of the host 
country.
–   Analogously, the ratio of outward FDI stocks to value added reﬂ  ects a corresponding outﬂ  ow of capital. 
However, it can also be an indication of corporate strength, where companies venture abroad to 
seize opportunities from foreign markets and resources.
3   Please note that in the statistical annex of the present report is used an alternative deﬁ  nition of RCAs (normalised market shares).
The major ﬁ  ndings from the added sectoral detail in 
Table 4.1 can be summarised as follows:
–   To begin with, the data for the EU-25 show a 
clear pattern in the growth performance of the 
broad sectors, with the service industries gener-
ally exhibiting the most dynamic development 
in terms of value added and labour input, fol-
lowed by total manufacturing, agriculture, and 
the steadily shrinking mining sector. Even though 
this is consistent with economic theories of struc-
tural change, the observed pattern does not 
apply universally. Within the EU it is upset by the 
New Member States’ (hereafter referred to as the 
NMS10) particularly strong performance in man-
ufacturing. The top 4 countries in terms of pro-
ductivity growth amongst old EU nations (Ireland, 
Finland, Sweden and Greece, hereafter referred to 
as the EU4*) exhibit stronger value added growth 
in manufacturing than the EU-25, although not as 
high as NMS. In addition, we see strong growth 
in higher technology service sectors than in the 
EU-25 aggregation. It should be stressed that the 
EU4* whilst indicative of the better performances 
within the EU are not necessarily widely repre-
sentative of the EU as an aggregate, even if they 
cover a diversity of growth paths. However, they 
do reveal some interesting sectoral growth pat-
terns. Conversely, the US data deviate from the 
European pattern in that mining (and agriculture) 
are observed to grow faster than manufacturing.
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–   Apart from mining and the insurance services78, 
all consistently declining industries in the EU-25 
are in the manufacturing sector. These are, for 
example, textiles, clothing, leather and basic met-
als industries, all of which rely upon relatively old 
or easy-to-copy technological blueprints and are 
particularly exposed to global competition and 
structural adjustment. Most of these are declining 
in the EU-15, the NMS10 and the US. One excep-
tion is textiles, where we see a decline in the EU-
15 growth rate exactly matched by an increase 
in NMS10 growth in value added, suggestive of 
substitution between the two areas. In addition, 
we see strong labour productivity growth in tex-
tiles in the EU4*. Another exception is the basic 
metals industry, where the decline of value added 
is restricted to the NMS10.
–   Within manufacturing, industries where the EU-
25 experienced high value added growth include 
electronic components, communications equip-
ment, computers and ofﬁ   ce machinery, and 
pharmaceuticals. In terms of the value added 
and labour input we again see stronger growth 
in the EU4* than the EU-25, particularly in high 
tech manufacturing sectors. In the NMS10, whilst 
these sectors do show high growth, the strong 
performance is less concentrated in high-tech 
industries, with high growth also seen in wood 
products, rubber and plastics, non-metallic min-
eral products, and motor vehicles. In comparison 
with the US, sectors where NMS10 and EU-15 
growth are relatively high include reﬁ  ned petro-
leum and nuclear fuel, precision instruments and, 
in particular in the case of the NMS10, audio-
visual apparatus. Conversely, European growth 
lags behind signiﬁ  cantly in computers and ofﬁ  ce 
machinery. In many industries the NMS10 expe-
rienced higher productivity growth than the US. 
However, this phenomenon is likely to be rela-
tively temporary, driven by structural adjustment 
as the New Member States converge.
–   Among the service industries, post and telecom-
munications and computer and related activities 
appear to be the fastest value added growth sec-
tors in the EU. The ﬁ  nancial services look particu-
larly strong for the NMS10. More than any other 
sector, the ﬁ  nancial services sector appears to be 
particularly affected by the transition to modern 
market economies. Compared to the US, Europe 
mainly has a distinct growth advantage in the 
network industries, i.e. electricity, gas and water 
supply as well as transport and communications, 
with the exception of air transport. In construc-
tion a low growth rate in the EU aggregates also 
78    The latter are notorious for the difﬁ  culty to deﬁ  ne output and measure 
prices (see, Triplett and Bosworth, 2004).
compares to negative growth in the US. In all of 
these sectors, the better growth dynamics of the 
EU becomes further apparent in terms of labour 
productivity. A worrying ﬁ   nding from the EU 
point of view is the weakness of the old EU-15 
compared to the US in the areas of wholesale/
retail trade, air transport, ﬁ  nancial intermediation 
and, to a lesser extent, real estate/business serv-
ices. These are sectors that have been thought to 
be driving US growth since 1995. In contrast, the 
labour productivity performance of the EU4* in 
the distributive trades sectors is relatively strong 
compared to the EU-15. In addition, the EU4* also 
experience high growth in ICT using sectors such 
as ﬁ  nancial intermediation, research and develop-
ment and computer related activities.
The growth of labour inputs varies considerably 
between the NMS10 and the EU-25. We already 
observed that for manufacturing, despite higher 
growth of value added in the NMS10, labour input 
decreased faster than in the EU-15. Among the serv-
ice industries the stronger decline in labour inputs 
is especially noticeable in construction and research 
and development, where we see a considerable 
reduction in hours worked in the NMS10 as opposed 
to growing labour inputs in the EU-15. One possible 
explanation for this (in addition to the extraordinary 
efﬁ   ciency gains from transition) is out-migration 
from the New Member States. It has been observed 
that migration is sectorally concentrated and these 
sectors generally tend to show high rates of migrant 
workers (Kangasniemi, Mas, Robinson and Serrano, 
2007). Especially in the case of research and develop-
ment, the sectoral pattern indicates a certain ‘brain-
drain’ from New Member States to ‘old’ Europe.
To provide an overview of the role that individual 
sectors play in overall value added growth, Graph 4.1 
shows the percentage contribution each sector makes 
to overall value added growth over the 1995-2004 
period for the EU-25 and the US. Please note that in 
terms of the absolute levels of value added growth, 
these are percentage contributions to an aggregate 
2.25% growth in the case of the EU-25 and 3.19% 
in the US. With this in mind, Graph 4.1 shows that 
renting of machinery and equipment, wholesale 
and retail trade and post and telecommunications 
are signiﬁ   cantly contributing to the overall value 
added growth in both the EU and the US. However, 
it should be borne in mind that these bars represent 
the relative contributions to the overall growth rates, 
which are higher in the US than in the EU-25. Tra-
ditional manufacturing sectors such as textiles, min-
ing and quarrying, and miscellaneous manufacturing 
and recycling make little contribution to value added 
growth in the EU-25. Whilst in general the pattern 
between the EU and the US is similar, Graph 4.1 does 































































Table 4.1: Average annual growth by sectors in%, 1995 – 2004 
NACE 
group
NACE description Value added Hours Worked Labour productivity 
(value added/hours worked)
   NMS EU-15 EU-25 EU4* US NMS EU-15 EU-25 EU4* US NMS EU-15 EU-25 EU4* US
A to B Agriculture, Hunting, 
Forestry and Fishing 2.37 1.37 1.49 -0.89 5.44 -1.00 -2.4 -2.3 -3.91 0.07 3.37 3.77 3.28 3.52 5.37
C Mining and Quarrying -3.24 -1.71 -1.92 -1.02 4.14 -7.18 -4.09 -4.52 -1.71 -0.76 3.94 2.38 3.69 2.48 4.90
D Total Manufacturing 5.44 1.51 1.78 4.72 2.71 -1.47 -0.97 -0.97 -0.55 -2.44 6.91 2.47 2.84 5.81 5.14
15 Food and Beverages 2.68 0.51 0.71 n.a. -0.32 -1.7 -0.32 -0.26 -0.75 -0.73 4.38 0.83 1.35 n.a. 0.41
16 Tobacco -1.97 -0.60 -0.77 n.a. -6.73 -5.83 -4.07 -4.32 -3.88 -3.39 3.87 3.47 3.67 n.a. -3.34
17 Textiles 2.07 -2.14 -1.78 -2.92 0.59 -5.88 -3.5 -3.46 -3.64 -6.83 7.95 1.35 2.29 1.51 7.42
18 Wearing apparel (Clothing?), 
Dressing and dying of fur -1.25 -2.98 -2.75 -2.98 -3.43 -3.55 -4.48 -4.96 -4.59 -10.10 2.30 1.51 1.44 3.31 6.67
19 Leather and Footwear -6.00 -3.50 -3.70 -2.45 -2.96 -8.03 -3.24 -3.44 -2.62 -9.58 2.03 -0.26 0.66 1.05 6.61
20 Wood and products of 
Wood and Cork 7.84 2.05 2.78 2.76 0.16 0.84 -1.15 -1.33 0.79 -0.98 7.01 3.20 3.34 4.12 1.14
21 Pulp, paper and printing 5.82 1.19 1.43 0.86 2.98 -1.94 -1.65 -1.6 -1.54 -3.29 7.76 2.83 3.12 4.18 6.27
22 Printing, publishing and 
reproduction 4.47 0.56 0.74 5.40 0.25 0.64 -0.94 -0.95 -0.92 -2.64 3.84 1.49 1.48 4.74 2.89
23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum 
and nuclear fuel -17.50 -2.53 -4.13 6.76 -40.24 -6.27 -1.54 -1.6 -0.90 -2.85 -11.23 -0.99 -1.49 8.66 -37.49
24 Chemicals and chemical 
products 2.03 2.91 2.86 8.94 2.35 -3.56 -1.14 -1.28 1.02 -1.45 5.58 4.04 4.38 7.96 3.8
244 Pharmaceuticals 3.80 5.47 5.4 n.a. 1.8 -2.43 1.27 1.23 2.33 -2.27 6.22 4.20 4.70 n.a. 4.07
25 Rubber and Plastics 12.06 2.94 3.72 2.80 3.25 3.34 0.04 0.06 -0.06 -1.86 8.72 2.91 3.11 1.66 5.11
26 Other non-metallic 
mineral products 10.02 1.05 2.03 2.77 2.91 -2.56 -0.81 -0.86 0.48 -0.73 12.59 1.86 3.21 2.53 3.64






















































































































28 Fabricated metals 8.11 2.01 2.33 3.94 2.42 1.63 0.12 0.08 1.12 -1.43 6.47 1.89 1.96 0.96 3.84
29 Machinery not elsewhere 
classiﬁ  ed 5.36 0.93 1.16 2.69 0.99 -4.25 -0.67 -0.72 0.13 -3.43 9.61 1.62 2.49 2.77 4.42
30 Ofﬁ  ce, accounting, 
computing machinery 33.31 5.66 6.83 -4.69 43.82 5.47 -3.14 -3.40 -2.87 -3.09 27.84 8.80 8.97 1.14 46.91
31 Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 13.27 0.73 1.61 6.61 9.67 2.02 -1.58 -1.58 -0.78 -3.24 11.24 2.31 2.45 4.36 12.91
32 Radio, TV and 
communications equipment 15.18 9.19 9.59 12.93 12.84 2.87 -1.65 -1.70 1.03 -2.91 12.31 10.85 10.36 n.a. 15.75
321  Electronic valves and 
tubes 13.87 13.86 13.89 n.a. 23.87 3.16 0.28 0.23 0.21 -2.27 10.71 13.58 12.99 n.a. 26.09
322  Telecommunications 
equipment 12.59 9.00 9.14 n.a. 1.63 -0.03 -1.5 -1.37 -5.30 -3.49 12.62 10.5 10.46 n.a. 5.12
323  Radio and television 
receivers 18.71 1.96 3.82 n.a. -11.99 4.7 -5.05 -5.41 -7.95 -4.64 14.01 7.02 6.24 n.a. -7.35
33 Medical, precision and 
optical instruments 5.98 4.59 4.64 7.58 1.80 -0.21 0.03 -0.12 2.56 -1.42 6.19 4.56 4.64 4.27 3.22
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers 15.35 2.82 3.34 5.15 5.61 2.54 0.43 0.41 0.72 -1.43 12.81 2.38 2.63 6.70 7.04
35 Other transport 
equipment 0.00 1.78 1.69 -0.08 1.94 -5.55 -0.79 -0.77 -1.99 -1.55 5.55 2.57 3.4 1.73 3.49
36 to 37 Manufacturing n.e.c.; 
recycling 6.04 0.44 0.77 2.01 3.3 1.14 -0.67 -0.73 -1.63 -1.31 4.91 1.11 1.07 2.67 4.61
E Electricity, gas and water 
supply 0.7 2.51 2.31 0.55 1.3 -2.61 -2.31 -2.55 -0.17 -1.6 3.31 4.82 4.72 1.57 2.90
F Construction 0.96 1.25 1.22 5.88 -0.42 -0.89 1.1 0.87 3.46 2.67 1.85 0.15 0.41 1.39 -3.09
G Wholesale and retail trade 4.91 2.25 2.49 4.00 5.15 0.31 0.70 0.66 1.10 0.23 4.60 1.55 1.86 3.26 4.91
50 Sale, repair of motor 
vehicles; retail fuel 4.18 2.00 2.18 5.93 7.09 3.48 1.13 1.06 1.28 0.84 0.71 0.87 0.77 4.02 6.25
51 Wholesale and 















































































































































52 Retail trade, exc.50; 
repair  3.89 1.74 1.96 4.78 5.42 -0.12 0.57 0.53 1.16 0.33 4.01 1.17 1.51 3.07 5.09
H Hotels and restaurants 1.00 1.78 1.74 5.66 2.19 1.12 1.97 1.98 1.56 0.95 -0.12 -0.19 -0.14 2.60 1.24
I Transport and communi-
cations 3.23 4.66 4.55 5.56 3.65 -1.12 0.73 0.71 0.89 0.71 4.35 3.94 4.15 4.82 2.94
60 Inland transport 3.71 2.32 2.50 3.86 2.94 -1.38 0.12 0.07 0.78 1.09 5.09 2.19 2.7 1.32 1.85
61 Water transport -7.14 9.55 8.80 13.84 -2.81 -6.52 -1.18 -1.42 0.06 1.37 -0.62 10.72 10.68 12.55 -4.18
62 Air transport 1.43 1.33 1.34 2.75 4.55 0.45 0.65 0.79 -0.35 -0.52 0.98 0.68 0.71 2.38 5.08
63 Auxiliary transport; travel 
agencies 0.07 3.15 2.86 5.14 4.92 2.00 3.21 3.36 1.43 1.01 -1.93 -0.06 -0.23 1.85 3.91
64 Post and 
telecommunications 8.39 8.17 8.17 4.90 4.44 -1.89 -0.39 -0.55 1.06 0.61 10.27 8.56 8.82 8.06 3.83
J Financial intermediation 7.85 2.95 3.28 5.93 6.16 0.40 0.28 0.16 1.65 1.24 7.45 2.67 2.99 3.27 4.92
65 Financial intermediation, 
exc. 66 8.02 4.05 4.33 4.04 7.55 -0.06 0.09 -0.03 1.29 1.70 8.08 3.96 4.26 3.82 5.86
66 Insurance and pension 
funds, exc. L  7.49 -2.86 -2.22 7.63 1.66 -2.31 -0.4 -0.57 1.48 0.57 9.80 -2.46 -1.59 1.52 1.09
67 Activities related to 
ﬁ  nancial intermediation 6.98 5.17 5.26 12.54 n.a. 8.72 1.37 1.25 3.56 n.a. -1.74 3.81 3.49 4.42 n.a.
K Real estate, renting and 
business services 1.96 2.94 2.86 4.13 3.36 4.28 4.08 4.05 4.45 2.67 -2.32 -1.15 -1.25 -1.31 0.69
70 Real estate activities 0.72 1.99 1.86 1.88 2.17 1.65 2.01 2.12 0.28 1.75 -0.93 -0.02 -0.09 -0.12 0.42
71 Renting of machinery and 
equipment 3.52 4.88 4.85 5.25 1.49 0.79 3.21 3.21 2.93 0.65 2.73 1.67 1.80 3.38 0.84
72 Computer and related 
activities 11.2 7.89 8.02 11.15 5.26 6.96 6.7 6.63 8.81 6.26 4.24 1.19 1.3 1.75 -1.00
73 Research and 
development -4.17 1.33 0.79 9.86 6.3 -1.98 1.6 1.12 7.07 2.07 -2.2 -0.27 -0.18 0.77 4.23
74 Other business activities 5.02 3.17 3.28 6.15 4.22 5.42 4.06 4.03 4.26 2.46 -0.39 -0.89 -0.89 -0.72 1.75
Note: EU-4* comprises of Finland Greece, Ireland and Sweden, the best productivity performers of the ‘Old’ EU in the period 1995 to 2004.
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Graph 4.1: Contributions by sector to value added growth in the EU-25 and US, 1995 – 2004.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reveal some sectors where fortunes diverge over the 
two regions. Chemicals and construction are two 
such examples of sectors that positively contribute 
to value added growth in the EU whilst their impact 
in the US is negative.
Graph 4.2 presents the percentage contributions 
of sectors to labour productivity growth, again 
arranged according to the magnitude of their con-
tribution in the EU-25. Labour productivity growth 
over the period is 1.68% in the EU-25 and 2.39% 
in the US. The ordering is similar to that observed 
for value added growth, but wholesale and retail 
trades account for the largest industry contribution 
to labour productivity. Whilst this is true for both the 
EU and the US, the relative percentage contribution 
to labour productivity in the US is almost double 
that of the EU-25. In reality, given the higher growth 
rate in the US, this effect is even larger. Surprisingly 
perhaps, agriculture, hunting, forestry and ﬁ  shing 
contribute more than 15% to the overall growth in 
labour productivity in the EU-25, much larger than 
the US contribution from this sector. Finally, turn-
ing to sectors that contribute the least in the EU-25, 
Graph 4.2 shows that the renting of machinery and 
equipment and hotels and restaurant sectors have a 
negative contribution to labour productivity growth 
whilst contributing signiﬁ  cantly to the productivity 
growth in the US.
Table 4.2 summarises the main components of the 
growth accounting decomposition for the period 
1995-2004 by sectors for the aggregate of ten ‘old’ 
EU countries (with corresponding available data) and 
the US. The sectoral detail reveals a broad variation 
between industries. In general TFP represents a large 
part of the growth in some high technology sectors, 
such as electrical machinery and post and telecom-
munications but also in other declining industries 
such as traditional manufacturing and agriculture 
and mining. An interesting case is the textiles, leather 
and footwear sectors in the US, which show negative 
value added growth but an important positive con-
tribution from TFP growth. In all sectors except some 
other production industries such as agriculture, elec-
tricity, gas & water, transport and storage and post 
and communications, the relative contribution of TFP 
is considerably higher in the US than in the EU. The 
sectors in which the differences are highest are whole-
sale and retail and ﬁ  nancial intermediation. However, 
the difference between the relative contribution of 
TFP in the high-technology sector electrical and opti-
cal equipment is minimal between the EU and the US, 
where the value added growth is much higher.
ld711576Int.indd   94 ld711576Int.indd   94 19/12/07   13:16:32 19/12/07   13:16:3295
Chapter 4. Analysis of the performance of European Industries
Graph 4.2: Contributions by sector to labour productivity growth in the EU-25 and US, 1995 – 2004.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, Graph 4.3 depicts the growth of value added, 
labour- and Total Factor Productivity for selected 
broad sectors since 1995. Again, the graphs illustrate 
the substantial heterogeneity between industries. As 
mentioned before, the US shows the strongest lead 
in total manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade 
and ﬁ  nancial intermediation. In the business services 
the US leads in terms of productivity performance, 
but the growth of value added is similar between the 
two areas. Conversely, the EU outperforms the US in 
the network industries of electricity, gas and water as 
well as transport and telecommunications. In most of 
the sectors, TFP appears to be a decisive and consist-
ent source of labour productivity growth. One strik-
ing observation, however, is the minor role that TFP 
growth plays in the growth of ﬁ  nancial intermedia-
tion and business services, both thought to use tech-
nology intensively. If measured correctly by national 
accounts79, the data imply that the growth of output 
hardly matches the increased use of labour and capi-
tal inputs in these sectors. This suggests deﬁ  cits in 
the adoption of new technologies, which depends 
on complementary investments (e.g., in labour 
skills, organisational innovation, or new products) 
before becoming effective through cost reductions 
or increased customer value.
In short, the comparison with the US demonstrates 
that the EU productivity slowdown is not due to 
exogenous forces, such as global business cycles, 
or a generally decelerated growth in high-income 
countries, but is instead due to a speciﬁ  c and current 
European experience.
79   One notable source of measurement problems are changes in the qual-
ity of output. If adjustments for quality improvements are too cautious, 
growth of output at constant prices will be underestimated.
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Graph 4.3: Growth of value added, labour productivity and TFP: EU* vs. US
Source: EU KLEMS, WIFO calculations.
Note:   * comprises all of the EU-15 countries, except Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden.
VA = value added; LP = labour productivity; TFP = Total Factor Productivity.
(a) Manufacturing (b) Electricity, gas and water supply
(c) Wholesale and retail trade (d) Transport and communications
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Table 4.2: Growth decomposition, average p.a., 1995 – 2004 
EU* US
VA K, L TFP VA K, L TFP
in % in percentage points in% in percentage points








-1.80 -1.1 -0.7 4.14 0.7 3.4




0.30 0.6 -0.3 -0.96 0.4 -1.3
17 to 19
Textiles, leather and 
footwear
-2.81 -2.6 -0.3 -1.46 -6.1 4.6
20
Wood, products of 
wood
1.73 -0.1 1.8 0.16 -0.2 0.3
21 to 22
Pulp, paper, print, 
publishing




1.91 0.5 1.5 -1.86 0.3 -2.2
23
Coke, ref. petrol., 
nuclear fuel




2.05 0.1 1.9 2.35 0.6 1.7








1.39 0.7 0.7 2.03 -0.7 2.7
















2.63 0.2 2.4 1.30 0.8 0.5
F Construction 0.98 1.6 -0.6 -0.42 3.3 -3.7
G
Wholesale and retail 
trade
2.12 1.7 0.5 5.15 1.9 3.2
50
Sale, repair motor 
vehicles; fuel




2.96 1.8 1.1 4.52 2.3 2.2
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52
Retail trade, except 
50
















8.21 2.2 6.0 4.44 4.1 0.4
J to K
Finance, real estate, 
business activities




2.59 1.8 0.8 6.16 2.7 3.5
K
Real estate, renting, 
business activities
2.73 4.2 -1.5 3.36 4.0 -0.6





3.51 5.8 -2.3 4.12 4.8 -0.7
Note: * comprises all of the EU-15 countries, except Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden.
   VA = value added growth, L = contribution of labour input growth, K=contribution of capital input growth, 
TFP=   Contribution of total factor productivity growth
Source: EU KLEMS, NIESR calculations.
4.3. Foreign  trade
The aggregate trends in international trade are char-
acterised by the fast growth of the world markets and 
rising competition from emerging economies, such as 
China, Mexico or India. Given these general tenden-
cies, the European Union’s trade performance is rather 
favourable when compared to that of the US, although 
the latter’s faster growing domestic demand may 
absorb a greater part of its production and thereby 
explain its lessened proﬁ  le on the export markets.
Taken together, in the year 2005 the European 
Union, the United States and Japan account for 48% 
of the world export market for manufacturing goods 
(see Annex Table 4.1)80. Taken separately, the EU-27 
has the largest share (22%), followed by the United 
States (15%) and Japan (11%). Similarly, manufac-
turing export increases in the EU-27 are higher than 
those of the United States and Japan. The NMS12 in 
particular have recorded high export growth. As far 
as import growth is concerned, similar results have 
been reported by the EU-27 and the United States, 
80    The market shares are deﬁ  ned as the share in total exports of EU-27 (exclud-
ing intra-EU trade) plus Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, 
Iceland, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Mexico, 
South Korea, China, India, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia.
while Japan has shown lower import growth due 
to sluggish domestic demand. While global market 
shares were generally redistributed in favour of the 
emerging economies, the EU-27 was relatively suc-
cessful in maintaining its position. In absolute terms 
and relative to the year 1996, the EU-27 lost only 
1.3  percentage points, the United States 3.9 and 
Japan 3.2. In relative terms, after 1996 the EU-27 lost 
fewer than 6% of its export shares, the United States 
more than 20% and Japan 23%.
Graph 4.4 presents the market shares for manufac-
turing industries in the EU-27, the NMS12 and the 
US on a disaggregated level81. Industries with a lower 
than average market share in 2005 are characterised 
as ‘weak’ and those above average as ‘strong’; indus-
tries gaining or losing market shares since the year 
2000 are depicted as either ‘improving’ or ‘declin-
ing’. The main results82 can be summarised as fol-
lows:
81   The results for the EU-15 are not displayed separately because the gains 
and losses in market shares have been very similar to those of the EU-
27 (the only exception is transportation equipment and communication 
equipment, which both lost market shares in the EU-15 while gaining in 
the EU-27).
82   These results, taken in isolation, are prone to over-interpretation, i.e. 
losses of export market share could lead to the conclusion of a competi-
tiveness decline where other factors (such as higher growth or domestic 
demand) might be in play.
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–   In the EU-27, the pharmaceutical industry enjoys 
an outstanding strong position in international 
trade, followed at some distance by air and space-
craft, machinery, the broad sector of chemicals, 
and publishing and printing. As each of them was 
able to increase its market shares, albeit at rela-
tively modest degrees, neither of them appears in 
danger of losing ground due to growing global 
competition in the short term. Most industries 
enjoying the highest growth of market shares are 
relatively close to the aggregate level of export 
shares. In particular, motor vehicles, pulp and 
paper, wood products and tobacco have substan-
tially improved their market shares. Conversely, 
we ﬁ   nd the weakest and further deteriorating 
performance in the manufacture of electronic 
components and audiovisual apparatus, as well as 
ofﬁ  ce machinery and computing.
–   In the NMS12 all industries (except tobacco, elec-
tronic components) have increased their export 
market shares, with the greatest improvements 
taking place in communications equipment, iso-
lated wire and cable, motor vehicles and publish-
ing and printing. In terms of the actual market 
shares, the strongest positions are in ships and 
boats, the manufacture of wood, and that of non-
metallic mineral products.
–   In sharp contrast to the European Union, the 
US lost market shares in all of its manufacturing 
industries (except for reﬁ  ned petroleum and the 
manufacture of ships and boats). It enjoys its high-
est market shares in aircraft and spacecraft, which 
it has also been able to maintain. Other persisting 
strongholds are the publishing business and the 
paper industry. In contrast, the strong produc-
tivity performance of the US computer industry 
is not apparent from the trade data, where mar-
ket shares are slightly below average and rapidly 
decreasing. The same applies to US producers of 
communication equipment. One possible expla-
nation is the stronger domestic demand for infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) 
in the US, absorbing a larger fraction of its ICT 
production.
–   The trade data for manufactured goods provide 
more sectoral detail on a consistent basis than any 
other indicator in this chapter. Hence, they are 
especially useful for tracing the scope and direc-
tion of structural change and examining whether 
the European Union is falling behind or moving 
up the ‘quality ladder’ (in the sense of upgrad-
ing its industrial structure towards activities with 
a higher content of technology or skills and less 
exposure to pure cost competition).
–   For that purpose, we apply three sectoral taxon-
omies to organise the numbers on the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) indicator. The tax-
onomies are based on data for 3-digit product 
groups (see Box 4.2 and Annex Table 4.2) and 
aim for essential characteristics of the respective 
competitive regimes. Taxonomy  I focuses on 
the distinction between tangible and location-
bound versus intangible and ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c factors 
of production, distinguishing labour and capital 
intensive sectors from marketing and technology 
driven industries while at the same time isolating 
a group of traditional industries with an aver-
age proﬁ  le of factor inputs (‘mainstream’). Tax-
onomy II is directed at the dimension of human 
resources and distinguishes industries according 
to educational intensity (‘high skill’ versus ‘low 
skill’) and occupation (‘blue collar’ versus ‘white 
collar’). Finally, taxonomy III separates industries 
according to an indicator of ‘revealed quality elas-
ticity’, which captures the response in trade vol-
umes to changing trade prices (unit values)83.
Table 4.3 summarises European and US trade per-
formance for manufactured goods in terms of indus-
trial specialisation by these taxonomies. In short, the 
EU-27 shows a comparative advantage in the groups 
of ‘mainstream’ manufacturing (which is comprised 
of traditional medium-tech industries such as the 
machinery sector or rubber and plastics), ‘medium-
skill/blue-collar’ and ‘high-skill’ industries as well as 
those characterised by a ‘high revealed quality elastic-
ity’. In all other industry types the EU-27 is character-
ised by a comparative disadvantage. Remarkably, the 
European Union as a whole has not yet specialised in 
technology driven industries, even if individual coun-
tries (such as the UK, France, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Belgium) are already enjoying a comparative advan-
tage in those. However, we ﬁ  nd that specialisation in 
technology driven industries and those characterised 
by high-skills and a high revealed quality elasticity 
has increased in most of the EU-2784, indicating a 
solid process of structural change which is moving 
the European economies further up the ‘quality lad-
der’ in international trade.
The NMS12 have a comparative advantage in all sec-
tors of taxonomy I, except the technology driven 
industries. Similarly, they remain specialised in low-
skill industries. However, the transition process is also 
accompanied by marked structural changes. The dis-
advantages in technology driven and high-skill indus-
tries and the comparative advantages in labour inten-
sive and low-skill industries are decreasing, bringing 
83   See Peneder (2001) for a detailed documentation of taxonomies I and II; 
and Aiginger (2000) for taxonomy III.
84   For example, with the exception of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania and the Netherlands (and hardly any 
change in Austria and Germany) all of them increased their RCAs in tech-
nology driven industries between 2000 and 2005.
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the NMS12 closer to the patterns of industrial speciali-
sation we observe in the old EU Member States.
The US patterns of specialisation show it to be the 
most advanced region on the ‘quality ladder’, with 
the strongest comparative advantages in high-skill, 
medium-skill/white-collar, capital intensive and 
technology driven industries as well as those char-
acterised by a high and medium revealed quality 
elasticity. Accordingly, the negative specialisation in 
labour intensive and low-skill industries is nowhere 
as pronounced as in the US. Compared to the year 
2000, the US improved its comparative advantages 
in the capital intensive, technology driven, medium 
skill and quality sensitive industries.
In conclusion, we see that, consistent with economic 
theory, industrial activity is shifting away from labour 
intensive and low-skill production to sectors charac-
terised by innovation and product differentiation, 
which are thus largely technology driven and high 
skills intensive. In an inﬂ   uential report, Fontagné, 
Fouquin, Gaulier, Herzog and Zignano (2004) have 
stated that Europe has missed the 21st century tech-
nological boat. In a certain sense, the results pre-
sented here tell a different story. While it is true that 
historical evidence has shown unsatisfactory Euro-
pean performance in technology driven industries, 
we can observe that this trend is changing. Since 
2000 the EU-27 has been increasing specialisation in 
technology driven industries, with several old Mem-
ber States already enjoying a comparative advantage 
and the NMS12 having signiﬁ  cantly improved their 
export structure in a relatively short time period. 
However, the total EU-27 does not yet have a com-
parative advantage in those sectors. It remains to be 
seen whether the observed structural changes are 
sufﬁ  cient for ‘catching the technological boat’ and 
whether the European industries are ‘moving-up’, 
rather than “moving out” the international markets.
In addition to the observed structural changes 
between sectors, measures of intra-industry trade 
(IIT) provide an indication of quality upgrades within 
sectors. Recent analysis performed on behalf of the 
Enterprise and Industry Directorate General reveals 
that the EU-27 share of vertical high quality IIT 
Box 4.2 – Industry taxonomies
We further condition the chosen trade indicators using three different taxonomies based on the 3-digit 
NACE classiﬁ  cation of manufacturing industries. The taxonomies were speciﬁ  cally intended to facilitate 
inquiries into industrial performance with respect to the intangible sources of competitive advantage. 
Table 4.2 in the Annex provides a complete list of industries and their respective identiﬁ  cation within 
the three taxonomies.
Taxonomy I focuses on the distinction between tangible and largely location-bound versus intangible 
and ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c factors of production. Statistical clustering is applied, using US sector and ﬁ  rm level 
data for wages and salaries, investments in physical capital, advertising outlays and R&D expenditures. 
These are assumed to span four independent dimensions of inputs for revenue generation. The classiﬁ  -
cation identiﬁ  es ﬁ  ve types of industries that are either particularly “labour intensive”, “capital intensive”, 
“marketing driven”, “technology driven”, or characterised by no pronounced deviation from the overall 
mean of factor input combinations (“mainstream manufacturing”). Peneder (2001) provides further 
details on the creation and validation of the taxonomy.
Taxonomy II is directed at the dimension of human resources and based on occupational data, that dis-
tinguish between two types of white collar and blue collar workers, as well as the shares of high and low 
skilled labour for each of these two types. The data originate from the OECD and cover employment 
shares for a sample of developed economies. The taxonomy is based on statistical clustering and clas-
siﬁ  es industries into “high skill”, “medium skill white collar”, “medium skill blue collar”, or “low skill” 
industries. This taxonomy is also documented in Peneder (2001).
Taxonomy III separates the 3-digit NACE manufacturing industries into three classes, based on their 
revealed quality elasticity. For the calculation of the revealed quality elasticity, the industries of indi-
vidual countries are divided into four segments depending on whether they are dominated by price 
competition or quality competition, and whether the country is successful in the prevailing type of com-
petition. “Price competition industries” are deﬁ  ned as industries where low relative costs lead to high 
exports, whereas in quality competition dominated industries a higher unit value of exports (reﬂ  ecting 
higher quality) leads to a trade surplus, thus revealing that quality is deﬁ  ning the competitive edge. A 
ranking of the industries based on the number of bilateral trade ﬂ  ows where price competition prevailed 
resulted in this revealed quality elasticity taxonomy by Aiginger (2000).
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Graph 4.4: EU export market shares (excl. intra-EU-27 trade), 2005
Note:   The x-axis denotes export market shares for 2005 and the y-axis represents changes in export market shares between 
2000 and 2005.
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increased 13.7 percentage points between 1996 
and 2005, while its share of vertical low quality IIT 
decreased 2.9 percentage points during the same 
period. Vertical high quality IIT was in 2005 the pre-
dominant type of intra-industry trade accounting for 
58 percent of total intra-industry trade85.
In contrast to trade for manufactured goods, the 
relatively small but rapidly growing trade in services 
is only poorly documented. In the year 2005, serv-
ices accounted for 30% of total exports in the EU-
25. Within the Triad (excluding intra EU-15 trade), in 
the year 2004 more than 51% of all service exports 
originate from the EU-15, compared to 38% from 
the US and 11% from Japan (see Annex Table 4.1). 
The EU-15 more than doubled its export growth in 
services between 1996 and 2005, while its imports 
grew in a smaller proportion. As a result, over a nine 
year period the EU-15 almost quadrupled its services 
trade balance. In the same period the positive serv-
ices trade balance of the United States diminished. 
In contrast to the positive trade balance of the EU-
25 and the United States, Japan reported a services 
trade deﬁ  cit of 30 bn € in 2003.
Table 4.4 summarises the available indicators on rela-
tive export shares in the Triad, measured as percent 
of total exports by the EU-25 (excluding intra-EU25 
trade), Japan and the USA, and the revealed compara-
tive advantages for broad sectors. With the exception 
of travel and personal services, the EU-25 has higher 
shares in the Triad’s exports than the US in all the broad 
sectors. The differences are particularly pronounced in 
the sectors of construction and transportation as well 
as communications and computer services. With the 
exception of the travel, communication and personal 
services sectors, the EU has a positive revealed com-
parative advantage in all other sectors. In the US, the 
revealed comparative advantage is strongest in per-
sonal services, construction and computer services, 
but also positive in business services and travel.
4.4. Foreign  direct  investment
Aside from international trade, the global integration 
of European industries has increased rapidly through 
increased foreign direct investments. This is conﬁ  rmed 
by Graph 4.5, which exhibits the employment shares 
of afﬁ  liates under foreign control by country. In the 
manufacturing sector for all EU countries (with availa-
ble data) the share of employment under foreign con-
trol is 25%. This compares to 13% in the United States. 
The service industries are generally less integrated in 
terms of foreign afﬁ  liate employment. Their share in 
total employment is 12% in the EU and 4% in the 
85   Vertical IIT measures intra industry trade with goods in different qualities, 
it can be divided further in high and low quality vertical IIT based on the 
export to import unit value relation.
US. We also ﬁ  nd wide differences between countries 
within the EU, where the employment share of for-
eign afﬁ  liates in the NMS is generally higher than that 
of the EU-15. Overall, the foreign afﬁ  liate data suggest 
that a signiﬁ  cant proportion of domestic production is 
now accounted for by foreign owned ﬁ  rms.
Assessing their potential economic impact, inward FDI 
is generally thought to be beneﬁ  cial for host countries 
in terms of generating positive effects for domestic 
growth86. In particular, they contribute to gross ﬁ  xed 
capital formation, and thereby stimulate value added, 
employment, and the adoption of new technologies 
and business practices in the host market. Further-
more, the entry of foreign ﬁ  rms increases competition 
and forces domestic ﬁ  rms to use their resources more 
efﬁ   ciently. Nearly all EU countries have thus estab-
lished investment promotion agencies (IPA) in order 
to attract inward FDI. Most IPAs identify different ‘tar-
get industries’ with additional incentives.
Conversely, we ﬁ  nd two contrary views on the poten-
tial impact of outward FDI. One view is that outgoing 
FDI reduces output, investment and employment at 
home. The other view is that FDI increases the level 
of domestic activity by making EU ﬁ  rms more com-
petitive. In the latter case, outward FDI, whether for 
‘greenﬁ  eld’ investments or mergers & acquisitions, 
are perceived as an indication of corporate strength, 
signalling a company’s ability to go after foreign 
markets and resources. In fact, both arguments can 
be valid, with the former likely to apply for direct 
effects in the short term, and the latter referring to 
indirect impacts that might only materialise in the 
longer run. What effect dominates will depend on 
the time scale of the assessment and on the initial 
motives for FDI, i.e. whether it is aimed at pure cost 
savings (offshoring of production), or at the open-
ing of foreign markets and access to technology or a 
skilled workforce. As both effects are conﬂ  ated in the 
available statistics, the empirical evidence tends to 
be ambiguous87.
Despite the generally rapid increase of FDI, there 
remain large differences in the degree of interna-
tionalisation across industries. As the coverage of the 
New Member States by sectoral FDI statistics is still 
rather poor, Table 4.5 presents the main indicators 
on FDI stocks for the EU-1588 and the US at the broad 
sector level. The major ﬁ  ndings can be summarised 
as follows:
–   For the total economy of the EU-15 the ratio of 
FDI stocks to value added in 2004 has been 18% 
for inward and 25% for outward FDI. Both ratios 
86   See, e.g., Barrel and Holland (2000), Herrmann and Lipsey (2003), Lipsey 
and Sjöholm (2004).
87  See, e.g., Desai et al. (2005), or Pfaffermayr (2001). 
88  The data are for extra EU-15, i.e. not including FDI between the EU-15. 
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Table 4.3: Revealed comparative advantages (RCA) by taxonomies, 2005
NMS12 EU-15 EU-27 US
RCA RCA abs. RCA RCA abs. RCA RCA abs. RCA RCA abs.
2005 change 2005 change 2005 change 2005 change
2000/2005 2000/2005 2000/2005 2000/2005
Taxonomy 1
Mainstream 0.292 -0.002 0.402 0.069 0.390 0.060 0.119 -0.093
Labour intensive 0.175 -0.355 -0.387 -0.175 -0.347 -0.167 -0.725 -0.058
Capital intensive 0.062 0.173 0.026 -0.027 0.028 -0.016 0.201 0.101
Marketing driven 0.161 -0.105 -0.179 -0.122 -0.156 -0.112 -0.271 -0.065
Technology 
driven




0.130 -0.145 -0.353 -0.112 -0.319 -0.102 -0.408 -0.063
Medium skill/blue 
c.w.
0.433 -0.061 0.213 -0.047 0.226 -0.044 -0.444 0.090
Medium skill/
white c.w.
-0.279 0.036 -0.020 0.002 -0.040 -0.005 0.247 0.026
High skill 
industries
-0.142 0.068 0.176 0.110 0.167 0.107 0.378 0.000
Taxonomy 3
High RQE 0.056 0.150 0.272 0.026 0.267 0.028 0.037 0.045
Medium RQE -0.098 -0.075 -0.343 -0.063 -0.329 -0.058 0.042 -0.011
Low RQE 0.043 -0.097 -0.178 -0.060 -0.166 -0.057 -0.122 -0.061
Source: UNO, WIFO calculations.
NB: The RCA is deﬁ  ned as the logarithm of the export to import relation of one sector divided by the export to import relation 
of all sectors. Positive RCA values indicate comparative advantages and negative values represent comparative disadvantages 
of a particular industry. Please note that this deﬁ  nition is different from the one given in the statistical Annex, which refers to 
RCA as measured by the normalised market shares.
Table 4.4: Trade in services sectors (excl. intra-EU-25 trade), 2004
Export market share* RCA
EU-25 US EU-25 US
Construction 53.6 16.0 0.343 1.153
Business services 59.5 30.2 0.117 0.216
Travel 44.1 49.9 -0.332 0.140
Transportation 56.7 27.6 0.032 -0.486
Communication 60.8 35.7 -0.239 -0.238
Financial services 57.4 36.4 0.546 -0.231
Computer services 72.1 24.2 0.566 1.028
Personal services 46.9 52.6 -0.280 2.749
Note:   * As % of total exports by EU-25, Japan and the US. Personal services include education, health and social work and 
recreational, cultural and sporting activities.
Source: Eurostat, WIFO calculations.
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Graph 4.5: Employment of afﬁ  liates under foreign control 2004 as a percentage of total employment.
Note: Services do not include NACE 75-93.
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are steadily growing, but outward FDI is more 
dynamic. While the intensity of inward FDI is 11 
percentage points above that of 1995, outward 
FDI intensity has even grown by 17 percentage 
points.
–   Industries differ greatly in their degree of interna-
tionalisation measured as the FDI inward and out-
ward stock. Financial services, mining and quar-
rying, chemicals and transport equipment have 
the highest stock of FDI as a percentage of value 
added in the EU-15. Financial services are charac-
terised by a robust increase in both inward and 
outward activity, which indicate a positive impact 
of reduced regulatory barriers, decreased infor-
mation and communication costs, the introduc-
tion of the Euro, and market-driven investments 
in the NMS, especially since the 2004 EU enlarge-
ment (Farouk, 2004).
–   The ranking of industries from low to high FDI 
intensity tends to be very similar between the 
EU-15 and the US, even though the position of 
ﬁ  nancial services is less exceptional in the latter. 
This indicates that sector speciﬁ  c factors may be 
more important than country speciﬁ  c factors in 
explaining outward FDI. With respect to the ratio 
of the inward FDI stock to value added, the US is 
ahead of the EU-15 in most manufacturing indus-
tries. However, the EU-15 have a higher inward 
FDI intensity in business services and ﬁ  nancial 
service.
–   With outward FDI stocks exceeding inward FDI 
stocks, the EU-15 is traditionally a net investor, 
which applies to all broad sectors except metal 
and mechanical products as well as real estate 
and business services. This net surplus is most 
pronounced in the food, trade, transport and 
communications sectors.
–   The major part of direct investments takes place 
between EU-15 countries: 66% of the stock of 
inward FDI originates from the EU-15 member 
countries and 59% of the total outward stock of 
the EU-15 is held in other EU-15 countries. From 
1995-2005 intra EU-15 FDI stocks (not displayed 
in the table) also grew faster than Extra EU-15 
stocks in all industries except transport equip-
ment. This indicates that FDI has become a key 
element of the EU integration process.
–   Again, the variation across industries is substantial. 
Food & beverages, textiles, and wood activities, 
transport equipment, and hotels & restaurants 
receive a larger than average share of inward FDI 
from non-EU-15 countries. Electricity, gas, and 
water; transport, storage & communication, and 
trade & repairs receive a low share of inward FDI 
from non-EU countries. With respect to outward 
FDI, food & beverages, petroleum, chemical, rub-
ber, and plastic products, transport equipment, 
construction and energy, water and gas have a 
high share of extra-EU-15 FDI in per cent of the 
total outward EU-15 FDI stock.
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–   Finally, the Eurostat New Cronos FDI database 
provides additional information on inward and 
outward FDI stock by sector and destination (not 
displayed in the table). Activities in high-wage 
countries account for the bulk of the FDI outward 
stock of the EU-15. For instance, in manufactur-
ing 88% of the FDI outward stock is held by other 
EU-15 countries or non-EU OECD countries. The 
New Member States account for only 4% of the 
outward FDI stock in manufacturing. This does 
not support the view that there is signiﬁ  cant off-
shoring to low wage countries.
4.5.   Mutual dependencies and the 
appropriate economic policies
To establish a better understanding of the mecha-
nisms that drive sectoral performance, this ﬁ  nal 
section presents additional results which focus on 
mutual dependencies between the performance 
variables and the relative importance of differences 
between countries and sectors or the interaction of 
both89. For this purpose, in a ﬁ  rst stage, the simple 
bivariate correlations among the chosen indicators 
are assessed and tested for their signiﬁ  cance. These 
correlations provide an immediate indication of 
which variables tend to move together without any 
invocation of presumed causality. One remarkable 
set of observations from the bivariate analysis is a 
general catching-up tendency in labour productivity 
for the aggregate economy, not found at the sectoral 
level. In a second stage, are presented, in a summary 
fashion, results from a series of panel regressions 
that provide a deeper insight into the multivariate 
associations after controlling for ﬁ  xed country and 
industry effects. These panel regressions offer an 
enriched understanding of the interdependencies 
between the variables. However, they are also more 
tentative in the sense that the results are sensitive to 
prior assumptions of causal relationships implied by 
the choice of variables for the estimations. Finally, an 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is applied in order to 
decompose the total variation in the data panel into 
constant country and industry effects and the inter-
action between each pair of countries and industries. 
ANOVA is akin to ﬁ  xed effects panel regressions and 
tells us whether the differences between countries, 
industries or their joint interactions predominantly 
affect the outcome in the performance variables. 
The source of variation can inform on which policies 
might be more appropriate for inﬂ  uencing the cor-
responding variables.
Beginning with a brief examination of bivariate cor-
relations among the performance variables (Annex 
89   The actual determinants or ‘drivers’ of sectoral perform-
ance will be studied in more detail in future reports.
Table 4.4), the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  nding is an obvious and strong 
statistical association between the average growth 
of value added, employment, labour- and Total Fac-
tor Productivity (measured as value added per hour 
worked). This is not surprising, as the increase in 
value added can be mechanically decomposed into 
the contributions from labour inputs and labour pro-
ductivity growth. Consequently, average growth of 
employment and labour productivity are positively 
related with value added growth, but negatively 
related among them. Similarly, we ﬁ  nd a very high 
correlation between labour and Total Factor Pro-
ductivity. More surprisingly, there are relatively few 
statistical associations among the other variables. 
Most notably, apart from the obvious relationships 
between the growth accounting variables, in the 
bivariate analysis TFP growth only relates signiﬁ  -
cantly (and positively) to the change of inward FDI. 
This lack of direct statistical associations between the 
different indicators suggests that they span relatively 
independent dimensions of sectoral performance, 
which need explicit consideration in any compre-
hensive assessment.
The only exception is the initial level of labour pro-
ductivity in 1995, for which there are signiﬁ  cant 
coefﬁ  cients with most of the other variables. In par-
ticular, the negative correlation with average growth 
of labour productivity indicates a tendency towards 
catching-up, implying that additional productivity 
growth becomes more difﬁ  cult to achieve at higher 
levels. Graph 4.6 provides additional detail by sepa-
rating the bivariate associations for the total econ-
omy and selected sectors. For the total economy, 
the ﬁ  rst chart indeed shows a marked negative rela-
tionship between the initial level of productivity in 
1995 and its average annual growth afterwards. The 
same catching-up tendency is observed, for instance, 
in the wholesale, retail trade and business services 
sectors. The implication is that countries at the top 
of their productivity performance ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to 
defend their position in the longer run, as those 
countries lagging behind enjoy more opportunities 
to absorb productive knowledge and hence tend 
to more rapidly increase their labour productivity. 
This ﬁ  nding is of immediate relevance to economic 
policy. For countries lagging behind other nations 
in a sector, it demonstrates the particular need for 
the better diffusion of new technology and business 
practices and the need to ensure the openness of a 
country to foreign technology through the ﬂ  ow of 
goods, people and ideas (Guellec and Pottelsberghe 
de la Potterie, 2004). While this is also important 
for industrial leaders if they want to maintain their 
productivity advantage, a pronounced catching-up 
tendency will also raise their awareness of appropri-
ability problems (Geroski, 1995). This may result, for 
instance, in the introduction of stricter intellectual 
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics on sectoral FDI stocks











EU-15 US EU-15 US EU-15  Inward  Outward
Total 18 +11 12 +4 25 +17 16 +6 1.4 1.3 34 41
Manufacturing 18 +7 30 +10 28 +11 25 +3 1.9 0.8 38 48
Food & beverages  19 +4 17 -4 29 -1 28 +6 4.0 1.6 43 52
Textiles and wood 
activities
15 +8 16 +6 13 +6 14 +6 1.5 0.9 44 26
Ref. petrol., chemical, 
plastics
39 +17 53 +2 57 +18 39 -6 1.5 0.7 36 52
Metal and mechanical 
products
8 +2 13 +6 13 +6 10 +4 0.8 0.7 33 46
Computers, R&TV, 
comm. equ.
9 -1 14 -5 13 +2 15 -19 1.5 1.1 31 49
Transport equipment 17 +8 31 +23 37 +27 24 -1 1.7 0.7 41 57
Electricity, gas and 
water
6 +3 16 +14 31 +27 6 +2 1.4 0.4 17 65
Construction 1 +1 1 +1 3 +2 1 +0 2.1 0.5 28 65
Total services 27 +20 13 +5 35 +27 22 +12 5.3 1.6 33 37
Trade and repairs 7 +0 15 +7 9 +4 11 +2 4.3 0.7 28 38
Hotels and restaurants 3 +1 7 +0 4 +1 7 +6 1.3 1.0 49 25
Transport and commu-
nication
5 +4 10 +6 20 +19 3 +0 4.3 0.3 16 29
Financial intermediation 144 +121 31 +8 192 +162 43 +15 1.3 1.4 36 41
Real estate, business 
activities
17 +11 3 -1 14 +9 27 +18 0.9 10.7 32 31
Total 18 +11 12 +4 25 +17 16 +6 1.4 1.3 34 41
Notes: Change is measured in percentage points. EU-15 is extra EU.
Source: EUROSTAT (New Cronos), WIFO calculations.
property rights or attempts to speed up the innova-
tion process, introducing new goods or practices at 
shorter intervals.
However, Graph 4.6 also reveals that convergence 
is not a universal force. It applies to some industries 
and not others. For example, in the broad sectors 
of total manufacturing or electricity, gas and water 
supply, we ﬁ   nd no pronounced tendency, neither 
in favour of nor against catching up. Some indus-
tries even show a signiﬁ   cant positive relationship 
between the initial level and subsequent growth of 
labour productivity. Graph 4.6 picks the example of 
the pharmaceutical industry, where those countries 
with the highest labour productivity in 1995, e.g., 
France, Sweden or Ireland, also enjoyed the fast-
est productivity increases in the subsequent period. 
Again, the ﬁ  nding of a tendency towards ‘dynamic 
specialisation’ has an immediate bearing on eco-
nomic policy. In general, it calls for measures to 
raise the capacity for own innovation in the respec-
tive technology ﬁ   eld. However, countries that lag 
far behind are warned that attempts to catch up are 
costly and unlikely to succeed (unless they focus on 
very speciﬁ  c niches of yet uncharted opportunities). 
In keeping with the principle of comparative advan-
tage, the general policy prescription will be to enable 
the free and competitive ﬂ  ow of goods and services 
and thus maintain consumer welfare.
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To conclude, the data show that the relative impor-
tance of the dynamic forces of catching-up versus 
self-reinforced strengths depend on the techno-
logical nature of the industry. While catching-up is 
more frequently observed, we also ﬁ  nd instances of 
dynamic specialisation, especially in high-tech indus-
tries with a strongly cumulative knowledge base.
The results of the multivariate analysis can be found in 
Annex Table 4.3.A which summarises the coefﬁ  cients 
of selected panel regressions. For the standard growth-
accounting variables (i.e. the growth of value added, 
employment, and productivity) the general relation-
ships in the correlation table also determine most of the 
outcomes of the panel regressions. For example, any 
change in growth of employment or labour produc-
Graph 4.6: Catching-up versus dynamic specialisation
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tivity affects value added growth by almost the same 
magnitude. Conversely, for both employment and 
labour productivity, own increases negatively affect 
the growth of the respective other variable, while a 
rise in Total Factor Productivity has a positive effect on 
both. This illustrates a fundamental trade-off in com-
mon policy choices. While activities directed at raising 
the growth of value added (e.g., public investments 
in infrastructure) have a positive impact on productiv-
ity and employment, other policies either focus more 
on generating employment (for instance, by lowering 
labour cost) or on increasing productivity (for instance, 
by means of structural reforms raising competition).
Structural reforms that take a long-term view tend to 
favour productivity increases, despite the likely nega-
tive effects on employment in the short-term (i.e. for 
a given rate of value added growth). Such policies are 
nevertheless based on the expectation of a positive 
relationship between the growth of employment and 
long-run labour productivity (i.e. when the growth 
of value added is not given). The small but positive 
relationship between the level of labour productiv-
ity in 1995 and the average growth of employment 
between 1995 and 2004 is consistent with this view. 
Further supportive evidence is provided by the positive 
coefﬁ  cient on Total Factor Productivity in the estima-
tion of employment growth. The bivariate correlation 
between the two variables was negative. However 
after separating the impact via increased labour pro-
ductivity in the multivariate regression, Total Fac-
tor Productivity captures additional efﬁ  ciency  gains 
which appear to have a positive effect on employ-
ment growth. The consistent positive contribution 
of Total Factor Productivity growth has proved to be 
the most remarkable observation from the additional 
panel regressions on the other dimensions of sectoral 
performance, i.e. on the intensity of inward FDI, the 
change in RCA and the export market shares (Annex 
Table 4.3.B). This was not to be expected after an 
investigation of the correlation matrix, where none of 
the coefﬁ  cients on the bivariate relationship with MFP 
growth is signiﬁ  cant (Annex Table 4.4). From the mul-
tivariate regressions, however, Total Factor Productiv-
ity comes out as the most robust determinant with a 
positive inﬂ  uence on sectoral performance in each of 
the chosen dimensions. This would make Total Factor 
Productivity a central driver that could be identiﬁ  ed 
among the various measures of performance.
Finally, the following paragraphs review the impact 
of differences between countries, industries, and the 
respective pairs of particular industries in a country 
on sectoral performance. Again, this bears relevance 
for economic policy, as, for example, large shares of 
explained variation from ﬁ  xed country effects point 
at the relevance of differences in the macroeconomic 
business environment, which is the same for all indus-
tries in a country. Conversely, a higher explanatory 
power of ﬁ   xed industry effects hints at the impor-
tance of different intrinsic characteristics of the sec-
tors, which are hardly affected by economic policies 
(particularly at the national level). However, if certain 
industries exhibit desirable characteristics, such as a 
sustained tendency toward increased growth dynam-
ics, ﬁ  xed industry effects may still help deﬁ  ne the tar-
gets of policies directed at enabling favourable struc-
tural changes. Finally, the importance of interaction 
effects from speciﬁ  c pairs of countries and industries 
(Annex Table 4.5) may indicate the need for a reﬁ  ned 
approach to competitiveness policy, where the simul-
taneous pursuit of horizontal activities directed at the 
general business environment, combined with an 
awareness of the particular needs of the individual 
industries, is the most promising approach.
At this point, one must of course emphasise that 
differences in sectoral performance need not prima-
rily relate to economic policy but could be mainly 
caused by other factors. For instance, ﬁ  xed  coun-
try effects may be due to different endowments of 
natural resources, geographic location, etc. Similarly, 
interaction effects are largely driven by idiosyncratic 
events, such as individual bursts of technological 
breakthroughs and entrepreneurialism or dynamic 
spillovers due to increasing returns and other 
instances of self-organised processes (such as the for-
mation of regional industrial clusters).
An analysis of variance (ANOVA, see Annex Table 4.5 
for results and methodological notice) on the data 
found that, on average, the differences between coun-
tries explained fewer than 12% of the total variation 
in sectoral performance. Thus ﬁ  xed country charac-
teristics, such as general differences in the business 
environment (tax rates, labour market regulation, 
etc.) or macroeconomic conditions explain some of 
the performance of European industries, while leav-
ing a much larger portion unexplained. The ﬁ  xed 
country effects are most powerful in explaining the 
FDI intensities while are particularly small for employ-
ment growth. To avoid misinterpretation, however, 
one must emphasise that this ﬁ  nding does not mean 
that the general business environment or horizontal 
policy measures have little impact on performance as 
such. Nevertheless, it conﬁ  rms that industries differ 
in their sensitivity to these factors and that much of 
their impact must be sought in the interaction term 
of particular country and industry pairs.
Employment growth is the variable with the highest 
share of explained variation by ﬁ  xed industry effects. 
While on average these account for about 33% of 
total variation, in the case of employment growth 
the constant differences between industries explain 
more than 56%.
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In all other cases, the joint interaction of country 
and industry effects is the most powerful factor. On 
average it explains more than 55% of the total vari-
ation. This is to be expected, as the interaction term 
adds one dummy for each industry and country pair. 
Indeed, it is surprising that the ﬁ   xed country and 
industry effects do not leave more for the interaction 
term to explain. Its share is highest for the change in 
revealed comparative advantage and export market 
shares, and lowest for employment growth.
4.6. Conclusions
This chapter investigates European sectoral competi-
tiveness, assessing the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of European industries with respect to the var-
ious dimensions of performance, such as the growth 
of value added, employment, labour and Total Factor 
Productivity, international trade, and foreign direct 
investments.
Overall, we ﬁ  nd that the competitive performance 
of European industries is highly variable, both across 
countries and between sectors. This large hetero-
geneity accentuates the need for sectoral analysis 
of two different kinds. On the one hand, industrial 
policy requires detailed sector studies which investi-
gate competitive performance and its determinants 
at the level of individual industries. Second, we 
need systematic analyses across sectors, as pursued 
here, in order to set the general frame of reference 
for a coherent understanding of individual develop-
ments.
More speciﬁ  cally, the empirical ﬁ  ndings lead to the 
following conclusions:
–   The general proﬁ  le of European competitiveness 
differs greatly depending on which dimension 
of performance is observed. For the period since 
1995, the EU exhibits low performance in terms of 
the growth of value added, labour and Total Fac-
tor Productivity, while appearing quite healthy in 
terms of sectoral proﬁ  tability and trade perform-
ance. Foreign direct investments expand rapidly 
in each direction, with outward FDI growing 
stronger. Even though the current upswing of the 
European economies (which is not yet captured 
in the sectoral data) will improve the general out-
look, the comparatively poor performance in the 
growth of labour and Total Factor Productivity is 
likely to become the major concern of European 
policies in coming years.
–   Assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses 
by sector, the sectors of mining and among man-
ufacturing industries the production of leather 
& footwear, clothing, textiles, nuclear fuel and 
tobacco show a persistent decline in value added 
and employment. Conversely, apart from water 
transport, all industries with the highest rates of 
value added growth in the European Union relate 
to the new information and communication tech-
nologies, i.e. communication equipment, ofﬁ  ce 
machinery and computers, as well as telecommu-
nications and computer related services.
–   Compared to the US, the biggest gap in sectoral 
performance can be found in the manufacturing 
of ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers, wholesale and 
retail trade, air transport, and the ﬁ  nancial serv-
ices. The latter three services sectors all appear to 
be rather sensitive to economies of scale and are 
likely to beneﬁ  t from the larger integrated mar-
kets in the US. Conversely, the EU shows pockets 
of higher growth in selected areas of high-tech 
manufacturing, particularly pharmaceuticals, and 
the network industries, such as the sectors of 
electricity, gas and water supply, water transport, 
and telecommunications, which are apparently 
undergoing substantial restructuring processes.
–   Addressing the dynamics of labour productivity 
growth, the data conﬁ  rm a general catching-up 
tendency for the total economy, including many 
service sectors. This implies that countries with 
lower initial levels of labour productivity have 
since on average achieved higher growth, whereas 
countries initially ranking at the top of productiv-
ity performance found it more difﬁ  cult to maintain 
high growth rates. However, a general tendency 
does not establish universal rules, as some technol-
ogy driven manufacturing industries demonstrate. 
For instance, pharmaceuticals and the computer 
industry are characterised by the opposite process 
of dynamic specialisation, where given competi-
tive strengths not only persist but tend to be rein-
forced. Consequently, in these industries certain 
countries with an initially high level also enjoyed 
higher rates of labour productivity growth.
–   An analysis of structural relationships among the 
different performance indicators highlights the 
trade-off between the growth of employment 
and labour productivity, which in the short run 
affects the choice of priorities among policies that 
are primarily directed at raising the labour inten-
sity of growth, or those aiming to raise productiv-
ity growth. Overall, among the variables investi-
gated, Total Factor Productivity growth appears 
to be the central driver of sectoral performance. 
It exerts a positive impact on the growth of value 
added and labour productivity, inward FDI, and 
gains in international comparative advantage.
–   Decomposing the entire variation in average sec-
toral performance between countries and indus-
tries, an analysis of variance shows that a relatively 
small portion of about 12% is accounted for by 
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ﬁ  xed country effects. This is the share of perform-
ance, which results from differences in purely 
macro-economic conditions and the general busi-
ness environment with equal impact on all indus-
tries. Conversely, ﬁ   xed industry effects explain 
almost one third of the total variation in perform-
ance. These refer to intrinsic differences between 
industries and as such are not likely to respond to 
different policies. However, they point toward the 
importance of structural change and the policies 
that enable it (such as raising the power of labour 
and capital markets to reallocate resources).
–   Finally, the majority of variation is explained by 
country-industry interaction effects, i.e. by the 
particular performance of country and industry. 
This is testimony to the heterogeneity in perform-
ance and variety of causative factors. It calls for 
an integrative policy approach, where horizontal 
and vertical perspectives are combined in order 
to adjust the business environment to the par-
ticular characteristics of the respective industries 
(e.g., in terms of regulation, innovation and edu-
cation policies). This conﬁ  rms the validity of the 
integrated approach to industrial policy put for-
ward by the European Commission over these last 
years90, based on a concrete work programme of 
horizontal and sectoral initiatives.
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Annex: Supplementary tables and ﬁ  gures
Annex Table 4.1: Summary indictors on aggregate trade performance
Trade in goods (manuf. excl. intra-EU-27 
trade), 2005








1996=100 in% 1996=100 1996=100 in% 1996=100
Austria 1.40 119.38 0.58 124.2 1.01 97.78 1.81 100.85
Belgium-
Luxembourg
0.93 86.70 1.17 117.1 1.26 132.26 2.51 132.53
Bulgaria 0.68 45.92 0.05 70.9 - - - -
Cyprus 0.28 68.17 0.01 27.6 - - - -
Czech Republic 0.70 98.34 0.20 165.5 - - - -
Denmark 1.56 104.88 0.48 100.5 1.18 - 2.16 -
Estonia 0.58 60.35 0.03 117.3 - - - -
Finland 1.67 91.48 0.50 92.0 1.59 184.59 0.89 166.45
France 1.07 87.90 2.59 82.1 1.20 92.21 6.41 80.65
Germany 1.38 105.17 6.41 102.8 0.83 111.98 7.98 106.40
Greece 0.35 63.55 0.08 73.3 2.19 72.75 2.00 212.03
Hungary 0.80 83.03 0.22 223.0 - - - -
Ireland 1.50 148.35 0.72 163.3 0.54 - 1.94 -
Italy 1.45 74.78 2.53 78.4 1.01 92.82 3.75 60.07
Latvia 0.87 60.92 0.02 106.5 - - - -
Lithuania 1.21 85.45 0.06 120.8 - - - -
Malta 1.20 118.94 0.02 87.6 - - - -
Netherlands 0.66 81.26 1.26 95.7 1.26 108.10 4.16 109.80
Poland 0.79 99.76 0.35 175.1 - - - -
Portugal 0.95 109.08 0.12 84.9 1.32 114.32 0.37 93.94
Romania 0.57 52.99 0.09 113.0 - - - -
Slovak Rep. 0.47 61.01 0.07 197.7 - - - -
Slovenia 1.78 147.80 0.11 138.3 - - - -
Spain 0.67 66.69 0.87 98.3 0.99 85.10 2.32 120.61
Sweden 2.05 95.16 0.90 86.1 1.39 - 2.15 -
UK 0.86 95.39 2.52 72.9 1.56 109.93 13.25 133.68
Japan 1.60 105.46 10.52 76.8 - - 10.75 88.73
US 0.60 75.88 15.19 79.3 1.20 76.16 37.54 88.57
EU-15 1.12 92.51 20.75 92.1 1.13 105.38 51.71 113.65
NMS-12 0.76 84.23 1.24 148.1 - - - -
EU-27 1.09 91.22 21.98 94.14 - - - -
Note:   * Deﬁ  ned as share in total exports of EU-27 plus Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, the United 
States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, China, India, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, ** Deﬁ  ned as share in total exports of EU-15 plus 
US and Japan.
Source: UN COMTRADE, EUROSTAT, WIFO calculations.
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Annex Table 4.2: List of 3-digit industries and the respective identiﬁ  cation 
within the three taxonomies
NACE 3-digit industries Taxonomy I* Taxonomy II* Taxonomy III**
Factor inputs Skills Quality
151 Meat products 4 1 2
152 Fish and ﬁ  sh products 4 1 2
153 Fruits and vegetables 4 1 3
154 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 4 1 3
155 Dairy products; ice cream 4 1 1
156 Grain mill products and starches 4 1 2
157 Prepared animal feeds 4 1 2
158 Other food products 4 1 2
159 Beverages 4 1 1
160 Tobacco products 4 1 1
171 Textile ﬁ  bres 3 1 2
172 Textile weaving 2 1 1
174 Made-up textile articles 2 1 3
175 Other textiles 1 1 2
176 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 1 1 1
177 Knitted and crocheted articles 1 1 2
181 Leather clothes 2 1 2
182 Other wearing apparel and accessories 2 1 1
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 2 1 2
191 Tanning and dressing of leather 4 1 1
192 Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 4 1 1
193 Footwear 4 1 1
201 Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood 2 2 3
202 Panels and boards of wood 2 2 3
203 Builders’ carpentry and joinery 2 2 2
204 Wooden containers 2 2 3
205 Other products of wood; articles of cork, etc. 2 2 3
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard 3 3 3
212 Articles of paper and paperboard 1 3 3
221 Publishing 4 3 3
222 Printing 4 3 2
23 Reﬁ  ned petroleum and nuclear fuel 3 3 2
241 Basic chemicals 3 3 3
242 Pesticides, other agro-chemical products 5 3 1
243 Paints, coatings, printing ink 1 3 1
244 Pharmaceuticals 5 4 1
245 Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes 4 3 2
246 Other chemical products 5 3 1
247 Man-made ﬁ  bres 3 3 2
251 Rubber products 1 1 3
252 Plastic products 1 1 2
261 Glass and glass products 1 1 3
262 Ceramic goods 2 1 2
263 Ceramic tiles and ﬂ  ags 3 1 2
264 Bricks, tiles and construction products 2 1 3
265 Cement, lime and plaster 3 1 3
266 Articles of concret, plaster and cement 1 1 3
267 Cutting, shaping, ﬁ  nishing of stone 2 1 3
268 Other non-metallic mineral products 1 1 3
271 Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 3 1 3
272 Tubes 1 1 3
273 Other ﬁ  rst processing of iron and steel 3 1 2
274 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals  3 1 3
281 Structural metal products 2 2 2
282 Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators, boilers 4 2 1
283 Steam generators 2 2 3
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286 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 4 2 2
287 Other fabricated metal products 1 2 3
291 Machinery for production, use of mech. power 1 4 2
292 Other general purpose machinery 1 4 1
293 Agricultural and forestry machinery 1 4 1
294 Machine-tools 2 4 1
295 Other special purpose machinery 1 4 1
296 Weapons and ammunition 1 4 3
297 Domestic appliances n. e. c. 1 3 3
300 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers 5 4 2
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers 1 3 3
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 5 3 1
313 Isolated wire and cable 1 3 3
314 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 1 3 3
315 Lighting equipment and electric lamps 1 3 2
316 Electrical equipment n. e. c. 2 3 2
321 Electronic valves and tubes, other electronic comp. 5 3 2
322 TV, and radio transmitters, app. for line telephony 5 3 1
323 TV, radio and recording apparatus 5 3 3
331 Medical equipment 5 3 1
332 Instr. for measuring, checking, testing, navigating 5 3 1
334 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 5 3 1
335 Watches and clocks 4 3 1
341 Motor vehicles 5 2 1
342 Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers 2 2 1
343 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 3 2 1
351 Ships and boats 2 2 2
352 Railway locomotives and rolling stock 2 2 1
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 5 4 1
354 Motorcycles and bicycles 1 2 3
355 Other transport equipment n. e. c. 1 2 2
361 Furniture 2 2 2
362 Jewellery and related articles 2 2 1
363 Musical instruments 4 2 2
364 Sports goods 4 2 2
365 Games and toys 4 2 1
366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c. 4 2 3
1. Mainstream
1. Low skill 
industries
































Source:   * Peneder, M., Entrepreneurial Competition and Industrial Location, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2001. – 
** Aiginger, K., Europe’s Position in Quality Competition, European Commission Enterprise Directorate General, 2000.
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Labour productivity 1995 - 0.00001 5.46e-06
Employment growth 0.97079*** - -0.20651***
Labour productivity growth 0.98424*** -0.34171*** -
Total Factor Productivity growth - 0.30727*** 0.88036***
Fixed country effects yes yes yes
Fixed industry effects yes yes yes
No. of observations 1,289 404 404
R2 (adjusted) 0.992 0.727 0.878
Note:   Labour productivity is value added per hour worked; growth is measured as annual average rates from 1995 to 2004. 
Fixed effects control for constant differences between countries and industries.
Level of signiﬁ  cance: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level.
Source: EU KLEMS, WIFO calculations.








Labour productivity 1995 - 0.00718* 0.03140***
RCA 1995 - -0.28420*** -
Export market share 1995 - - -0.08166**
TFP growth 14.78684** 3.82420** 10.07829**
Fixed country effects yes yes yes
Fixed industry effects yes yes yes
No. of observations 17 48 39
R2 (adjusted) 0.934 0.226 0.537
Note:   labour productivity is value added per hour worked; growth is measured as annual average rates from 1995 to 2004.
Level of signiﬁ  cance: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level.
Source: BACH, EU KLEMS, EUROSTAT, OECD, UNO; WIFO calculations.







































Annex Table 4.4: Bivariate correlations between performance variables




















































































-0.020 -0.045 -0.002 -0.036 0.229
**





























Note:   lpi1995 = labour productivity in 1995; agva = average growth of labour productivity; agemp = average growth of employment; aglpi = average growth of labour productivity; 
agmfp = average growth of multifactor productivity; anpm = average net proﬁ  t margin; aroa = average return on assets; arca = average revealed comparative advantage; drca = change of 
RCA value; aexs = average export share; dexs = change of export share; aifdir = average ratio of inward FDI to value added; difdir = change of ifdir; aofdir = average ratio of outward FDI to 
value added; dofdir = change of ofdir; depending on data availability all averages are for the years 1995 (1996) to 2004 (2005). The changes are measured as differences between the aver-
age of periods 2000 – 2004 (2005) and 1995 (1996) – 2000.


















































































































































Annex Table 4.5: Summary Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Share of total variation in% explained by
Country effects Industry effects Country*Industry effects No. of obs.
Labour productivity 2004 10.11 32.72 57.17 2035
Employment growth 5.95 56.61 37.44 1440
Value added growth 7.67 33.68 58.66 1295
Labour productivity growth 8.87 27.29 63.84 1294
MFP growth 11.62 27.95 60.43 436
Change of RCA 4.12 12.61 83.27 828
Change of export shares 11.73 8.06 80.21 714
Inward FDI 27.01 34.40 38.59 153
Change inward FDI 18.22 23.53 58.25 171
Outward FDI 14.57 40.71 44.72 160
Change of outward FDI 12.03 34.23 53.74 167
Mean of explained variance 11.81 32.66 55.53
Note:   In this exercise, ANOVA was performed after removing the time dimension, through calculation of mean values or by using the values for a particular year. Thus, the overall variance has 
been dramatically reduced when compared to the same analysis with all variables in the respective years appearing as independent observations. However, in the latter case all ﬁ  xed time 
effects were entirely negligible and remained below 1%, leaving the major part of explanation to the noisy time dependent interaction effects.
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Chapter 5. The Future of 
Manufacturing in Europe – 
a survey of the literature 
and a modelling aproach
5.1. Introduction
The current wave of globalisation has led to a 
renewed discussion of how the manufacturing land-
scape, in terms of location, production, distribution 
of labour and physical appearance will manifest itself 
in the near and longer-term future. Will the world be 
an even ‘ﬂ  atter’, ‘spikier’ or ‘smaller’ place by 2030? 
(Friedman, 2005; Florida, 2005; Leamer, 2006). 
And if so, what would this imply for manufacturing 
activity in Europe? What about future employment? 
Can Europe’s future prosperity be ensured without a 
thriving manufacturing sector? What would a further 
retreat of manufacturing – a ‘gravity centre’ for R&D 
and innovation – from European soil mean for future 
innovation capacity?
While structural adjustment and relocation have been 
linked to manufacturing for decades, the character 
and speed of adjustment and its potential longer-
term consequences appear to have recently taken on 
new dimensions recently. This review aims to high-
light the most signiﬁ  cant trends and issues for Euro-
pean manufacturing in the next 25 to 30 years91. It 
does so in the form of an extensive literature survey 
of existing foresight and futures studies. It includes 
the ﬁ   ndings of a wide range of different studies, 
some of which are directly concerned with the future 
of manufacturing. Others only deal with particular 
issues such as (the impact of) climate change, future 
technologies, organisational innovation or new busi-
ness models. The backbone of this literature survey 
is formed by three recent EU-wide foresight projects 
on the future of manufacturing in Europe FutMan, 
ManVis and Manufuture (see Annex Boxes 1 and 2 
for a short background on the key futures and fore-
sight studies).
Across the studies surveyed, a considerable degree 
of consensus appeared to exist on what the most 
important drivers are that shape the future of manu-
facturing. These include:
–   Increasing international competition involving the 
emergence of new competitors and the further 
integration of global markets.
–   Increasing pace of technological change leading to 
shorter product cycles forcing ﬁ  rms to continu-
91   A more detailed presentation of the literature review can be found in 
Manufacturing futures for Europe – a survey of the literature; F. Van der Zee 
and F. Brandes, TNO, 2007.
ously innovate but also enabling new organisa-
tional forms and processes.
–   Socio-demographic drivers including the ‘greying’ 
of most of the industrialized world (except for the 
US) and some emerging economies (e.g. China, 
Russia), but also further growth of the emerging 
economies offering new market opportunities.
–   Environmental drivers such as climate change, 
the depletion of natural resources and pollution 
caused by industrial activity impacting how and 
what will be manufactured in the future.
–   Additionally, some – but not all – studies outlined 
the importance of the regulatory environment and 
the values of the public as important driving fac-
tors determining future developments.
These drivers are quite broad and give rise to new 
challenges. Understanding future challenges is 
therefore as important as understanding the nature 
and background of the drivers to shed light on future 
development in manufacturing. This chapter will 
hence take the classiﬁ  cation into ﬁ  ve major categories 
of drivers as a point of departure. Section 2 discusses 
the key international developments expected to 
shape global manufacturing. Section 3 outlines new 
key (enabling) technologies as well as knowledge 
skills and competencies essential to the ﬁ  rm of the 
future. Section 4 presents emerging manufacturing 
paradigms that have received considerable attention 
with the advent of the knowledge society and Sec-
tion 5 explores societal and consumer aspects likely 
to shape the future of manufacturing, as well as key 
environmental factors (Section 6). Section 7 uses a 
modelling and scenarios approach so as to obtain 
more differentiated outcomes at sector level and to 
explore the effect of policies. Section 8 concludes.
5.2.   Globalisation and international 
competition
5.2.1. Introduction
The current wave of globalisation has led to renewed 
discussion of how the manufacturing landscape, in 
terms of location, production, distribution of labour 
and physical appearance will look like in the near 
and longer-term future. Are we witnessing a new 
industrial revolution? In most developed countries 
the potential loss of jobs associated with relocation 
of manufacturing and other production has become 
a major topic of both popular and academic debate 
(e.g. Blinder, 2005; Kirkegaard, 2005; OECD, 2005 
and 2006). Calculations show that the number of 
jobs potentially affected by offshoring is substantial. 
According to recent OECD (2006) estimates, 18% 
of total employment in the US and 19% in the EU-
15 could be affected (upper limit). Many if not most 
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of these potentially affected jobs are professional or 
high-skilled jobs92.
The current wave of globalisation is unprecedented 
in terms of scale and speed. Whereas openness to 
trade, investment and talent are important precon-
ditions for globalisation, international competition is 
one of its major drivers. Much of the current discus-
sion focuses on the integration of the ‘new’ emerg-
ing economies in the world economy, in particular 
the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China; see Box 
5.3). While sometimes perceived as an important 
threat to Western economies, the emergence of 
the BRICs and other developing countries on the 
world stage also offers new opportunities with new 
attractive and large(r) markets and with even more 
scope for specialisation for individual companies. Of 
course, global competition is not conﬁ  ned to goods 
and services (trade), but applies also to capital (FDI; 
relocation) and labour (talent and skills), thereby 
adding a further dimension to globalisation.
Improving competitiveness and revitalising manu-
facturing production already feature prominently 
on the policy agendas of the US, Europe and Japan 
(ManVis, 2005C; see also UNCTAD, 2005). For devel-
oping economies, in particular the new emerging 
economies, the high growth era not only increases 
expectations about future income and wealth, it also 
raises questions as to its sustainability in the medium 
and longer run. One major challenge for the BRICs 
and other rapidly growing developing countries is for 
instance to balance high growth sectors and regions 
with the other less thriving parts of the economy 
(ManVis, 2005C; OECD, 2005).
5.2.2.   Expected macro-developments: productivity, 
income and wealth
In a long-term scenario to 2030, the WorldBank 
(2007) foresees a near doubling of GDP in high-
income countries and more than a tripling of GDP in 
developing countries. An important driver behind this 
process is the expansion of China and India, home to 
half of the population in developing countries. This 
world-wide rise in GDP will go hand in hand with 
increasing exports and energy use, with Asian levels 
approaching those of Europe and the US. Evidently, 
all kinds shocks may occur along the way. The longer 
the timeframe, the larger uncertainty will be.
Anchored in trends already evident and based on a 
number of assumptions, GoldmanSachs (2003) and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) estimate that by 
2050 China will be the world’s biggest economy, fol-
lowed by the US and India. PriceWaterhouseCoop-
92   However, evidence to date suggests that offshoring has played a minor 
role so far for labour market developments. 
ers (2006) projects that by 2050 the ‘E7’ economies 
(BRICs plus Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) will be 
around 25% larger than the current G7, and in Pur-
chasing Power Parity (PPP) terms even 75% larger. 
Currently the size of the E7 is only around 20% of 
that of the G7 (75% in PPP terms). With three of the 
four largest economies in 2050 potentially residing 
in Asia, important geopolitical shifts towards Asia are 
to be expected too. One crucial assumption behind 
these projections is that the BRICs maintain their 
growth-supportive policy settings. Not all experts 
share this optimism about future growth, however. 
Some even refer to the BRIC growth optimism as 
a ‘marketing ploy’ (Amicus, 2006). However, what 
holds for developed high-income economies also 
applies to the new emerging economies: ensuring 
the right conditions for growth now and in the future 
is vital. These conditions include macro stability 
(sound macroeconomic policies and a stable macro 
environment), strong and stable institutions (CEPII-
CERIM, 2004)93, openness to trade, and investment 
in new technologies, R&D and talent, and education 
(secondary schooling and beyond).
Both GoldmanSachs (2003) and PriceWaterhouse-
Coopers (2006) illustrate that – driven by demo-
graphic trends94 – notable shifts in relative growth 
rates within the E7 can be expected. China and Rus-
sia are expected to face signiﬁ  cant declines in their 
working age populations between now and 2050, 
in contrast to younger countries like India, Indo-
nesia, Brazil, Turkey and Mexico. As a result, India 
is projected to have the highest growth potential, 
with a GDP similar to the US in PPP terms by 2050. 
China, even with a marked growth slowdown, would 
be around 40% larger than the US economy in PPP 
terms. Note that as a result of demographic change, 
most established OECD economies are projected to 
lose some ground relative to the US economy by 
2050. This holds for all bigger EU-15 economies as 
well as Japan, with Canada and Australia being nota-
ble exceptions.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) and ManVis 
(2005C) point out that while the BRIC might repre-
sent some of the largest markets by 2050, GDP per 
capita in that area will still be lower than in the G7. 
By 2050 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) projects 
India and Indonesia to be on a par with Spain and 
Korea today, and China, Turkey and Brazil on a 
par with the leading G7 in per capita GDP terms 
(PPP based, see Graph 5.1). In a similar study, with 
growth stemming from labour force growth, capital 
93   In the broadest sense, including the legal system, functioning markets, 
ﬁ   nancial institutions, health and education systems and government 
bureaucracy.
94   GDP projections of the E7 appear to be particularly sensitive to assump-
tions on trends in education levels, net investment rates and catch-up 
speeds. 
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accumulation and total factor productivity growth, 
Poncet (2006) estimates that the US does not lose 
the ﬁ  rst rank in the world GDP hierarchy in 2050, 
even if China and India are expected to experience 
a 13-fold and 10-fold increase in GDP at current real 
exchange rates, respectively. Of the current G7, only 
the US, Japan, Germany and the UK may be among 
the seven largest economies in 2050 according to 
Poncet (2006).
In all projections discussed above Total Factor Pro-
ductivity (TFP) expected to be a major factor for GDP 
growth. In the past productivity growth in manufac-
turing was unrivalled by other sectors in the econ-
omy. This trend is likely to continue, although pro-
ductivity in parts of the services industry, especially 
tradable services, could rise signiﬁ  cantly due to the 
pervasive and continuing impact of ICTs.
By 2030 the per capita income gap between East Asia 
and other emerging economies on the one hand and 
the high-income countries on the other will still be 
considerable (WorldBank, 2007). The same will still 
be true in 2050 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006). 
Nevertheless, steep rises in income, like in East Asia, 
will clearly have implications for the types of the 
goods and services that consumers will demand, with 
patterns of demand looking much more like those in 
the leading OECD economies today, notwithstand-
ing cultural differences. With rises in income, income 
inequality is likely to rise as well, posing considerable 
social and public policy challenges. 
Graph 5.1: Projected relative size of economies in 2005 and 2050
Note: relative sizes expressed as percentage of their sum in 2005 and 2050, respectively. GDPs are expressed in PPP terms. 
EU-5: sum of Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain.
Source: calculation using projection results by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) “The World in 2050. How big will the major 













































































































Larger and wealthier economies are not per se 
important lead markets. Much depends on indi-
vidual purchasing power and the willingness to 
buy leading-edge products and services (ManVis, 
2005C). For OECD consumers, the trend of the last 
decade in which low cost imports from China and 
other emerging economies were much to their ben-
eﬁ  t is set to continue and to even broaden to a wider 
range of products over time, leaving consumers with 
more money to spend on services (PriceWaterhouse-
Coopers, 2006).
5.2.3.  Relocation and international sourcing
One of the manifestations of globalisation is the 
growing trend in international sourcing. The term 
sourcing applies to ﬁ  rms that contract out (parts of 
their) production to other ﬁ   rms (i.e. outsourcing) 
or other production locations within the ﬁ  rm itself 
(i.e. insourcing), either domestically or abroad. In 
the latter case we speak of offshoring. International 
sourcing in manufacturing is not new, with original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM) in electronics and 
ICTs in East Asia in the 1970s being the prime exam-
ple of offshore outsourcing avant la lettre. Yet the 
scale and the pace at which relocation of production 
has occurred over the last decade appear to have 
increased.
Relatively new phenomena are the take-off of inter-
national sourcing in services (including R&D) and 
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the emergence of global production networks. A cru-
cial enabling factor behind both developments is the 
increased ability of ﬁ  rms to fragment or divide produc-
tion processes into increasingly smaller components, 
which can in turn be traded (Krugman, 1995; OECD, 
2005A; Evans et al., 2006). Thus recent technologi-
cal developments, which have resulted in impor-
tant decreases in communication, computing and 
transport costs and an increased ability to monitor, 
manage and control have enabled ﬁ  rms to fragment 
and spatially separate various stages of production 
at different locations. According to BoozAllenHamil-
ton (2004) a new wave of (international) sourcing is 
occurring now also including white collar work and 
business services. At the same time, the quality of 
sourced services has reached unprecedented levels 
while costs have decreased signiﬁ  cantly (ditto).
One major argument for the relocation of produc-
tion to other parts of the world, mostly emerging 
economies, is low labour cost (KPMG, 2004) or 
– more general – lower production costs. Key are 
total landed (i.e. integral) costs, including energy, 
transport and other costs. With important changes 
in relative prices, and with falling levels of labour 
content in total production, the relative importance 
of labour costs may well shift in the longer run. While 
China may be a low cost labour location now, its 
future landed cost may appear to be relatively similar 
to countries in the EU or the US (see Box 5.1 below) 
especially if exchange rates adjust accordingly. In 
some sectors, cost differentials can be substantial, 
however. To take the example of IT-enabled services, 
the reported cost savings of offshoring amount up 
to 40%. Yet the evidence is not all-conclusive. Other 
surveys give a more mixed picture, with some com-
panies even losing from offshore outsourcing (OECD, 
2006). Increasingly other arguments for offshoring 
are voiced, including the search for new markets 
and customers and the availability of a talented and 
skilled labour force (PricewaterhouseCoopers95).
While accessing a highly skilled pool of talent is not 
yet among the most important drivers for business 
presence in emerging economies, the longer-term 
future will most certainly look very different. Fut-
Man (2003E) emphasises that the recruitment of 
skilled workers and the training of the workforce will 
become a major competitive factor for manufactur-
ing companies in the post-industrial area.
Globalisation and the increased use of sourcing 
by manufacturing and services ﬁ  rms can also have 
important effects on productivity. However, the 
direction and extent of these effects has not been 
studied in depth (Olsen, 2006) and the empirical evi-
95   9th Annual Global CEO Survey based on interviews with 1,410 CEOs 
between September and December 2005.
dence remains far from conclusive. If any, the effect 
on productivity of outsourcing seems to be condi-
tional on the industrial sector (Olsen, 2006).
5.2.4.   The emergence of regional and global 
production networks
The increasing ability of ﬁ   rms to decompose and 
‘slice up’ the value chain into a number of self-con-
tained parts (activities/production processes as well 
as products) has, together with the search for cost 
reduction and new markets, led to the emergence 
of global production networks and – associated with 
these – an increase of trade in parts and components. 
The emergence of global production networks has 
also signiﬁ  cantly stimulated the use of services, rang-
ing from third-party logistics (3PL) services such as 
customs clearance and freight forwarding, quality 
assessment services through communication, trans-
port, distribution and ﬁ  nancial services, to R&D and 
engineering (OECD, 2005A; UNCTAD, 2005)96.
The complex, transnational character inherent in 
global value networks necessarily implies a growing 
importance of organisation and coordination. Of 
particular interest is the role of leading ﬁ  rms  that 
govern the chain and enforce the governing rules by 
which local producers – often micro-enterprises and 
SMEs – in the chain operate. Multinational compa-
nies (MNCs) are the classic example of chain gov-
ernors and continue to play this role, particularly 
in so-called producer-driven  value chains (OECD, 
2005A). These producer-driven chains often manu-
facture complex goods such as semiconductor chips 
or automobiles, and in order to do so chain gover-
nors have signiﬁ   cant control over both backward 
(raw materials, components) and forward linkages 
(distribution and retailing). Buyer-driven value chains 
on the other hand operate in competitive global and 
regional production networks typically situated in vari-
ous locations around the world, the role of leading 
ﬁ  rm being performed by a large manufacturer with 
a well-known brand name, a large marketing ﬁ  rm or 
a large retailer. Buyer-driven value chains are usually 
labour-intensive industries, ranging from apparel, 
footwear, toys to wood furniture.
5.2.5.   Globalisation vis-à-vis further regionalisation 
and regionalism
China and India play an important and increasingly 
eminent role in internationalisation and globalisation. 
At the same time, a trend of increasing intra-regional 
Asian trade and rising intra-Asian investment can 
96   Manufacturing and services have become increasingly intertwined, and 
it is increasingly difﬁ  cult to categorize ﬁ  rms as strictly manufacturers or 
service providers, especially where digital goods (e.g. software) are con-
cerned. 
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be observed (regionalisation), along with a strong 
rise in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and 
other forms of intra-regional cooperation (regional-
ism). China and the other East and South-East Asian 
nations, including Japan, have developed a strong 
intra-regional trade and investment focus, while 
actively striving for further trade integration through 
the forming of PTAs at the same time (Evans et al., 
2006). India is less pro-active in concluding bilateral 
trade agreements and lags behind China in open-
ing up to global trade, although there are indications 
of acceleration lately (The Economist, 2006A; ADB, 
2006). Whether Asian regionalism is to the beneﬁ  t of 
the world in the medium and longer term is not yet 
clear; what the proliferation of PTAs in Asia means for 
unilateralism and the future of multilateral organisa-
tions, most importantly the WTO, neither. In China 
and India, and indeed throughout Asia, a strong 
preference for technological independence and an 
increasing ability to set technical rules and standards 
can be observed (Suttmeier, 2005; Schmitz, 2006; 
Kang and Segal, 2006).
Box 5.1: BRICs and Future Competitiveness
Globalisation and the concomitant intensiﬁ  cation of international competition is the single most impor-
tant driver shaping the future of manufacturing. While countries like Japan and South Korea have 
already made the transition to competing on equal terms with the West, similar expectations hold at 
least for China. The current discussion on future competitors focuses on the BRIC countries although 
large differences exist between these countries.
China being the world’s manufacturing powerhouse is perceived as the biggest potential competitor of 
the BRICs. If current trends continue GoldmanSachs (2003) estimates that China will become the larg-
est economy by 2050, although not the richest in terms of GDP per capita. Furthermore, China’s large 
number of R&D employees, which is only second to the US, makes it not just an attractive low cost 
manufacturing location but increasingly competitive in high-technology and R&D (Amicus, 2006). While 
wage inﬂ  ation is starting to affect highly skilled jobs in China, the large reservoir of unskilled labour means 
that wage inﬂ  ation for low skilled manufacturing activities is less of an issue. In view of these advantages 
the challenges China is likely to face and which determine its competitiveness receive less attention. For 
example even China has lost manufacturing jobs since the mid-1990s due to high productivity gains 
(ManVis, 2005C). Furthermore, energy and a lack of infrastructure are key constraints to future growth in 
China. The uneven growth within the country is hampering development as some areas such as Shanghai 
already lose their labour cost advantage, whereas other parts of the country lack the infrastructure to be 
attractive for manufacturing (ManVis, 2005). Due to the one child policy China is one of the most rapidly 
ageing societies posing similar challenges as in the West. Lastly, the industrial catching up process of 
China has come at huge environmental costs, which seem unsustainable as the country is already suffer-
ing from heavy environmental pollution and shrinking water supplies (Amicus, 2006).
Despite not experiencing the same growth rates as China, India is perceived as one of the most pro-
spective economies of the coming decades. Among its advantages is its use of special economic zones 
(SEZ) and having one of the best legal frameworks in Asia which reduces investment risks. Although 
having well educated workers, labour costs in India are at the lower end of emerging economies 
(KPMG, 2005). Also India’s population is the only one expected to grow until 2050. However, insufﬁ  -
cient infrastructure making transport expensive as well as unstable energy supplies could hamper future 
development (KPMG, 2005). Overall, India is expected to play an important role in the second wave of 
outsourcing, where white collar work is outsourced and off-shored (Deloitte, 2006).
Although the economies of Brazil and Russia are expected to grow signiﬁ  cantly, the future of manu-
facturing is much less rosy than in China or India. Brazil is perceived as far from being competitive on 
foreign markets and much less open to trade than China. Furthermore, its investment and saving rates 
are lower, whereas public and foreign debt is higher (Amicus, 2006). Also, to achieve the projected 
growth rates Brazil’s performance would have to increase considerably (GoldmanSachs, 2003). Russia’s 
growth is largely driven by recent increases in energy and commodity prices, whereas the economy is 
not diversiﬁ  ed and at the mercy of cyclical movements of the world economy. Russia’s biggest chal-
lenge though is its weak institutions and the expected population decrease. Overall, although Russia 
and Brazil are expected to grow, their role in the international division of labour in global manufactur-
ing is uncertain given the challenges they are presumed to face.
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5.2.6.  Financial globalisation and ﬁ  nancialisation
One of the most salient features of the current wave 
of globalisation is the surge in capital ﬂ  ows between 
industrial countries and, even more notably, between 
industrial and developing countries. While in the 
early 1970s the ratio of foreign exchange trading to 
world trade was around 2:1, this had risen to 50:1 by 
the early 1990s and to 70:1 by the end of the 1990s, 
with the majority of foreign exchange positions held 
for less than a week (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000). The 
daily volume of global foreign exchange transactions 
amounted to more than 1.9 trillion US$ each day in 
2004, in contrast to 570 billion per day in 198997). 
FDI ﬂ  ows which accounted for US$22 billion only in 
1990 have nowadays reached levels of some US$600 
billion each year (after peaking at over US$1,300 bn 
in 2000 at the end of the dot-com boom) (World-
Bank, 2007). Capital markets have become more 
integrated so that global and international industry-
speciﬁ  c factors appear to have become more impor-
tant compared to national factors in stock markets 
movements (Brooks and Catao, 2000).
While theoretical models have established a number 
of channels through which ﬁ  nancial  globalisation 
can promote economic growth, systematic exami-
nation of existing empirical evidence reveals that it is 
difﬁ  cult to establish a strong causal relationship. The 
same goes for the ability of international ﬁ  nancial 
integration to help countries to reduce macroeco-
nomic volatility.
5.2.7.   Relocation and the future: possible 
consequences for European manufacturing
There is little doubt among experts that relocation 
will have affect signiﬁ  cantly European manufactur-
ing in the next years (ManVis, 2005D). However, 
there are strong mitigating factors which can be 
summarised as follows. For manufacturing produc-
tion where the quality of the product as well as the 
quality of the supplier is of high importance, Europe 
remains competitive as certain levels of quality can 
not be achieved cost effectively overseas (KPMG, 
2004). Furthermore, close user-producer relation-
ships require a presence in the European market 
while the available pool of talent in Europe is still a 
factor in location decisions according to the KPMG 
survey. Lastly, lower labour productivity and higher 
risks, often associated with weak institutions, in any 
emerging economies also militate in favour of Euro-
pean location (KPMG, 2004). Thus when consider-
ing the total cost of relocation and outsourcing the 
picture becomes less bleak for Europe (and other 
industrialised nations) (ManVis, 2005C).
97   Bank of International Settlements, see www.bis.org/press/p040928.htm; 
www.bis.org/publ/rpfx02t.pdf
While R&D and other business services are increas-
ingly outsourced, the question whether R&D will 
follow manufacturing production is hotly debated 
among experts. While a close user-producer inter-
action is increasingly important for innovative proc-
esses, this mechanism works both ways. European 
ﬁ  rms relocate R&D facilities to emerging economies 
to build the necessary user relationships. However, 
ManVis experts see no ‘automatism’ of R&D fol-
lowing manufacturing production. One out of ﬁ  ve 
ManVis experts do not believe that R&D will be per-
formed close to manufacturing. While this does not 
imply that R&D will remain in its current locations, 
there does not seem to be a natural co-location pres-
sure. What is clear though is that competition in R&D 
and R&D location will intensify in the coming years 
(ManVis, 2005C).
In conclusion, the longer-term impact of continued 
globalisation and the recent integration of new com-
petitors in the global economy will be pervasive, 
even if the exact consequences in terms of produc-
tivity, income and wealth, employment and indus-
try location are difﬁ  cult to predict. Who will win and 
who will lose from globalisation is therefore far from 
clear-cut. However, based on ‘educated guesses’, the 
following tentative list illustrates the possible effects 
of further globalisation (see Table 5.1).
Important parts of the low- and medium-skilled 
labour segment are expected to come under consid-
erable stress as manufacturing across the OECD will 
account for a diminishing proportion of GDP. This 
trend is well known: while productivity in manufac-
turing is generally higher than in services, thus com-
pressing the relative prices of manufactured goods in 
comparison to services, the higher income elasticity 
for the latter leads to their ever increasing share in 
consumption.
5.3.  Technological progress and innovation
5.3.1. Introduction
New technologies not only enable ﬁ  rms to reorgan-
ise and optimize business processes, but also enable 
the production of new and better quality goods and 
services. A key message signalled by a majority of 
futures studies is that the rapid pace of technologi-
cal change and the need of staying competitive in a 
globalising and increasingly ICT-based world nowa-
days requires ﬁ  rms to focus even more on science, 
technology and innovation. Firms seem to be caught 
in a race in which rapid advances in science and 
technology exert almost constant pressure to adapt 
and exploit new technological possibilities. Over 
the last decades the ICT revolution has had a pro-
found impact across manufacturing industries. For 
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Table 5.1: Potential winners and losers in OECD economies over the next 10 years
Potential winners Potential losers
Companies • Retailers
•  Leading global brand owners
• Business  services
• Media  companies
•   Niche high value added 
manufacturers
•   Health care and education 
providers
•   Financial services companies able 
to penetrate E7 markets
•  Energy and utilities companies
•   Mass market manufacturers (both 
low tech and hi tech)
•   Financial services companies not 
able to penetrate E7 markets who 
may become vulnerable in their 
home markets
•   Companies that over-commit to 
key emerging markets without the 
right local partners and business 
strategies
Individuals • Global  ‘star  performers’*
•  Consumers of low cost imports
•   Providers of high value personal 
services with cultural barriers to 
migrant labour
•   Individuals with strong cross-
cultural skills
•   Low and medium-skilled workers 
in tradable sectors (including those 
open to offshoring)
•   Low and medium-skilled workers 
in non-tradable sectors open to 
migrant labour
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006. * Ranging from chief executives and ﬁ  nancial market traders to footballers and ﬁ  lm stars.
the future the convergence of nano-tech, bio-tech, 
cognitive and neuroscience with ICTs is expected to 
cause similar disruptive changes, although no one 
exactly knows how and what these might look like 
(RAND, 2001; SRI, 2004B).
Technological progress is dealt with in different ways 
in the surveyed futures studies. Some studies attempt 
to outline the expected major technological develop-
ments over the coming decades (e.g. FutMan, 2003; 
IMTI, 2000; ManVis, 2005; ManuFuture, 20006; Nis-
tep, 2005). Other studies make instead inferences 
about future productivity changes based on assumed 
technological progress, the latter remaining largely 
or entirely a black box (e.g. GoldmanSachs, 2003; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005; WorldBank, 2007). 
Again other studies present a rudimentary outline of 
expected technological advances and combine these 
with trends in R&D expenditure and R&D capabili-
ties to draw conclusions regarding the future techno-
logical competitiveness of countries or sectors (e.g. 
Amicus, 2006; CME, 2004; HM Treasury, 2004; US 
DoC, 2004). These various perspectives all highlight 
different aspects for the future of European manu-
facturing.
5.3.2.  R&D and innovative capacity
Technological progress and innovative capacity are 
usually assessed on the basis of variables such as R&D 
expenditures, patents and patent applications or the 
number of R&D workers. While these measures are 
indicators of technological and innovative capacity, 
it should be stressed that technological and innova-
tive capacity is as much about how R&D money is 
spent and how results are commercially exploited as 
it is about how much R&D is spent or how many 
patents are granted.
Still countries with high R&D expenditures such as 
Germany, Sweden and Denmark are perceived to 
have a viable long term future in manufacturing, 
whereas in countries with low R&D expenditure such 
as Spain and Portugal, the prevailing manufacturing 
structure is perceived to be problematic (KPMG, 
2004). Implicit here is the belief that high R&D 
expenditure is associated with high-technology and 
highly innovative ﬁ  rms that can compete internation-
ally by focusing on knowledge intensive activities. By 
contrast, low R&D expenditures are associated with 
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low skill manufacturing activities that are expected 
to be relocated to low cost countries over time.
Some studies highlight the large (absolute) number 
of R&D workers in China – second only to the US 
– emphasising a potential future threat of China 
becoming a high technology competitor rather than 
just a location for manufacturing production (Ami-
cus, 2006). Others, however, point out that the rela-
tionship between R&D workers and technological 
leadership is far more complex than mere numbers 
suggest. For example, during the Cold War Russia 
employed more R&D workers than the US, neverthe-
less failing to achieve technological leadership in the 
long-run (WorldBank, 2007).
The importance of strong institutions in relation to 
commercial exploitation of technological advances is 
stated as the main reason for the superior US innova-
tive performance (WorldBank, 2007). For emerging 
economies like China, which currently are a magnet 
for manufacturing production, key in closing the 
technological gap to industrialised economies in the 
future will be the development of efﬁ  cient institu-
tions (CEPII-CIREM, 2004).
5.3.3.  Future key technologies
Future key technologies are expected to enable 
new products and processes and create new market 
opportunities (ManVis, 2005A; Manufuture, 2006). 
However, many of these new technologies are liter-
ally in the making with expected impacts coming to 
us only in the longer term.
Enabling technologies will play a crucial role in keep-
ing a technological leadership role for Europe in the 
future. Key is their pervasive diffusing capacity, which 
potentially affects future competitiveness across sec-
tors. The four key enabling technologies outlined by 
major foresight studies are Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICTs, most developed), 
micro-systems, advanced materials, and bio-tech-
nologies and nano-technologies (least developed) 
(FutMan, 2003; ManVis, 2005A; SRI, 2004).
Most futures studies expect ICTs to play a decisive role 
in short-term manufacturing operations (CME, 2004; 
IMTI, 2000; ManVis, 2005; Nistep, 2005). ICTs allow 
for productivity increases through automation as well 
as through reorganising business processes. In com-
bination with technologies such as Radio Frequency 
Identiﬁ   cation (RFID), this will cause supply chains 
and value networks to be dramatically transformed. 
It will also enable the emergence of new business 
models. Although this will no doubt lead to produc-
tivity increases, high uncertainty precludes any ﬁ  rm 
quantitative predictions. Several studies outline the 
importance of ICTs in ‘virtual design’, which makes it 
possible to reduce both production costs and devel-
opment times (CME, 2004; IMTI, 2000; Manufuture, 
2006; Nistep, 2005). Virtual manufacturing deﬁ  ned 
as the use of information technology and computer 
simulation to model real world manufacturing for 
the purpose of analyzing, evaluating and design-
ing, is increasingly used to engineer the real manu-
facturing environment (Offodile and Abdel-Mayek, 
2002). In some instances, actual simulation can be 
carried on concurrently as the manufacturing facility 
is being built.
Furthermore, ICTs are important for the customisa-
tion of products as they enable producers and cus-
tomers to communicate in different and new ways, 
such communication being a new and important 
ingredient for the creation of new business models 
(see Section 5.4). ICTs also enable the delivery of 
product/services combinations, whose development 
is pursued by ﬁ  rms in order to generate new niches 
and a high(er) value added (ManuFuture, 2006A; 
Manufuture, 2003). However, in the long run, bet-
ter human-machine interfaces need to be developed 
to exploit further productivity increase from more 
ﬂ  exible automation technologies based on ICT and 
complementary technologies in controls and sen-
sors (ManVis, 2005D). Interestingly, futurists remain 
sceptical about long-term automation visions such as 
the manless factory (ManVis, 2005).
Most of the applications above are already in use. At 
the same time though it is clear that developments 
in ICTs can be expected to continue playing a major 
role in shaping future manufacturing operations.
Micro-systems – particularly electromechanical micro-
systems – such as actuators and integrated sen-
sors and microprocessors are expected to be used 
across production systems in the mid-term to make 
machines more intelligent and efﬁ   cient. This will 
allow using machines more ﬂ  exibly and will enable 
ﬁ   rms to tailor production to individual customers’ 
demand more easily (ManVis, 2005). Other studies 
speak of micro-machining, meaning essentially the 
same as micro-systems (CME, 2004B). In the long 
run experts expect micro-systems to enable plug-and-
produce productions systems, which allow combining 
different components to production systems accord-
ing to the required task, thus allowing for even more 
ﬂ  exible production in the future (ManVis, 2005A). 
However, this vision is still a long way off.
Advanced & smart materials are expected to enable 
the production of high performance products that 
fulﬁ  l the demands of customers better than current 
product technologies. While advanced materials 
focus on improving product and process perform-
ance, smart materials change material attributes 
such as colour or shape to external stimuli (CME, 
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2004B). Smart materials attempt to serve customer 
needs better. The challenge faced by manufacturing 
is to make the processing and manipulation of new 
materials feasible (ManVis, 2005A).
Nano-technologies and bio-technologies allow the 
manipulation of inorganic and organic materi-
als for manufacturing products and components. 
Firms are already exploiting scientiﬁ  c  advances 
in this ﬁ   eld using genetically modiﬁ  ed  products 
and nano-materials for some applications (CME, 
2005B). However, over the coming decades huge 
advances are expected from developments in bio- 
and nano-technologies which will drastically change 
the way in which products are manufactured. In a 
long term – 20 to 50 year – vision, products may 
be manufactured from the molecular or ‘bottom-
up’ level. However, scientiﬁ  c developments in this 
area are just starting and future developments are 
still highly uncertain (ManVis, 2005A; Manufuture, 
2006B).
What is regarded as highly important for the future 
of European manufacturing is the development of 
complementary manufacturing technologies that 
will allow for the integration of new technologies 
in products and processes that can be brought 
to the market, and hence will create future com-
mercial opportunities as well as strengthen com-
petitiveness. The development of these comple-
mentary technologies is a challenge for European 
manufacturing that needs to be addressed through 
a continuous updating of research and innovation 
policies.
5.3.4. Non-technological  innovation
Non-technological innovation, particularly organisa-
tional innovation, plays an important role in main-
taining and improving competitiveness and growth, 
both as an enabler and facilitator of technological 
innovation and in its own right. The organisational 
changes manufacturing ﬁ   rms are expected to go 
through in the future are discussed in most of the 
surveyed studies, including the large European fore-
sight studies (FutMan, 2003; ManVis, 2005; Manu-
future, 2006), US (IMTI, 2000; SRI, 2004;) and 
Japanese reports (METI) as well as accounts by the 
large management consultancies (KPMG, BoozAl-
lenHamilton, Deloitte). Organisational innovation is 
particularly important for knowledge development 
in companies (ISI, 2006) and for better management 
of business processes. Examples of organisational 
innovations over the last decades include the wide-
spread implementation of team work, Just-In-Time 
(JIT) production, Total-Quality-Management (TQM), 
Continuous Improvement Processes (CIP), Supply 
Chain Management (SCM), outsourcing/relocation 
and performance-based pay, to mention only a few. 
Over time numerous organisational innovations have 
been introduced, with varying relevance and impact 
on the various manufacturing sectors (ISI, 2006; 
ETEPS, 2006). However, the exact impact of organi-
sational innovation on industrial performance is very 
difﬁ  cult to quantify.
All studies agree that the future ﬁ  rm should network 
and collaborate to exploit knowledge that is beyond 
its organisational boundaries in order to remain com-
petitive (CME, 2004; FutMan, 2003; ManVis, 2005; 
ManuFuture, 2006; SRI, 2004). The reason is that 
technologies become increasingly complex and 
interdisciplinary in nature. The rapid pace of tech-
nological change means that ﬁ  rms cannot build all 
competencies within the ﬁ  rm. Consequently, ﬁ  rms 
will have to learn how to exploit knowledge through 
collaborations with suppliers, customers, competi-
tors, but also with research organisations and univer-
sities. Accessing external knowledge from networks 
and collaborations is broadly known as open innova-
tion. Open innovation will be a source of competi-
tive advantage as it determines how cost effective 
ﬁ   rms manage to exploit knowledge commercially. 
An important observation is that companies pre-
fer to limit these collaborations to pre-competitive 
research as they are afraid of losing their competitive 
advantage (FutMan, 2003D). The challenge is to ﬁ  nd 
the right balance between ‘openness’ while defend-
ing competitive advantage.
Closely linked to open innovation is user-centred 
innovation, a concept that refers to learning proc-
esses through close producer-user interaction. 
Learning is important to improve products and 
processes and hence is a major source of competi-
tive advantage. If a ﬁ  rm knows what its customers 
want, it has already a competitive advantage over 
potential competitors that lack that knowledge. 
The special importance for Europe is that such 
close interaction can ‘localise’ production as it ties 
producers to users (ManuFuture, 2006). Whether 
such localisation actually occurs remains to be 
seen. Firm evidence here is (still) lacking. In order 
to seriously implement user-centred innovation, 
European ﬁ  rms are also required to build up R&D 
facilities in large overseas markets such as the US 
and more importantly Asia to serve overseas users 
(KMPG, 2004).
5.3.5.  Knowledge, skills & competencies
The transformation from a resource-based to a 
knowledge-based manufacturing paradigm leads 
experts to rate knowledge and skills as absolutely 
crucial to future growth and competitiveness. This is 
one of the key messages found across most futures 
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studies (CME, 2004; FutMan, 2003; HM Treasury, 
2004; KPMG, 2004; Manufuture, 2006; ManVis, 
2005; Nistep, 2005). Such a transformation does not 
only require ﬁ  rms to develop and manage a skilled 
and educated workforce, it also requires organisational 
competences in knowledge and innovation manage-
ment.
One of the key challenges for manufacturing is war-
ranting a continued supply of skilled labour. Future 
labour supplies are under threat, not only as a result 
of demographic change (ageing), but also as a result 
of underinvestment in education and training. These 
are not particular European problems, but also apply 
to the US and Japan (FutMan, 2003D, IIPS, 2005, 
ManVis, 2005, ManuFuture, 2006, US DoC, 2004). 
The aforementioned studies speciﬁ  cally call for edu-
cating more graduates in areas relevant to manufac-
turing as well as attracting graduates to enter the 
manufacturing sector after graduation instead of 
seemingly more attractive sectors of the economy. 
Also more women need to be integrated into the 
labour market to prevent future skills shortages (Fut-
Man, 2003; CEFIC, 2004).
The number of skilled workers in other parts of the 
world is assumed to increase, even though the skill 
premium (deﬁ  ned as the ratio of skilled wages rela-
tive to unskilled wages) is set to increase as well, and 
mostly so in countries with a high investment rate 
(WorldBank, 2007: 58). Currently, the share of skilled 
workers is 32% in developed countries and less than 
10% in developing countries (ibidem).
To work in knowledge-based manufacturing employ-
ees increasingly need new soft-skills. These become 
more important as organisations are increasingly 
globally networked and ﬂ   exible. Teamwork, net-
working, intercultural literacy, interdisciplinary think-
ing, high worker autonomy and mobility/ﬂ  exibility 
are therefore crucial skills required in knowledge 
based businesses (FutMan, 2003D, FutMan, 2003E). 
Soft-skills are generally associated with university 
education. An OECD study revealed that one-fourth 
to one-third of workers do not possess the required 
soft-skills (FutMan, 2003E). Firms therefore need to 
develop their workforce to adapt to the new chal-
lenges. While life-long employment in the same ﬁ  rm 
is expected to be a thing of the past, workers will 
need to engage in life-long learning (FutMan, 2003, 
UK Foresight, 2000). The pace of technological 
change makes this especially important for highly 
innovative rapidly changing sectors. New learning 
strategies and technologies need to be adopted by 
companies in order to build the necessary human 
capital and keep it competitive (FutMan, 2003D, see 
also Chapter 3 for a discussion of trade offs associ-
ated with skills acquisition).
5.4.   Transforming the manufacturing 
landscape: new manufacturing 
paradigms and future business models
5.4.1. Introduction
European manufacturing businesses will need to 
adapt to new realities in which continuing globalisa-
tion, international competition and innovation will 
play a pervasive role. Increasing international com-
petition has already led ﬁ  rms in developed countries 
to move away from pure cost competition to higher 
added value activities and to relocate (parts of their) 
production to the new emerging economies with 
their substantially lower labour costs. Manufactur-
ing ﬁ  rms face more competition but also collaborate 
more and are increasingly part of global value net-
works (FutMan, 2003E; IMTI, 2000; ManVis, 2005; 
ManuFuture, 2006A; Meti, 2005; SRI, 2004A). Mov-
ing into high value added manufacturing segments 
and niches calls for customisation and high perform-
ance products, with the latter increasingly including 
a service component. New requirements in terms of 
service, ‘new’ human capital and knowledge alter 
the manufacturing landscape as much as technologi-
cal change.
Manufacturing ﬁ   rms will actively have to identify, 
promote and apply new business models, new 
methods and information tools, in order to sustain 
global competitiveness. If taken up well, this could 
allow existing industries to continue to operate from 
a base within Europe and allow new businesses to 
arise (ManuFuture, 2006B). Recent transformations 
in business models observed in industrialised coun-
tries are rather similar, as most ﬁ  rms are exposed to 
the same pressures of international competition and 
operate in similar environments with an increasing 
pace of technological change and innovation.
The search for new ways to adapt and transform 
to new realities also includes ‘new’ grand visions or 
designs  at the higher, overarching ‘supra-sector’ 
level. New manufacturing paradigms have emerged, 
not only in Europe but also in Japan, on how manu-
facturing can transform and reinvent itself and face 
the future in a sustainable manner. This section starts 
with a concise discussion of new manufacturing par-
adigms (Section 5.4.2), followed by a more exten-
sive discussion of new trends and developments in 
manufacturing in relation to future business models 
(Section 5.4.3).
5.4.2. New  manufacturing  paradigms
New  manufacturing paradigms have been deﬁ  ned 
both in Europe (the ‘Manufuture’  paradigm) and 
Japan (the ‘Monodzukuri’ paradigm). While US stud-
ies refrain from coining a new manufacturing para-
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digm, it is certainly acknowledged that similar chal-
lenges call for solutions similar to those proposed in 
Europe (e.g. CME, 2004; SRI, 2004). This includes 
the adoption of mass customisation, more and bet-
ter quality services, more networking and collabora-
tion, and embracing globalisation. Both ‘Manufuture’ 
and ‘Monodzukuri’ endorse fundamentally different 
ways of production in view of increasing scarcity of 
non-renewable energy and natural resources (water, 
minerals, metals) as well as climate change (global 
warming). In the US sustainability seems to be less 
prominent an issue still. New impetuses and signals, 
both from the global warming and climate change 
debate (Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007 and 2007A; Al 
Gore’s ﬁ  lm An Inconvenient Truth), but also discus-
sion on and increasing concern about the effects of 
offshoring (e.g. Blinder, 2006) could quickly change 
the position and views in the US though.
Manufuture is described as a powerful vision link-
ing human and societal needs (demand) to both 
industrial and education systems (supply) (ManuFu-
ture, 2004). The paradigm shift is proclaimed to be 
a transition from competing on ‘cost’ to competing 
on added value, which requires ‘high performances’, 
‘customisation’, ‘new business models’, ‘new human 
capital’ and a ‘service dimension’ in manufacturing 
(Manufuture, 2006A). Important to note is that this 
is a future vision and not yet reality, although the 
trends are visible.
While traditional manufacturing is based on land, 
labour, and capital, ‘manufuture’ is founded on knowl-
edge and capital. The transition therefore depends 
on the successful adoption of new attitudes towards 
the continuous acquisition, deployment, protection 
and funding of new knowledge as a source of com-
petitive advantage (ManuFuture, 2004). This requires 
a high degree of collaboration and networking with 
suppliers, customers, competitors and other sources 
of external knowledge as ﬁ  rms will have to cooper-
ate across whole manufacturing systems instead of 
competing individually in view of more complex 
technologies. This paradigm also requires complex 
organisational approaches as dispersed organisations 
are collaborating in networks (ManuFuture, 2006).
The trend of linking future developments of manufac-
turing to societal needs can also be observed in Japan 
where foresight is used as extensively as in Europe. 
The Monodzukuri paradigm also seems similar to the 
Manufuture paradigm in that the transformation is 
described as involving a move from ‘manufactur-
ing objects’ to ‘producing value’ (JMA, 2003) but 
puts more emphasis on environmental constraints. 
It is not clear though how ‘monodzukuri’ is put into 
practice and how it is expected to affect Japanese 
manufacturing competitiveness in the future.
5.4.3.   New business models: importance and 
possible ingredients
Whereas manufacturing paradigms can be compared 
with grand visions at the supra-sector level, busi-
ness models represent the set of (multidimensional) 
opportunities and choices that individual ﬁ  rms – the 
micro-level – make vis-à-vis the future. These range 
from value propositions to customers, ﬁ  nancial mod-
els, value networks to functional architecture98. Busi-
ness models are crucial for future competitiveness 
as they determine revenue generation by integrat-
ing production system, workforce and organisa-
tional competencies (Manufuture, 2006B). Recent 
changes in business models reﬂ  ect four major trends 
identiﬁ  ed across futures studies (e.g. FutMan, 2003; 
KPMG, 2004; ManVis, 2005; Manufuture, 2006; SRI, 
2004). Firstly, large businesses become less vertically 
integrated as they increasingly manage global net-
works. Secondly, a transition from products to services 
is observed, with manufacturing ﬁ  rms  increasingly 
providing add-on services to their traditional prod-
ucts as well as relocating and outsourcing produc-
tion. Thirdly, ﬁ   rms increasingly diffuse intellectual 
property (IP) beyond company and even country 
boundaries, as ﬁ   rms innovate more openly. Lastly, 
small businesses have to compete in manufacturing 
networks and collaborate openly to address market 
challenges.
That business models and manufacturing paradigms 
will play an important role in the future of manu-
facturing is beyond doubt. Future business models 
will need to reﬂ  ect ‘new ways of working’ based on 
the rapid formation of open networks in both tra-
ditional and emerging sectors, which will improve 
capabilities and increase productivity. At the same 
time, future business models will also need to take 
account of other factors, issues and trends. The fol-
lowing sub-sections discuss some of the more promi-
nent trends in organising business operations.
5.4.3.1.   Managing global networks, ﬁ  rms becoming 
‘orchestrators’
In the past big manufacturing ﬁ   rms owned large 
parts of the supply chain. However, today many of 
the most successful manufacturers rely on outside 
suppliers for major portions of their supply system. 
This trend is acknowledged without exception across 
all studies surveyed. An extreme example is Dell (see 
Box 6.2) that sources all components from outside 
vendors. The core competence here changes from 
98   A business model can be deﬁ  ned as “a description of the value a com-
pany offers to one or several segments of customers and of the architec-
ture of the ﬁ  rm and its network of partners for creating, marketing, and 
delivering this value and relationship capital, to generate proﬁ  table and 
sustainable revenue streams” (Osterwalder et al., 2005). Business model 
analysis is widely applied in the context of strategic, ﬁ  nancial and opera-
tional decisions by private ﬁ  rms.
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producing to managing the production, which 
requires well managed global networks (SRI, 2004). 
This trend also offers new opportunities for smaller 
manufacturers that are capable of participating in 
the global networks of large manufacturers.
An extreme case of orchestration would be the virtual 
factory where linkages between the ﬁ  rm and its suppli-
ers and customers are purely electronic. This business 
model has been experimented with by global ﬁ  rms 
operating in global industries. Nevertheless, even these 
large ﬁ  rms so far struggle implementing the concept 
(FutMan, 2003D: 61). A reason could be that the virtual 
factory model impedes closer linkages between pro-
ducers and their suppliers / customers. Furthermore, 
technology does not yet replace personal contacts that 
are important to the management of networks.
Especially for small and medium sized enterprises, 
operating in manufacturing networks and collabo-
rating openly to grab new market opportunities and 
face new challenges is of crucial importance. This 
applies in particular to the acquisition of external 
knowledge from suppliers, customers, competitors 
and universities (see Section 5.3.4: ‘open innova-
tion’). However, apart from collaborating, ﬁ  rms need 
strong competition to their advantage (ManuFuture, 
2004). The fruitful combination of collaboration 
and competition has been termed co-opetition99. 
But experts participating in ManVis remain sceptical 
about the economic viability of external cooperation 
99   The purpose of co-opetition is not to limit competition but, usually, to 
share pre-market development costs (for instance, among software pro-
ducers or among carmakers).
Box 5.2: Successful Business Models of Large Firms
While technologies and competencies are crucial to the ﬁ  rm its business model determines success or 
failure. Current trends in outsourcing, collaborating, networking and the provision of services are clear, 
although differences between sectors exist. On the other hand new developments in internet-based 
business models such as the virtual world ‘Second Life’ or the ‘Long Tail’ comparative advantage of 
internet retailers presently receive much media attention while it is yet unclear if and how these devel-
opments impact manufacturing.
In manufacturing Dell represents an example of a business model innovator that has become a manu-
facturing ‘orchestrator’. Although a manufacturer, Dell assembles and markets products using system 
designs and architectures developed in-house but sources most product technologies and components 
from a global network of suppliers. Furthermore, Dell sells directly to end consumers speciﬁ  ed to order 
mainly over the internet. Production only starts with product payment. Large parts of its business 
focuses on the provision of services, which range from maintenance contracts, technology consulting, 
technical support, training of system administrators as well as ﬁ  nancial services (SRI, 2004A). Dell’s busi-
ness model today is already widely emulated indicating its potential beyond electronics and textiles. 
Nevertheless, many ﬁ  rms still have to make the transition of stringently exploiting opportunities from 
ICT technologies to reorganise their supply chain and adapt their business model.
Another example is GE which generates most of its sales growth from the provision of services rather 
than products allowing it to outperform its competitors (SRI, 2004A; 2004d). These examples empha-
sise the general trend across manufacturing sectors of traditional ﬁ  rms adapting their business models 
to become service providers.
While the orchestrating of global value chains is a prevalent aspect of changing business models for large 
ﬁ  rms, outsourcing seems to be limited to non-critical products / technologies. Pharmaceutical companies like 
GSK represent a special case as they exploit global scales in production through sourcing, but keep the major-
ity of production of strategic drugs and active ingredients in-house. In fact GSK chooses to produce its active 
ingredients in only ﬁ  ve countries, namely Australia, Ireland, Singapore, the U.K. and the US. Consequently, its 
supply chain has two components: primary sites produce active ingredients which are then mixed and pack-
aged into ﬁ  nal products at secondary sites. (SRI, 2004d). Furthermore, the pharmaceutical sector provides 
fewer opportunities to provide services competitive advantages could be jeopardized by collaborating or 
outsourcing critical products. Thus sectors vary in terms of outsourcing, collaboration and networking.
The examples also show that there is no ‘one size ﬁ  ts all’ business model. Instead, even within sectors 
different business models can co-evolve. Structural differences between sectors, such as high R&D 
expenditure and negligible variable production costs in the pharmaceutical sector, lead to limited 
sourcing and R&D collaboration.
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as it is cost intensive (ManVis, 2005A). Furthermore, 
ﬁ  rms fear losing competitive advantage through col-
laborating with competitors (FutMan, 2003D). Nev-
ertheless, the need of, and current trend towards, 
collaborating and networking in value chains and 
knowledge networks is given high importance across 
studies (inter alia: FutMan, ManVis, Manufuture, SRI, 
KPMG, Deloitte).
5.4.3.2. (Mass)  Customisation
All studies point at an increasing future demand for 
customised products, yet with short delivery times. 
Firms therefore adjust their organisational structure 
to provide mass customised goods. Mass customi-
sation requires close user-producer interaction and 
allows charging higher prices than for commodi-
tized products. This also implies that ﬁ  rms produce 
according to demand-pull production systems to 
take into account customer speciﬁ  cations. Demand-
pull production reduces working capital, increases 
ﬂ  exibility, satisﬁ  es customer demand and tightens 
user-producer linkages. These advantages are all 
sources of competitive advantage, and also offer 
the opportunity to attach add-on services to the 
product. According to industry experts surveyed 
in FutMan, the demand for this type of produc-
tion is, however, still lower than expected (FutMan, 
2003D: 51).
5.4.3.3. Services  and  servation
Servation i.e. the need to incorporate a greater serv-
ice element into the product, both during design 
and during after-sales, has emerged as a major 
trend across the studies surveyed. The addition by 
manufacturers of services to their core manufactur-
ing activities in a search for further differentiation 
and increased performance implies a whole new 
business model which no longer emphasises the 
maximisation of output and unit sales, but instead 
revenue generation via long-term customer rela-
tionships (FutMan, 2003E). A recent US study even 
identiﬁ   ed the services and servation trend as the 
main driver for the growth of sales in manufac-
turing (SRI, 2004A) and hence as a key source of 
growth for the manufacturing sector overall. It is 
expected to continue as services allow manufactur-
ers to diversify, create new revenue opportunities 
and gain competitive advantages. Furthermore, the 
close user-producer interactions necessary for the 
provision of services provide customer feedback 
into the design and manufacturing process, which 
is important for innovative competitiveness. Services 
and servation require high skilled labour, however. 
In an era in which ageing and increasing labour and 
skill shortages are expected, the provision of labour 
may pose a major challenge to manufacturing ﬁ  rms 
(see Section 5.5).
While manufacturing ﬁ  rms increasingly offer services 
to their customers, they also outsource many busi-
ness functions to external service providers. This has 
important implications for the labour market, as the 
number of people directly employed by manufac-
turing ﬁ  rms is decreasing. In statistical terms, how-
ever, this is largely a problem of sector classiﬁ  cation 
rather than of job losses. An expected decrease in 
employment in manufacturing therefore is not per se 
an undesirable development. The question is where 
the outsourced business functions are located, and 
whether the job losses in the manufacturing sector 
can be compensated by new jobs in the services sec-
tor.
5.5.   Society at large: demographics 
and ageing
Future societal developments and consumer behav-
iour will to a large extent determine the beacons 
for industries and ﬁ  rms and are key in any analysis 
of the future of manufacturing. Population growth 
associated with rising consumption levels, increasing 
incomes, but also changing consumption patterns 
driven by many different factors will all affect the 
future demand for manufactured products.
Key drivers are future developments in economic 
growth, income and wealth, demographic changes 
and the impact of an ageing society, developments in 
education and skill levels as well as changes in social 
values of European consumers impacting future con-
sumption patterns. Ageing society in industrialised 
economies and, related, overall expected skill short-
ages are two major factors that are found across 
almost all studies (inter alia: CME, 2004; CEFIC, 
2004; FutMan, 2003; ManVis, 2005; Manufuture, 
2006; WorldBank, 2007; US DoC, 2004; SRI, 2004). 
Between 2005 and 2030 the world population is 
projected to grow from 6.5 billion to 8 billion per-
sons. According to WorldBank (2007) calculations, 
roughly 12% of the world population will be living 
in high-income countries, down signiﬁ  cantly  from 
18% in 1980 and 14.5% in 2005. The population 
growth rate, however, will gradually slow to 1% in 
2015 and 0.7% toward 2030. High-income coun-
tries will observe population declines – Japan after 
2010 and the EU soon thereafter. Under current 
projections Japan will fall from 128 million in 2005 
to 117 million in 2030. The EU-15 population will 
fall likewise from 412 to 402 million persons (World-
Bank, 2007: 38)100. In the EU accession countries, 
population declines will average about 0.2 to 0.3% 
annually up to 2030. The US population, with much 
100   EPC and European Commission projections to the year 2050 indicate a 
relative stability of EU-15 (+1%) and a 12% fall for EU-10 population 
(Economic Policy Committee and European Commission, 2006).
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higher fertility rates than in other high-income coun-
tries, is projected to grow by 45 million to 345 mil-
lion in 2030. Elsewhere, population growth patterns 
are more highly varied, with declining populations in 
Central Asia and Russia, but steep increases in India 
(up by 320 million), Sub-Saharan Africa (up by 320 
million), and less so but still signiﬁ  cantly, China (up 
by 170 million).
The ‘greying’ of society in the Western world as a 
result of huge declines in fertility on the one hand and 
longer life expectancy on the other is regarded as an 
important driver of future change (FutMan, Montalvo 
et al., Manufuture, WorldBank, HM Treasury, ManVis, 
US DoC). While ageing is not limited to developed 
economies, the developed economies are expected to 
age faster than the rest (HM Treasury, 2004). 
The ageing of society has three major implications 
for the future of manufacturing. Firstly, manufactur-
ing will have to adapt to the demands of an ageing 
society. More health care products, pharmaceuticals, 
medical equipment but also medical services will be 
demanded. Furthermore, future products need to be 
designed in more user-speciﬁ  c ways for older and 
disabled people (FutMan, 2003E). This change offers 
a chance for Europe to become a lead market for 
such products as ageing is a global trend.
Secondly, as a result of ageing the labour force is 
declining as the baby boomer generation retires, 
particularly in Europe and Japan (FutMan, 2003E; 
HM Treasury, 2004; Montalvo et al., 2006; World-
Bank, 2007). In Europe this decline is expected 
shortly after 2010. If aggregate growth of 2-3% 
on an annual basis is to be sustained over the next 
decades, this will necessarily imply that both capital 
accumulation and productivity will have to acceler-
ate in order to compensate for the effect of a declin-
ing labour force and the resulting negative employ-
ment growth (Poncet, 2006; WorldBank, 2007). 
At the same time, important skill shortages across 
industries can be expected, as the combined effect 
of a declining labour force and an increasing need 
for skills in tomorrow’s knowledge-based economy. 
What is clear, however, is that manufacturing sectors 
need to make workplaces more attractive for poten-
tial high-skilled employees. This refers especially to 
the female workforce, the elderly as well as to the 
young (Ceﬁ  c, 2004; EMCC, 2005; FutMan, 2003E; 
ManVis, 2005).
Thirdly, an ageing society not only faces a reduced 
share of workers, but also an increased share of 
dependents consuming out of existing production. 
Increasing dis-savings would lower the rate of overall 
savings in developed economies, including Europe. 
Yet, evidence for this effect is mixed since other 
factors may affect savings and investment patterns 
as well. Lower labour supply could lessen invest-
ment needs in sectors where labour and capital are 
close complements while increasing investments in 
labour-saving technology may counteract this effect 
in sectors where the capital and labour are substi-
tutes (WorldBank, 2007). The exact implications 
for industry and competitiveness are, therefore, less 
clear (FutMan, 2003E).
The issue of education and skills is of course con-
nected to demographic developments as a bet-
ter educated and, thus more productive workforce 
is seen as an antidote to a shrinking one. Chapter 
3 of this report explored the relationship between 
skills and competitiveness and the prevailing trends 
of skills upgrading which in all foresight studies is 
expected to continue.
In addition to demographic developments, other 
important factors such as changes in social values 
determining future consumption patterns are rel-
evant. Although their importance can hardly be 
downplayed – consider for instance how the debates 
on genetically modiﬁ   ed organisms and stem cell 
research affect the development of the correspond-
ing technologies – are discussed in more detail by 
only a few studies (Futman, 2003E, 2003A; Mon-
talvo et al., 2006).
5.6.   Environmental and natural resource 
concerns
Our environment not only provides the raw materi-
als and natural resources that form the very basis of 
manufacturing, but it also determines the physical 
context in which manufacturing production takes 
place. In the following we will discuss three key driv-
ers that will shape the future of manufacturing: (i) the 
availability of natural resources focusing on the sup-
ply of energy and energy efﬁ  ciency, (ii) the impact 
of climate change, and (iii) the impact of environ-
mental regulation. The key studies dealing with envi-
ronmental aspects most comprehensively are Fut-
man (2003), ManVis (2005), Montalvo et al. (2006) 
and WorldBank (2007). These are complemented by 
studies such as Stern Review (2006) and IPCC Sum-
mary (2007) focusing on climate change, analyses 
on the availability of mineral resources (BMWi, 2007) 
and projections on energy resources (IAE, 2005).
Climate change is a major issue on current global 
and national policy agendas. In particular the Stern 
Review and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) have outlined the potential impacts 
of global warming for humanity. Both address the 
necessary actions for governments and industries. 
Waste and pollution as by-products of ‘normal’ man-
ufacturing processes also have potentially serious 
negative impacts on the environment and human-
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ity. In a response to counteract the negative impact 
of waste and pollution new laws and regulations are 
being introduced (e.g. REACH the new chemicals 
legislation in the European Union).
The costs of environmental protection for the manu-
facturing sector increased by 3% in absolute terms 
between 1995 and 2002 but their share relative to 
Gross Value Added decreased from 2.1% to 1.8%. 
Some of these costs will of course have been offset 
by increases in efﬁ  ciency associated with new proc-
esses. There is no evidence that this trend is chang-
ing, so any structural adjustment and changes in the 
future composition of European manufacturing due 
to environmental policy is likely to be negligible.
5.6.1.  Availability of resources
The availability of natural resources is usually dis-
cussed along two distinctive lines: energy and other 
natural resources. The reason is that energy makes 
up a considerable part of production costs across sec-
tors. As a result some studies focus on energy and do 
not deal with other natural resources. This holds for 
example for US DoC (2004). Experts appear to have 
contradicting opinions regarding the future avail-
ability of ‘other resources’. While some experts only 
expect ‘other natural resources’ to become scarce in 
50 years time (FutMan, 2003D), others see scarcity 
already now as an important driver for manufactur-
ing (Montalvo et al., 2006).
Important to note here is the recently published 
study by the German Ministry of Economics and 
Technology (BMWi, 2007) that sees no critical short-
ages of long term supplies of mineral resources for 
industry and expects shortages for speciﬁ  c minerals 
to be eased through technological change creat-
ing substitutes and exploring new reserves. The SRI 
(2004C) study is the only surveyed study that makes 
quantitative long-term projections of future prices 
(see section below).
5.6.1.1.  Energy and energy efﬁ  ciency
Past trends make it very clear that energy consump-
tion is broadly rising in line with GDP growth (Mon-
talvo et al., 2006). As studies expect global growth to 
continue over the long-term, global energy demands 
are also expected to rise (HM Treasury, 2004), even if 
at a lower rate.. However, this rise in energy demand 
can have an adverse effect on energy prices, possi-
bly slowing down growth rates as high energy prices 
continue. Furthermore, globalisation thrives on 
cheap transport costs, which could increase in case 
of higher energy costs in the future thereby impact-
ing global trade. However, recent high oil prices 
do not seem to affect global economic growth as 
adversely as might expected. Energy use is also one 
of the main sources for green house gases emissions. 
In this context energy efﬁ  ciency represents an impor-
tant driver of climate change mitigation,
As energy prices rise energy efﬁ  ciency  becomes 
an increasingly important topic. However, FutMan 
(2003D) argues that energy efﬁ   ciency is only an 
important topic in product markets for example in 
automotive and lighting sectors. Energy efﬁ  ciency is 
less important for mechanical manufacturing proc-
esses, as energy cost are only one cost factor and 
need to be balanced against cost savings. This is, 
however, not true for process manufacturing such as 
the chemicals industry where energy is a considera-
ble cost factor in production (FutMan, 2003D). Here 
energy efﬁ  ciency measures are taken up by industry 
without speciﬁ  c legislation for cost reasons but are lim-
ited for technological reasons where process energy 
is needed. Furthermore, recent increases in energy 
costs make it increasingly attractive to save energy, 
changing the underlying assumptions of the FutMan 
assessment for mechanical manufacturing processes. 
The subject of energy efﬁ  ciency nevertheless seems 
to be of varying importance across manufacturing 
sectors, receiving attention wherever representing a 
considerable cost factor. This ﬁ  ts the observation of 
experts stating that increasingly alternative sources 
of energy are used across manufacturing industries 
(FutMan, 2003D). The recent energy price hikes, as 
well as the more acute sense of urgency regarding 
climate change have renewed interest in energy sav-
ing at political level (see, for instance, the European 
Council Decision of 9 March 2007 backing the 20% 
energy efﬁ  ciency objective or the G8 Declaration of 
7 June 2007, in Heiligendamm).
5.6.1.2. Other  resources
As indicated above the scarcity of resources other 
than fuels is controversially debated among experts. 
While experts participating in the FutMan study 
indicated that the availability of natural resources is 
not relevant to the future of manufacturing over the 
coming 50 years (FutMan, 2003D), others perceive 
this as far more problematic. While this discussion 
has been going on for several decades starting with 
the ‘limits to growth’ debate, it remains unconcluded 
(Montalvo et al., 2006). A recently published study 
by the German Ministry of Economics and Technol-
ogy BMWi (2007) analysing past trends of mineral 
resources provides strong evidence that there are no 
critical future absolute shortages to be expected in 
the future, thus contradicting other experts proclaim-
ing scarce resources. The study expects technological 
change stimulating substitutes and new reserves to 
prevent any absolute shortages. From 1995 to 2002 
world commodity prices have declined structurally 
to around 75% of 1995 levels and were expected 
to do so in the future (SRI, 2004C). However, com-
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modity prices have increased considerably since then 
due to increasing global demand, particularly from 
China. According to the WorldBank (2007), mineral 
prices have increased by around 200% from their 
low in 2001 until 2006. Again, similar to the predic-
tions of long-term oil prices a couple of years ago this 
only highlights how difﬁ  cult quantitative predictions 
are. Consequently, the BMWi (2007) study does not 
make any price forecasts as past data shows that 
mineral prices follow a ‘random-walk’ making the 
last price the best forecast available.
5.6.1.3. Recycling
In terms of resource availability BMWi (2007) points 
at the increasing importance of recycling levels as 
more and more materials – especially metals – are 
recycled, making predictions about future supply 
levels even more complex. The increasing impor-
tance of recycling is also conﬁ  rmed by the results of 
the Japanese Delphi (2005) that outlines the future 
importance of recycling oriented manufacturing 
technology in the manufacturing sector (Nistep, 
2005). According to FutMan (2003D), recycling of 
other materials is largely regulation driven creating 
a trend to more environmentally friendly produc-
tion. However, as products comprise multi-materials, 
recycling becomes increasingly difﬁ   cult and needs 
to be considered in product development (FutMan, 
2003D).
5.6.2.  Global warming and climate change
The Stern Review, consecutive IPCC reports and 
other studies have led to a wide consensus that cli-
mate change will be one of the main drivers affecting 
the future of the globe over the coming centuries. 
More extreme weather events and rising sea levels 
will have wide economic and social impacts as agri-
cultural and human settlement patterns will have to 
adapt (HM Treasury, 2004). The main message of 
Stern was the costs of climate change far outweigh 
the costs of action, Climate change will pose chal-
lenges to many economic sectors and will magnify 
regional differences in Europe’s natural resources 
and assets (IPCC, 2007A). However, the studies can-
not tell us how exactly climate change will affect 
European manufacturing sectors.
Much depends also on clear policy responses as well 
as individual actors (business and consumers) follow-
ing the latest climate change reports. Policy-makers 
and others are urged to take steps to reduce green 
house emissions in an attempt to stabilize climate 
change (Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007). The key mes-
sage of the Stern Review for example is to introduce 
a global carbon-price that reﬂ  ects the real cost of 
fossil energy to reduce global consumption of fos-
sil energy, while making substitutes more attractive 
(Stern, 2006: 324). Such policy actions will have 
implications for all sectors of the economy but par-
ticularly for energy-intensive sectors, as energy cost 
will be rising. However, so far no global concerted 
binding actions have been implemented that could 
cause major structural changes.
5.6.2.1.  Impact of climate change on manufacturing
Even if the proposed policy actions raised in the 
Stern Review or IPCC reports (part of which is still 
forthcoming) are not implemented, manufacturing 
will be impacted by climate change in one way or 
the other. Either directly through environmental 
changes or indirectly through legislation passed to 
stabilise global warming. The Stern Review estimates 
future costs caused by climate change if no actions 
are taken at 5%-20% of GDP annually over the next 
century or two (Stern, 2006). Comprehensive esti-
mates of costs of climate change for manufacturing 
are nevertheless to be developed, This compares to 
an estimated mitigation cost of 1% GDP annually by 
2050 for policy measures expected to stabilise glo-
bal warming (Stern, 2006). The WorldBank (2007) 
acknowledges that if the worst climate change sce-
narios materialise, the development prospects of 
whole regions and or countries can be undermined 
through the potential effects on agriculture, water 
supplies and ecosystems.
The Green Paper on adaptation to climate change 
(European Commission, 2007) focuses more par-
ticularly on Europe and presents climate change 
impact scenarios for 2071-2100. The most imme-
diate effects would be felt by agriculture, forestry, 
ﬁ  sheries, and tourism, as well is in the construction 
materials industry.
5.6.2.2.  Environmental rules and regulations
Legislation inﬂ  uence industry structures as compa-
nies adapt to regulatory changes. Firms generally 
have two options: they can either adapt to regula-
tory changes or relocate to areas where legislation is 
– still – less strict.
Adapting to regulatory changes, particularly the 
measures proposed by the Stern Review, will come 
at a cost (Stern, 2006). This mitigating cost is esti-
mated to be around 1% of GDP by 2050 if actions 
are taken now while the cost of no action is pre-
dicted to be several times bigger. However, experts 
also point out that the proposed changes create new 
business opportunities in markets for low-carbon, 
high-efﬁ  ciency goods and services (ibid). The impact 
on competitiveness also depends on whether car-
bon reduction policies are implemented simultane-
ously around the globe, preventing relocation of the 
worst affected sectors (Stern, 2006:253). However, 
it is argued that very few of the most affected sec-
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tors have internationally mobile plants and processes 
limiting expected impacts (ibid).
It also has to be realised that the costs of environmen-
tal regulation are not signiﬁ  cant for the vast majority 
of sectors and factories. In practice, relocation is more 
likely to take place due to other factors that are much 
more ﬁ  nancially  signiﬁ   cant: proximity to market, 
labour costs, exchange rates etc. Indeed, it is often the 
case that ﬁ  rms who relocate maintain the same envi-
ronmental standards in their new locations as they do 
in their previous – suggesting that they see environ-
mental performance as synonymous with good proc-
ess management and corporate social responsibility,
On its March 2007 summit the European Council 
agreed to embark on an ambitious policy for energy 
and climate change. The aims of this policy are the 
following: the EU will reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions by at least 20% compared to 1990, will ensure 
that 20% of total energy use comes from renewable 
sources and will accomplish a 20% decrease in energy 
intensity over and above business as usual develop-
ments. Part of the target for renewable energy will 
be covered by increasing the share of biofuels up to 
10% of total transport fuel use in 2020.
Important environmental legislations discussed in 
the studies surveyed are the European chemicals leg-
islation REACH and the CO² trading scheme (CEFIC, 
2004; FutMan, 2003; IEA, 2005; ManVis, 2005). 
While the current impact of CO² emission trading is 
perceived as modest for the most energy intensive 
industries, it is expected to increase energy prices in 
the long-run (IEA, 2005). The largest emitters of the 
European industry are included in the system, which 
will signiﬁ  cantly contribute to the EU’s Kyoto objec-
tives in the period from 2008-2012. It is currently 
being revised, in order to fully exploit its potential in 
the period after 2012, i.e. to achieve effective emis-
sions reductions at least cost,
The implications of REACH are negligible for the com-
petitiveness or make-up of the chemicals sector. The 
costs over the entire central 11 year period are esti-
mated to be equivalent to less than 1,5% of the sec-
tor’s annual turnover. Firms outside Europe have com-
plained that it will be harder to comply, and that it will 
unfairly boost the competitive advantage of-European 
markets (CEFIC 2004; FutMan, 2003). It also provides 
European chemical ﬁ  rms new incentives and oppor-
tunities to develop innovative products based on less 
hazardous substitutes that ensure competitiveness 
tomorrow (EMCC, 2005; FutMan, 2003h).
Other environmental measures that will have a direct 
impact on European manufacturing are those related 
to the quality of the air, which include speciﬁ  c targets 
for acidifying gazes (SO2, NOx and NH3) by 2010 and 
2020. Large combustion plants are more particularly 
addressed in this context. Speciﬁ  c to the car industry 
are the targets of reducing CO2 emissions by 2012. 
Measures regarding water quality (targets by 2015) 
will affect more particularly the industries in the met-
als and chemical sectors.
While experts see relocation of global sectors as a 
possible consequence of environmental legislation, 
no unanimous view appears to exist on its impor-
tance; it remains unclear and case-speciﬁ  c of how 
this may affect future industry structures.
In general, environment protection can be expected to 
be a more signiﬁ  cant policy constraint in Europe than in 
other regions. While this entails costs, it is also a major 
driver towards the development and early adoption of 
technologies that can give European manufacturing 
ﬁ  rst mover and lead market advantages. The global 
market for eco-industries is worth about €600 billion a 
year, and the EU holds about one third of it.
5.7.   Two scenarios for European 
manufacturing
5.7.1. Introduction
The literature reviewed in the previous pages indi-
cates that globalisation, technological progress, busi-
ness models, ageing and the availability of energy 
and sustainability of the environment are the main 
drivers for the future of manufacturing in Europe. The 
future trends of these drivers are uncertain. In order 
to obtain a more clear and systematic view of what 
Europe’s future in manufacturing might be, two alter-
native scenarios with varying trends in globalisation, 
technological progress, business models and energy 
efﬁ  ciency have been developed. It must be stressed 
that those scenarios are purely indicative; their value 
lies in permitting illustrate the effects of different 
assumptions at sectoral level over long term.
The two scenarios presented here differ across all 
the drivers of change discussed above; to summarise 
them, in scenario II globalisation and technological 
progress thrive, production grows quickly, but the 
geographical centre of global manufacturing produc-
tion shifts to Asia. In scenario I, with less globalisation 
and technological progress, manufacturing produc-
tion grows more slowly and the European share in 
global production is relatively larger101.
This section provides a numerical illustration of the two 
scenarios through using CPB’s applied general equi-
101   For details of the scenarios see Lejour, A.M., and G. Verweij, 2007, “The 
future of manufacturing in Europe: background report”. In the back-
ground report, scenario I is code-named Cosy at Home and scenario II 
Adventuring the World.
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librium model WorldScan (See Box 5.3, Lejour et al., 
2006). Lejour and Verweij (2007) explain in detail the 
translation from the qualitative scenarios to the quanti-
tative ones and they also provide more detailed results. 
Because a large part of the scenarios can not be quanti-
ﬁ  ed, this section gives not a complete overview of the 
scenarios. It only illustrates scenario trends which are 
related to economic growth and economic integration 
which are at the heart of the WorldScan model.
The scenario-speciﬁ  c trends determine the variation 
between the scenarios in two ways: directly, because 
the exogenous trends differ between the scenarios; 
and indirectly, because these differences imply also 
the variation in the model outcomes. Table 5.2 
reviews the variation in exogenous input. Lejour and 
Verweij (2007) discuss these inputs and the results in 
greater detail.
Scenario II is built on a smooth functioning of 
national and international goods and services mar-
kets, with barriers to trade reduced through succes-
Box 5.3: WorldScan model
WorldScan is a multi-sector, multi-region Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) model. The model builds 
upon neoclassical theory, and solves for the equilibrium that maximizes welfare across the entire econ-
omy, subject to technological constraints, greenhouse gas limitations, etc.). Producers maximise their 
proﬁ  ts and consumers maximise their utility. Production technologies relate output to inputs, so a 
potential increase in the output of a sector leads to extra demand for inputs. This links output to input 
markets. Moreover, trade ﬂ  ows between countries, and in particular two-way intra-industry trade, are 
well modelled. The integration of national goods and services markets and of capital markets creates the 
possibility to analyse spillovers between countries. Another advantage is that these models distinguish 
several sectors in the economy. This model version inhibits endogenous R&D decisions and spillovers 
and imperfect competition. It distinguishes 15 regions and 20 sectors. Seven large EU countries are 
modelled separately, and two aggregates for the other old and new Member States. Also United States, 
Japan, China, India South-East Asia and the rest of the world are distinguished. The sectors are agricul-
ture, energy, ten manufacturing sectors and seven services sectors. The last sector is the R&D sector.
sive liberalisation rounds. In addition, this scenario 
assumes that the costs of international trade are 
gradually reduced. Innovation and ﬁ  erce  competi-
tion spur labour productivity all over the world. The 
twelve new EU members and Asia catch-up fast with 
the EU-15 and the rest of the OECD. The growth in 
labour productivity in the Rest of the World is much 
lower than in these catching-up regions. Economic 
growth is high in this scenario because of more tech-
nology spillovers and a more rapid catching up of 
the developing countries (represented in higher TFP 
growth). In scenario I labour productivity growth 
is lower than in scenario II, by about 1%, and no 
important innovations spur economic growth. This 
is the case for all regions.
5.7.2.   The macroeconomic variables 
in the two scenarios
Table 5.3 presents the annual average growth rates in 
labour productivity and GDP for the period 2006-2025. 
Table 5.2: Variation in exogenous inputs
Trend Scenario I Scenario II
Unemployment rate constant over time declining
Labour productivity EU low high
Energy efﬁ  ciency low high
Savings policy no  yes
Capital mobility low high
Global trade barriers high low
Note:   the terms low and high are used to describe the development of a trend in one scenario compared with the develop-
ment in the other scenario. It is not meant to characterise differences between various trends in one scenario.
Source: WorldScan.
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The growth in labour productivity is heavily based on 
the growth in TFP and the capital-labour ratio.
Table 5.3 shows that the spread for the EU-27 
between labour productivity growth rates is 1.5%. 
That explains a large part of the variation in GDP 
growth. In general, Both GDP and labour produc-
tivity growth display similar patterns. Table 5.4 also 
illustrates the process of catching up. Labour pro-
ductivity growth in the EU-12 members and the non-
OECD, exceeds that in the EU-15, the United States 
and Japan. This process will, in time, narrow the gap 
in GDP per capita between regions.
The variation in regional and global trade policies 
leads to a diverse picture of openness in the sce-
narios. In scenario I openness is about constant over 
time for the EU-15 and the rest OECD, but decreases 
for the other regions. This drop is explained mainly 
by the shift to services in the latter regions which are 
less open for cross border trade. This is completely 
different in scenario II which is based on liberalised 
global trade. The degree of openness increases every 
where and even more so in Asia.
Changes in the openness of regions and differences 
in regional growth patterns affect also the size and 
direction of trade ﬂ  ows. Asia, but also, to a lesser 
degree, the Rest of the World, will become a more 
important trading partner for Europe during the 
coming decades in both scenarios but more so in sce-
nario II. This is triggered by high economic growth in 
Asia. In general, the redirection of trade is stronger 
in scenario II, with its higher GDP per capita growth 
and trade liberalisation, than in scenario I.
5.7.3.  The two scenarios at sectoral level
In both scenarios, the trend towards a services econ-
omy is likely to continue, albeit at a lower speed. 
Table 5.3: Labour productivity and GDP growth, annual averages 2006-2025 by region
Scenario I Scenario II
Labour productivity 
growth
GDP growth Labour productivity 
growth
GDP growth
EU-27 1.5 1.3 2.5 2.5
EU-15 1.3 1.2 2.4 2.4
EU-12 3.1 2.6 4.7 4.4
Rest OECD 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.3
Asia 3.3 4.6 4.6 6.1
Rest of World 1.9 3.3 2.9 4.5
Source: WorldScan.
Employment shifts away from manufacturing towards 
services and manufacturing contributes less to the 
European economy in terms of its value added share. 
In terms of production manufacturing will grow and 
will remain important for trade.
Within manufacturing various developments take 
place. For the purposes of this exercise ten broad 
manufacturing sectors have been explored: food 
products, textiles and wearing apparel, wood and 
other manufacturing, pulp, paper and publishing, 
chemicals, rubber and plastics, basic metals, non-
metallic minerals, electronic equipment, transport 
equipment and other machinery and equipment. 
Existing futures and foresight studies as identiﬁ  ed 
in the literature survey underlying the scenarios (see 
Sections 5.2 – 5.6) do not give much guidance on 
specifying possible future sectoral developments in 
the scenarios. Moreover, based on historical pro-
ductivity growth paths of these sectors, their trade 
openness, R&D intensity, energy efﬁ  ciency,  and 
skill intensity, it is highly likely that these sectors will 
develop differently over time. It has to be noted also 
that the developments may also differ within the ten 
sectors identiﬁ  ed. In most of these aggregate sectors 
one can distinguish between basic and specialized 
manufacturing. Basic manufacturing will on average 
be more affected by international competition than 
specialized manufacturing. Possible intra-sector shifts 
from basic to specialized manufacturing are not ana-
lysed here, but are certainly relevant.
Economic growth in Europe and the world is higher in 
scenario II (see Table 5.3 above). This is also reﬂ  ected 
in production growth by sector. Production grows 
faster in scenario II than in scenario I for nearly all sec-
tors in Europe, except textiles and wearing apparel 
and electronic equipment. These are also sectors in 
which Europe has a comparative disadvantage. It 
seems that increasing globalisation and a faster tech-
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nological change reinforces existing specialization 
patterns. For most other sectors production growth 
is about 1% per year higher in scenario II. For wood 
and other manufacturing, transport equipment, con-
struction and non-metallic minerals it is about 2% 
higher per year and for chemicals, rubbers and plas-
tics and transport services about 1.5%.
The increase in production seen in almost all sectors 
does not imply that manufacturing in Europe keeps 
up with other regions. High economic growth in Asia 
expands manufacturing production there faster. The 
Asian share at the world markets increase measured 
in production and trade. For instance, in scenario 
II, Europe’s share in World production decreases by 
about 5.4% points, on average. For electronic equip-
ment the decline is dramatic from 22% to less than 
8% (see Table 5.4), but also in other machinery and 
equipment and textiles and wearing apparel the 
decline is substantial, about 10% of global produc-
tion. In chemicals, rubber and plastics and basic met-
als the loss in production share is also substantial, 
but in wood and other manufacturing we see a small 
increase in the share of global production. The pat-
tern of changes in production shares differs in both 
scenarios. The average decrease is equal, but the 
changes per sector over time are more pronounced 
in scenario II.
5.7.4.  The impact of policies
The use of a general equilibrium model to build the 
scenarios assures that those are internally consistent. 
More importantly, this approach permits to evaluate 
the impact of policies that aim at improving the gen-
eral framework conditions for competitiveness and 
their relative importance.
The policies considered are:
–   Upgrading skills – the policy modelled is the 
achievement of the 2010 targets adopted by 
Table 5.4: EU production as share of world production by sector, 2025
Sector Scenario I Scenario II
2005 2025 2025
Agriculture, oil and minerals 14.3 11.6 11.8
Energy carriers 19.2 16.5 18.4
Food products 26.9 22.7 23.0
Textiles and wearing apparel 19.3 13.9 9.7
Wood and other manufacturing 25.6 21.8 25.9
Pulp, paper and publishing 27.8 23.4 24.6
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 27.7 20.7 21.1
Non-metallic minerals 28.6 21.5 24.9
Basic metals 26.2 19.0 18.6
Electronic equipment 22.1 12.9 7.7
Transport equipment 29.3 23.5 24.8
Other machinery and equipment 28.5 19.0 17.7
Research and development 22.5 18.9 18.6
Transport services 25.5 22.0 23.5
Construction 24.8 19.3 21.0
Trade services 23.4 20.0 20.6
Communication 24.8 20.6 20.7
Financial services 21.7 18.7 19.1
Other business services 29.1 26.2 27.5
Other services 28.1 23.8 24.2
Source: WorldScan
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Council on May 2003 (10% maximum of early 
school leavers, at least 85% of 2 years olds with 
upper secondary education, 20% reduction of 
15 years olds with low reading literacy achieving, 
at least 12.5% participation in Lifelong Learning 
and 15% increase of S&T graduates). The trans-
mission channel is increased labour efﬁ  ciency. 
Some of the costs (notably opportunity costs) 
involved in reaching the targets – but not all, such 
as policy costs- are taken into account.
–   Better regulation and less administrative burdens 
for ﬁ  rms – the simulation assumes the achieve-
ment of the 25% reduction in administrative 
costs target. Here too, the transmission channel is 
increased labour efﬁ  ciency, i.e. fewer workers are 
needed for the same production level.
–   R&D and innovation policies – here the model 
assumes that the share of R&D expenditure in 
GDP reaches 2.7% by 2010. The transmission 
mechanism is increased TFP growth due to R&D 
spillovers (sectoral, domestic from other sectors 
and international) which have been estimated 
empirically. The model takes into account the 
policy costs of increasing R&D expenditure.
–   A strong competitive Single Market – modelled by 
reducing the non trade barriers applying to cross 
border trade of services and energy (by 20%) and 
to goods and agriculture (by 10%), thus resulting 
in higher trade ﬂ  ows.
–   Environmental policies – reﬂ  ected by an increase 
of energy efﬁ  ciency of 1% per year in all sectors 
(except energy production itself). This translates 
into reduced production costs and higher pro-
duction, especially in energy-intensive sectors. 
However, the costs of developing more energy 
efﬁ  cient technologies are not taken into account.










GDP 0.5 3.0 1.5 1.7 0.9 7.7
Consumption 0.5 1.6 1.4 5.5 0.9 9.8
Exports 0.5 4.8 1.4 40.6 1.8 49.0
Scenario II
GDP 0.6 3.5 1.6 2.3 0.8 8.8
Consumption 0.5 1.6 1.4 5.2 0.8 9.4
Exports 0.6 5.9 1.6 29.0 1.5 38.5
Source: WorldScan simulations. The results are % changes from the baseline in 2025.
The individual impact of achieving the targets of 
these policies on GDP by 2025 is in the range of 0.5-
0.6% (skills102) to3.0-3.5% (R&D), with the other 
structural policies in-between (Table 5.5). Their 
cumulative impact amounts to around 8% (scenar-
io I) to 9% (scenario II).
If the differences between the two scenarios in the 
macro effects of the individual structural policies are 
minor, the same cannot be said for their at sector 
level impact (Table 5.6). Globalisation is an impor-
tant driver that affects particular industries in different 
ways. The sectors which are already most open for 
international trade are also the ones mostly affected. 
These include textiles and wearing apparel, wood 
and other manufacturing, chemicals, rubber and 
plastics, electronic equipment, transport equipment 
and other machinery and equipment. Overall, the 
sectors food products and pulp, paper and publish-
ing are less inﬂ  uenced. These are sectors which are 
more domestically oriented, less R&D intensive and 
face less technological progress. Europe has no com-
parative advantages in textiles and wearing apparel, 
electronic equipment and basic metals. Chemicals, 
rubber and plastics, transport equipment and other 
transport and equipment will be the important man-
ufacturing sectors in Europe.
The increase in R&D beneﬁ  ts the most R&D intensive 
industries, like electronic and transport equipment, 
other machinery and equipment and chemicals. Also 
non-metallic minerals and basic metals beneﬁ  t more 
than the R&D-extensive service sectors. R&D does 
not only affect the sectors directly but also indirectly 
102   The economic effect of improved skills increases very gradually, as succes-
sive, better educated cohorts enter the work force. In addition, the costs 
of extra schooling in terms of working time lost are relatively high.
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Table 5.6: Production volume changes per sector due to framework policies in the two scenarios, 2025
Scenario I Scenario II
Agriculture, oil and minerals 0.0 0.5
Energy carriers 2.4 3.6
Food products 3.1 4.2
Textiles and wearing apparel 17.3 20.4
Wood and other manufacturing 10.8 13.4
Pulp, paper and publishing 3.5 4.1
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 18.9 31.7
Non-metallic minerals 5.9 6.5
Basic metals 11.1 15.3
Electronic equipment 53.2 85.8
Transport equipment 25.0 32.4
Other machinery and equipment 18.8 24.0
Research and development 63.6 73.7
Transport services 7.2 7.3
Construction 7.7 6.9
Trade services 3.5 4.1
Communication 1.5 2.4
Financial services 0.3 0.8
Other business services 2.3 3.1
Other services 4.4 3.7
Source: WorldScan.
by the spillovers between domestic sectors and the 
international spillovers.
More energy efﬁ   ciency seems to increase produc-
tion in most sectors. In particular, the energy-inten-
sive sectors as the chemical industry and transport 
services beneﬁ  t the most. For the energy sector itself 
it has a negative impact due to reduced energy 
demand. Non-metallic minerals beneﬁ  ts because it 
is energy-intensive, and manufacturing sectors like 
transport equipment beneﬁ  t because equipment is 
more demanded by the increase in transport serv-
ices.
Of the structural policies fed into the model, improv-
ing skills, reducing the administrative burden and 
increasing energy efﬁ  ciency, have the least impact 
on manufacturing. R&D and innovation policies and 
strengthening the internal market on the other hand 
have the strongest and most positive impact. In the 
coming decades Europe’s decreasing share in global 
manufacturing production and trade will slow down. 
The structural policies decelerate further the relative 
decline trend of manufacturing in Europe, such that 
in some manufacturing sectors such as chemicals, 
rubber and plastics, and combined machinery and 
equipment sectors the trend is almost cancelled out. 
In terms of the EU share in world production (Table 
5.7), in the absence of structural policies there is no 
sector where EU maintains its relative importance 
by 2025, under either scenario. In the presence of 
policies (i.e. achievement of targets) sectors such as 
transport equipment, wood and other manufactur-
ing, energy carriers, Research and development serv-
ices, chemicals, rubber and plastics; transport serv-
ices and other business services maintain or almost 
maintain, their global share (Table 5.7).
5.8. General  conclusions
Taking the long view only reinforces the conclusions 
already reached in the previous chapter. From the lit-
erature survey of existing foresight and futures studies, 
the backbone of which is formed by three recent EU-
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Table 5.7: EU production as share of world production by sector in the two scenarios, 2025














2005 2025 2025 2025 2025
Agriculture, oil and minerals 14.3 11.6 11.9 11.8 12.0
Energy carriers 19.2 16.5 17.8 18.4 19.8
Food products 26.9 22.7 23.5 23.0 23.9
Textiles and wearing apparel 19.3 13.9 16.2 9.7 11.5
Wood and other manufacturing 25.6 21.8 23.8 25.9 28.7
Pulp, paper and publishing 27.8 23.4 24.4 24.6 25.6
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 27.7 20.7 23.5 21.1 26.3
Non-metallic minerals 28.6 21.5 22.7 24.9 26.2
Basic metals 26.2 19.0 20.8 18.6 21.0
Electronic equipment 22.1 12.9 19.0 7.7 13.7
Transport equipment 29.3 23.5 27.6 24.8 31.0
Other machinery and equipment 28.5 19.0 22.1 17.7 21.4
Research and development 22.5 18.9 29.8 18.6 30.8
Transport services 25.5 22.0 23.1 23.5 24.7
Construction 24.8 19.3 20.9 21.0 22.5
Trade services 23.4 20.0 21.5 20.6 22.0
Communication 24.8 20.6 21.8 20.7 21.8
Financial services 21.7 18.7 19.7 19.1 20.0
Other business services 29.1 26.2 27.7 27.5 28.9
Other services 28.1 23.8 25.8 24.2 26.0
Source: WorldScan.
wide foresight projects on the future of manufactur-
ing in Europe FutMan, ManVis and Manufuture, there 
emerge some clear dynamics, summarised below.
Manufacturing will employ directly far less persons 
(even in China manufacturing employment shrunk 
over the last years) than today and will represent a 
smaller part of the whole economy. European man-
ufacturing ﬁ  rms will employ more people and will 
produce more outside Europe than today. Also, their 
ownership, at least for the larger among them, will 
be much more international than today. The most 
successful of these ﬁ  rms will act as component inte-
grators, leading global value networks.
It needs to be stressed that the continuation of the 
two negative trends, on employment and relative 
share in the total economy, must not be confounded 
with stagnation or decline. European industry can 
still contribute directly to welfare and productivity 
growth, in addition to its other positive “externali-
ties”, such as superior research intensity and demand 
for high skilled services, while losing jobs and rela-
tive size. To a certain extent, these trends result from 
normal demand size developments and reﬂ  ect the 
effect of different income elasticities of demand for 
goods and services. Of real concern, over the longer 
term, would be a growing differential in productivity 
growth with its main competitors.
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It is not clear which of the emerging technologies 
(electromechanical microsystems, advanced materi-
als, bio and nanotechnologies) will be in everyday 
use. What is certain is that managing knowledge will 
be as important, if not more, as managing the other 
production factors and the successful business mod-
els of the future will be those that perform better 
in this respect. This will probably lead to ever more 
complex organisational approaches, with a high 
degree of collaboration and networking with suppli-
ers, customers, competitors and external sources of 
knowledge, such as research institutions and univer-
sities.
It is also certain that the service content of manu-
facturing, but also of the package sold with the ﬁ  nal 
product, will further increase. The latter creates new 
revenue opportunities and valuable long lasting rela-
tionships with customers; however, they are also 
prone to outsourcing.
These developments will put the skill basis under 
stress. Soft skills, such as team working, learning, 
sharing and communicating, providing a service as 
well as a good and the ability to think interdiscipli-
nary will become crucial, especially for SMEs want-
ing to participate in the global networks, something 
which may become necessary even for serving a 
local market. In return, work places will have to 
become more attractive and accommodative for 
potential high-skill employees, especially older ones 
and women.
Dynamic specialisation will result in Europe main-
taining strong positions in many medium-high and 
high technology sectors (chemicals, including phar-
maceuticals, mechanical engineering, cars, aero-
space). This will necessitate important R&D efforts 
to continuously expand the technological frontier in 
these industries so as to keep the competitive edge. 
Another stronghold is represented by sectors with 
high income elasticity (high end products in tradi-
tional sectors) where, together with technological 
innovation, design and marketing play an important 
role.
Much will also depend on European ﬁ  rms’  ability 
to capitalise on the opportunities that global chal-
lenges, such as ageing and climate change, rep-
resent. As Europe seems to face them earlier than 
most of its competitors, with the exception of Japan, 
there is a real opportunity for establishing lead 
market positions in products linked to health care, 
convenience, leisure and entertainment. While the 
global response to climate change remains uncer-
tain, energy efﬁ   ciency and recycling potential will 
be important value attributes. More generally, tech-
nologies that permit to operate within much stringer 
environmental constraints than today will offer lead 
market opportunities.
The use of scenarios permits to draw a number 
of interesting conclusions on the future of manu-
facturing in Europe. The increase in trade and, 
more generally, globalisation appears to be one 
of the most important drivers. The sectors which 
are already most open for international trade are 
also the ones mostly affected by this trend. These 
include textiles and wearing apparel, wood and 
other manufacturing, chemicals, rubber and plas-
tics, electronic equipment, transport equipment 
and other machinery and equipment. Overall, the 
sectors food products and pulp, paper and pub-
lishing are less inﬂ  uenced. These are sectors which 
are more domestically oriented, less R&D intensive 
and face less technological progress. Europe has 
no comparative advantages in textiles and wearing 
apparel, electronic equipment and basic metals. 
These disadvantages will further manifest them-
selves in the oncoming twenty years. In particular 
this applies to electronic equipment which – while 
in the past a relative big sector – will decline even 
further. Textiles and wearing apparel is an already 
small sector in terms of value added and employ-
ment, which means that an even less prosperous 
future for this sector will also have less overall 
impact. Chemicals, rubber and plastics, transport 
equipment and other transport and equipment will 
be the important manufacturing sectors in Europe, 
although the comparative advantages in the other 
machinery and equipment sector will slide away. 
These sectors are important in the composition of 
Europe’s exports and produce about a quarter of 
global production and global trade in these sectors 
the coming decades.
Of the framework policies analysed in this study, 
improving skills, reducing the administrative bur-
den and increasing energy efﬁ  ciency, have a posi-
tive but relatively modest impact on manufacturing 
while R&D and innovation policies and strengthen-
ing the internal market will have a much stronger, 
and positive, effects. These are also the most ambi-
tious in terms of policy formulation and implemen-
tation, but potentially very effective in supporting 
manufacturing because of their R&D intensive and 
reinforcing competition nature. In the coming dec-
ades Europe’s decreasing share in global manufac-
turing production and trade will slow down. The 
framework policies further decelerate this slowing 
down of the relative decline of manufacturing in 
Europe, such that in some manufacturing sectors, 
as chemicals, rubber and plastics, and combined 
machinery and equipment, the declining trend 
nearly stops.
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Annex Box 5.1: Overview of Key Futures Studies
An obvious source for identifying trends and drivers affecting the future of European manufacturing are 
foresight or future studies on the subject conducted in Europe. However, as Europe’s future depends 
on developments of its main competitors, it is essential to take into account similar projects in America, 
and Asia to avoid a too Europe-centric view of the future.
The key European manufacturing foresight projects conducted in the past 5 years are FutMan (2003), 
ManVis (2005) and Manufuture. FutMan, short for ‘Future of Manufacturing’, was conducted in 2003 
addressing the question of how Europe can be competitive in 2015-2020 exploiting new scientiﬁ  c and 
technological developments, while responding to the needs and challenges of sustainable development 
(CEC, 2003). Based on a large Delphi survey involving more than 3000 manufacturing experts across 
Europe as well as the research results of FutMan, ManVis (2005) – short for Manufacturing Visions 
–developed future visions of EU manufacturing 2020. Questions also addressed how emerging econo-
mies such as China, India and Brazil impact on the location of global manufacturing production and 
resulting impacts for European manufacturing. These results have been fed into long-term planning 
for research funding in 2006 as part of the ‘ManuFuture’ Strategic Research Agenda. Manufuture is a 
European Technology Platform whose mission is to develop a strategy based on research and innova-
tion to secure high added value employment as well as a major share of world manufacturing in Europe 
by speeding up industrial transformation towards a knowledge driven economy (Manufuture, no date). 
All three projects were ﬁ  nanced by European Commission (DG Research) and feed into policy making 
at European but also national level.
The main American studies are the 1998 ‘Integrated Manufacturing Technology Roadmapping Initia-
tive’ (IMTI), which was created to identify and evaluate the key technology goals that would enable a 
competitive and capable US manufacturing base in the future, while creating pathways for achieving 
these goals in practice (Merrell, 1999). Furthermore, in 2004 SRI – a non-proﬁ  t research institute for-
merly part of Stanford University – conducted a series of analyses for the Manufacturing Extension Part-
nership (MEP) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to provide America’s small 
manufacturers with reports to better understand the major shifts arising from deepening globalisation, 
the emergence of south-east Asian competitors and rapid advances in technology (SRI, 2007).
Asian studies on the future of manufacturing available in English language are sparse. While Japan is 
the country with the longest tradition of technology foresight conducting quinquennial large scale 
foresight exercises since the late 1970s (Cuhls, 2001), the only relevant study found was the 2005 Del-
phi survey (Nistep, 2005) focusing on future technologies. As broader visions of future manufacturing 
cannot be found in this report, government policy documents were instead the main source on future 
manufacturing paradigms and strategic developments in Japan. Other countries like China (NRCSTD 
China, 2005) and India (PC India, 2002) have just started conducting national foresight or future stud-
ies, meaning that perspectives on future manufacturing in these countries rely on mostly Western 
assessments found in the large European and American projects.
Additionally, key global future studies with a primarily economic focus were included as macro-eco-
nomic future projections were missing from the Foresight projects presented above. These are the Glo-
bal Economic Prospects study by the World Bank (2007) as well as the GoldmanSachs (2003) and PwC 
(2006) studies on emerging economies in 2050.
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Annex Box 5.2: Emergence of Foresight in Europe
While the desire to foresee the future is as old as mankind, in the 1940s serious attempts emerged in the 
US to forecast future technological developments known as ‘technological forecasting’ (Jantsch, 1967). 
Disappointments with methods and results of these forecasts – particularly the failure to foresee the ‘oil 
crisis’ – meant that during the 70s and 80s interest was waning. The only nation consistently engaging 
in long-term forecasts were the Japanese, producing quinquennial large scale national Delphi surveys 
since 1971 (Cuhls, 2001). Europe experienced a renewed interest in forecasting in the early 1990’s, 
primarily to focus public resource allocation. Germany was the ﬁ  rst to emulate the Japanese survey in 
1991 soon followed by France (Grupp & Linstone, 1999). The UK started exploring new methods using 
expert panels for the different UK industry sectors, informed by a national Delphi survey, scenarios, 
expert presentations and regional workshops to identify future science and technology areas, which 
could be exploited for wealth creation and improvements in quality of life (Georghiou, 1996). This 
formed the UK Technology Foresight Programme from 1996.
These developments marked a new approach commonly termed as ‘technology foresight’. However, as 
these projects do not only focus on future technologies but as much on social and economic develop-
ments the term ‘technology foresight’ is misleading. Instead, it is nowadays plainly referred to as ‘fore-
sight’ (Unido, 2005). Foresight is commonly described as “a systematic means of assessing those sci-
entiﬁ  c and technological developments which could have strong impact on industrial competitiveness, 
wealth creation and quality of life” (Unido, 2005). It should not be confused with other approaches such 
as forecasting, future studies or strategic planning. In contrast to the previous forecasting attempts, the 
emphasis has changed from predicting to creating the future through shared visions and plans to put 
these into practice. Furthermore, with the rise of the ‘Systems of Innovation’ concept, the importance 
of linking the various actors became a key aspect of national foresight exercises. Consequently, the 
emphasis changed to creating networks and shared visions among dispersed expert groups to create 
possible self-fulﬁ  lling prophecies linking social-demands with technological and economic develop-
ments.
While the early phase of foresight in Europe led to a number of large scale national programmes, 
the focus has changed to small scale, topic related exercises in the countries that conducted the ﬁ  rst 
national programmes in the early 1990s. Examples are the 2nd and 3rd round of foresight exercises in 
the UK. However, the interest in national foresight exercises has spread to the New EU Member States 
and countries overseas, such as Romania and Hungary but also Thailand, India and China.
This spreading of foresight has led to a number of European exercises, also on the subject of manu-
facturing. In 2003 FutMan “The Future of Manufacturing in Europe 2015-2020 – The Challenge for 
Sustainability” was the ﬁ  rst project focusing on manufacturing. It differed to the foresight exercises 
described above in the respect that it was research groups producing the reports based on expert sur-
veys and desk research. However, it also included the construction of four scenarios. FutMan formed 
the basis for the large scale European foresight exercise ManVis – Manufacturing Visions 2020 – con-
cluded in 2005. Backbone of the ManVis exercise was a large scale European Delphi survey involving 
more than 3000 manufacturing experts across Europe. The results of this survey were used to augment 
the scenarios developed in the FutMan project to create visions of European manufacturing in 2020. 
Furthermore, the FutMan and ManVis results also fed into the ‘Strategic Research Agenda’ of the Euro-
pean Manufacturing platform ‘Manufuture’ presented in 2006. All three projects represent important 
sources in this survey. In addition, the European Commission (DG for Research) established in 2000 the 
European Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN)  1.
1   http://www.efmn.info/
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D: Statistical annex
Chapter 6. Sectoral 
Competitiveness Indicators
Explanatory notes
Geographical coverage: all indicators refer to 
EU-27
Production index: The production index is actu-
ally an index of ﬁ  nal production in volume terms.
Labour productivity: this indicator is calculated by 
combining the indexes of production and number of 
persons employed. Therefore, this indicator meas-
ures ﬁ  nal production per person.
Unit Labour Cost: it is calculated from the produc-
tion index and the index of wages and salaries and 
measures labour cost per unit of production. “Wages 
and salaries” is deﬁ   ned (Eurostat) as “the total 
remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable to all per-
sons counted on the payroll (including homeworkers), 
in return for work done during the accounting period, 
regardless of whether it is paid on the basis of work-
ing time, output or piecework and whether it is paid 
regularly … wages and salaries do not include social 
contributions payable by the employer”.
Relative Trade Balance: it is calculated, for sec-
tor “i”, as (Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi), where Xi and Mi are EU-27 
exports and imports of products of sector “i” to and 
from the rest of the World.
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA): For 
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Table 7.1: EU-27 production index annual growth rate (%)




C Mining and quarrying 1.2 -2.2 -1.6 1.7 -3.0 -3.7 1.2 -2.9 -3.1 -4.1 -4.1 0.0
D Manufacturing 0.2 4.4 3.6 1.7 5.4 0.2 -0.6 0.6 2.6 1.4 4.5 1.4
DA15 Food products and beverages 1.3 3.1 0.9 1.8 1.2 1.6 2.4 1.0 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.7
DA16 Tobacco products 9.4 -1.7 1.9 -5.2 -5.9 -2.4 -0.4 -5.7 -6.1 -4.5 -6.2 -4.2
DB17 Textiles -3.6 3.7 -1.9 -4.7 1.3 -3.7 -4.5 -2.8 -4.5 -4.8 -1.9 -3.7
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur -5.1 -3.4 -3.0 -9.5 -5.1 -2.7 -11.3 -5.3 -5.5 -9.8 -0.8 -6.0
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage -3.4 1.1 -5.5 -3.9 -3.1 -3.9 -7.6 -7.5 -11.1 -8.4 -1.5 -6.7
DD20 Wood and products of wood and cork -3.3 4.2 3.0 2.6 5.5 -3.0 0.2 1.3 3.5 1.1 3.8 1.1
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products -2.0 5.1 0.6 2.4 3.3 -2.2 3.3 2.1 3.5 -0.8 3.1 1.5
DE22 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media -0.1 3.7 4.7 3.4 2.0 -1.5 -0.5 -0.7 2.2 -0.2 0.3 -0.1
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel -0.4 -1.6 2.3 -5.7 3.8 -0.2 -1.3 1.4 4.0 1.0 -0.3 0.8
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products 2.8 6.1 3.1 4.7 5.1 3.2 5.3 2.1 1.6 2.0 3.9 3.0
DH25 Rubber and plastic products -0.9 5.6 4.4 2.5 4.8 -0.7 0.2 1.9 1.9 0.5 4.0 1.3
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products -2.6 2.8 2.2 2.2 3.8 -1.0 -1.9 0.7 2.1 0.2 4.0 0.7
DJ27 Basic metals -2.2 6.3 0.9 -3.6 6.8 -1.5 -0.3 -0.2 4.3 -1.7 5.1 0.9
DJ28 Fabricated metal products -1.1 4.0 4.6 0.6 5.9 0.7 -0.2 0.4 3.0 1.6 5.3 1.8
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.4 2.9 2.5 -2.7 5.9 1.4 -1.3 -0.7 3.9 3.6 7.4 2.3
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers 8.2 5.5 13.2 8.9 17.5 -2.1 -16.8 -0.4 -0.4 2.8 6.6 -2.0
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. -0.4 4.9 5.0 3.3 7.8 1.4 -3.8 -0.7 3.9 2.0 8.1 1.8
DL32 Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus 3.9 7.0 9.0 12.0 25.9 -10.9 -9.8 1.3 12.4 5.3 13.9 1.6
DL33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks 0.4 2.2 3.9 1.5 10.3 4.6 -0.2 1.5 2.5 1.9 7.4 2.9
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2.9 8.0 11.3 3.8 7.7 2.0 1.0 2.3 5.1 1.9 2.6 2.5
DM35 Other transport equipment 1.2 8.6 4.1 5.8 0.4 3.0 -6.1 3.0 2.9 3.0 10.2 2.6
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -1.1 1.5 4.5 2.7 2.7 -0.4 -4.7 -2.4 0.7 -0.2 2.5 -0.8
DN37 Recycling n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.5 6.6 -0.2 6.8 2.7 13.0 5.3
E Electricity, gas and water supply 3.3 0.4 1.8 2.4 3.8 2.5 0.8 3.0 1.9 1.6 0.9 1.8



































































































































Table 7.2: EU-27 number of persons employed annual growth rate (%)




C Mining and quarrying n.a. -5.7 -6.7 -9.8 -9.1 -4.0 -4.0 -4.4 -5.1 -3.6 -5.2 0.0
D Manufacturing -1.4 -0.7 0.7 -1.9 -1.1 -0.2 -2.1 -1.9 -1.9 -1.3 -0.6 -1.3
DA15 Food products and beverages 0.0 -0.3 0.8 -1.3 -1.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 -1.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.4
DA16 Tobacco products n.a. -4.3 -3.0 -9.3 -5.1 -2.9 -2.3 -6.0 -6.4 -2.8 -1.1 -3.6
DB17 Textiles n.a. -2.8 -2.1 -6.8 -4.9 -3.0 -4.7 -6.9 -5.9 -4.4 -6.1 -5.2
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur n.a. -3.5 -2.2 -3.2 -4.3 -2.7 -3.8 -4.0 -5.8 -8.3 -5.8 -5.1
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage n.a. -2.4 -4.2 -7.5 -4.1 -1.5 -1.1 -4.9 -7.9 -6.1 -3.4 -4.2
DD20 Wood and products of wood and cork n.a. -0.3 1.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -1.5 -1.8 -1.1 -0.2 -0.9 -1.1
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products -2.1 -1.3 0.8 -3.3 -1.5 -1.7 -1.2 -1.8 -1.2 -2.5 -2.0 -1.8
DE22 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media 0.2 0.3 1.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 -1.8 -2.9 -1.0 -2.6 -1.1 -1.5
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel n.a. -4.4 -6.6 -1.1 -3.2 -2.4 -3.0 -3.1 -1.6 -2.4 -6.4 -3.2
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products -1.6 -1.3 -1.1 -2.1 -2.4 -0.3 -0.7 -1.7 -3.1 -1.8 -0.3 -1.3
DH25 Rubber and plastic products -1.0 1.9 3.5 -0.8 1.7 0.8 -0.4 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -1.0 0.0
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products -2.9 -1.9 0.7 -2.4 -1.3 -1.1 -2.2 -3.0 -2.3 -1.2 -1.4 -1.9
DJ27 Basic metals -1.9 -2.5 -0.6 -4.3 -5.0 -1.8 -4.7 -3.4 -3.8 -1.5 -0.7 -2.6
DJ28 Fabricated metal products -0.4 0.1 2.1 0.3 0.4 1.1 -1.3 -0.9 0.6 0.5 1.7 0.3
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -1.5 -0.6 0.5 -3.0 -2.6 0.0 -1.9 -2.5 -2.5 -0.4 0.5 -1.1
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers -2.9 1.0 3.1 1.4 0.2 -2.0 -10.0 -7.4 -5.4 -3.1 -0.7 -4.8
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. -1.9 -0.8 3.4 -0.8 0.7 1.2 -2.8 -3.2 -0.2 -0.6 2.1 -0.6
DL32
Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus
-1.1 -2.2 1.9 -0.5 5.8 1.0 -8.6 -6.1 -3.8 -2.9 -3.1 -4.0
DL33
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks
0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -2.4 -0.2 3.0 -1.1 -1.9 0.6 0.5 2.1 0.5
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.7 1.3 3.0 0.0 1.6 1.3 -1.3 0.2 0.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.1
DM35 Other transport equipment -3.6 -3.0 -1.3 -2.3 -3.3 0.2 -1.5 -2.7 -1.8 0.8 0.2 -0.8
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. n.a. 0.0 0.4 -1.7 -0.1 0.5 -3.8 1.0 -1.6 -2.0 -1.5 -1.2
DN37 Recycling 9.1 3.9 5.1 -3.4 4.7 7.1 4.3 4.5 4.9 4.0 6.0 5.1
E Electricity, gas and water supply -4.0 -1.7 -2.9 -2.8 -3.0 -2.2 -2.4 -2.9 -2.9 -2.4 -1.0 -2.3

























































































































Table 7.3: EU-27 number of hours worked annual growth rate (%)




C Mining and quarrying -3.7 -4.7 -5.6 -3.9 -3.3 -5.2 0.0
D Manufacturing -1.4 -2.8 -2.0 -1.1 -1.5 -0.2 -1.5
DA15 Food products and beverages -1.5 -1.6 -1.7 -1.0 -1.1 -0.3 -1.2
DA16 Tobacco products -1.5 -1.5 -10.1 -5.9 -3.2 -6.7 -4.9
DB17 Textiles -3.3 -4.4 -5.9 -4.4 -6.8 -4.9 -4.9
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur -3.6 -4.0 -4.5 -3.9 -6.2 -4.3 -4.4
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage -2.5 -4.0 -5.4 -5.6 -6.2 -3.6 -4.5
DD20 Wood and products of wood and cork -2.8 -2.8 -2.3 -0.1 -0.8 0.3 -1.4
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products -1.7 -2.4 -0.1 -1.8 -2.5 -1.0 -1.6
DE22 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media -0.2 -3.4 -1.3 -2.5 -2.0 -0.2 -1.6
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel -3.4 -2.6 -3.6 -0.7 -3.1 -5.3 -3.1
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products -1.7 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7 -2.7 -1.0 -1.7
DH25 Rubber and plastic products -0.3 -1.8 -0.1 0.5 -0.6 1.1 -0.2
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products -2.8 -2.9 -3.2 -1.5 -1.6 -1.1 -2.2
DJ27 Basic metals -2.9 -4.3 -5.0 -1.8 -2.5 -0.1 -2.8
DJ28 Fabricated metal products -0.2 -2.0 -1.4 0.3 0.1 1.7 -0.2
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -1.6 -2.9 -2.3 -0.9 -1.1 1.1 -1.3
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers -2.5 -11.1 -5.9 -4.3 -4.7 0.0 -4.8
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. -1.1 -2.6 -1.5 0.0 0.1 1.8 -0.6
DL32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus -2.1 -7.9 -5.4 -1.9 -2.6 -2.3 -3.7
DL33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 1.6 -1.7 -1.6 0.2 0.2 1.6 0.1
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -0.4 -2.1 0.4 1.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.2
DM35 Other transport equipment -0.7 -1.9 -2.5 -2.1 0.9 0.9 -0.9
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0.1 -5.1 -2.1 -0.4 -2.9 0.0 -1.8
DN37 Recycling 7.8 2.2 3.4 2.6 6.1 5.0 4.5
E Electricity, gas and water supply -1.3 -2.8 -2.8 -2.2 -3.0 -1.3 -2.2



































































































































Table 7.4: EU-27 labour productivity (per person employed) annual growth rate (%)




C Mining and quarrying n.a. 3.8 5.5 12.8 6.7 0.2 5.5 1.5 2.0 -0.5 1.1 0.0
D Manufacturing 1.6 5.1 3.0 3.6 6.7 0.4 1.5 2.5 4.5 2.7 5.2 2.8
DA15 Food products and beverages 1.3 3.3 0.1 3.2 2.9 2.4 2.8 1.3 2.7 1.8 1.9 2.1
DA16 Tobacco products n.a. 2.7 5.0 4.5 -0.9 0.6 2.0 0.3 0.3 -1.8 -5.2 -0.7
DB17 Textiles n.a. 6.7 0.2 2.2 6.5 -0.7 0.3 4.4 1.5 -0.5 4.5 1.6
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur n.a. 0.1 -0.8 -6.5 -0.8 0.0 -7.7 -1.3 0.3 -1.5 5.3 -0.9
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage n.a. 3.6 -1.4 4.0 1.0 -2.5 -6.5 -2.7 -3.5 -2.4 2.0 -2.6
DD20 Wood and products of wood and cork n.a. 4.5 1.9 2.3 5.9 -2.2 1.8 3.2 4.6 1.4 4.8 2.2
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.2 6.5 -0.2 5.9 4.8 -0.5 4.5 4.0 4.8 1.7 5.3 3.3
DE22 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media -0.2 3.4 3.1 3.1 1.6 -1.8 1.3 2.3 3.2 2.5 1.4 1.5
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel n.a. 2.9 9.5 -4.7 7.2 2.3 1.8 4.6 5.8 3.5 6.5 4.1
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products 4.5 7.5 4.3 7.0 7.6 3.5 6.0 3.8 4.9 3.8 4.2 4.4
DH25 Rubber and plastic products 0.1 3.7 0.9 3.3 3.1 -1.5 0.6 1.2 2.0 0.6 5.0 1.3
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.3 4.8 1.5 4.6 5.2 0.2 0.3 3.8 4.5 1.4 5.5 2.6
DJ27 Basic metals -0.3 9.0 1.5 0.7 12.4 0.2 4.6 3.3 8.4 -0.2 5.8 3.6
DJ28 Fabricated metal products -0.7 3.9 2.4 0.3 5.4 -0.4 1.1 1.4 2.4 1.1 3.5 1.5
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.9 3.6 2.0 0.4 8.7 1.4 0.6 1.9 6.5 4.0 6.9 3.5
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers 11.4 4.4 9.8 7.5 17.2 -0.1 -7.5 7.6 5.2 6.1 7.4 3.0
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 1.6 5.8 1.5 4.1 7.0 0.3 -1.0 2.5 4.1 2.6 5.9 2.4
DL32
Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus
5.1 9.4 7.0 12.6 19.0 -11.8 -1.3 7.8 16.9 8.5 17.5 5.7
DL33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.2 2.7 4.8 4.0 10.6 1.5 0.9 3.4 1.9 1.4 5.2 2.4
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2.2 6.7 8.0 3.8 6.1 0.7 2.3 2.1 4.9 2.7 2.9 2.6
DM35 Other transport equipment 5.1 11.9 5.5 8.3 3.8 2.8 -4.7 5.9 4.8 2.2 10.0 3.4
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. n.a. 1.5 4.1 4.4 2.8 -0.9 -1.0 -3.3 2.3 1.8 4.1 0.5
DN37 Recycling n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -3.3 2.2 -4.5 1.8 -1.3 6.6 0.2
E Electricity, gas and water supply 7.6 2.1 4.9 5.3 7.0 4.7 3.3 6.1 4.9 4.1 1.9 4.2

























































































































Table 7.5: EU-27 Unit Labour Cost annual growth rate (%)




C Mining and quarrying n.a. 1.5 -0.4 -1.7 1.3 6.9 -2.7 4.4 2.6 6.1 8.5 0.0
D Manufacturing n.a. -2.7 -0.6 1.0 -1.9 2.6 1.6 0.2 -1.1 0.0 -1.8 0.2
DA15 Food products and beverages n.a. -1.2 1.4 0.6 1.3 1.7 0.1 1.9 -0.1 -1.2 -0.3 0.3
DA16 Tobacco products n.a. 2.7 1.0 7.0 10.4 4.0 1.3 7.2 10.6 7.4 11.1 6.9
DB17 Textiles n.a. -2.1 3.7 6.0 0.7 2.8 3.8 1.6 3.2 2.8 1.3 2.6
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur n.a. 3.1 3.9 11.0 4.7 2.0 11.0 2.8 6.8 9.7 1.6 5.6
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage n.a. 0.8 7.5 5.0 5.8 7.8 8.9 6.8 12.3 9.3 5.3 8.4
DD20 Wood and products of wood and cork n.a. -3.2 -0.1 0.0 -2.6 4.2 -0.1 -1.2 -0.8 1.2 0.1 0.6
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products n.a. -3.0 1.3 0.3 -0.1 4.8 -2.5 -1.9 -2.0 2.0 -2.4 -0.4
DE22 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media n.a. -1.9 -1.5 0.0 2.0 4.8 1.1 -0.9 -1.9 1.1 0.2 0.7
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel n.a. 1.6 -4.3 6.7 -1.8 3.7 3.9 1.8 1.6 3.4 3.7 3.0
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products n.a. -5.1 -1.0 -3.0 -1.6 -0.7 -2.5 0.4 -1.1 -0.8 -2.4 -1.2
DH25 Rubber and plastic products n.a. -2.8 -0.4 1.0 -1.2 3.3 1.2 0.1 1.2 0.4 -2.7 0.6
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products n.a. -2.3 -0.2 0.1 -1.1 2.2 3.1 -0.1 -1.4 1.0 -1.2 0.6
DJ27 Basic metals n.a. -3.9 1.8 4.3 -4.3 -1.0 -0.8 0.2 -2.8 4.2 -1.3 -0.3
DJ28 Fabricated metal products n.a. -2.1 -1.3 2.2 -2.7 2.9 1.3 0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -1.3 0.4
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.2 -1.6 0.8 4.8 -2.7 1.8 1.9 1.6 -1.1 -1.8 -3.2 -0.1
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers n.a. -7.3 -12.4 -5.3 -10.8 5.1 7.2 -7.2 -5.6 -3.5 -6.7 -2.0
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.5 -5.1 -1.6 -0.4 -3.6 2.0 4.2 -0.5 -1.9 -0.6 -3.8 -0.1
DL32 Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus n.a. -4.5 -2.7 -6.5 -14.7 17.1 6.1 -5.9 -11.8 -6.2 -12.6 -2.7
DL33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks 1.5 -1.2 -2.1 0.3 -4.9 1.5 1.5 -0.5 0.5 1.5 -3.5 0.2
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.7 -4.5 -5.8 1.1 -2.6 1.5 1.2 1.3 -2.4 -0.4 0.5 0.3
DM35 Other transport equipment n.a. -7.1 -1.2 -2.2 1.1 2.8 10.0 -1.1 -2.9 0.8 -6.6 0.4
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. n.a. -0.2 -2.5 -0.2 -0.4 3.2 5.0 1.3 -0.8 0.3 -0.1 1.5
DN37 Recycling n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.1 -2.0 6.9 0.5 3.7 -5.2 1.6
E Electricity, gas and water supply n.a. 0.5 -2.9 -0.7 -3.5 0.3 3.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 4.9 1.6



































































































































Table 7.6: EU-25 Relative trade balance (X-M)/(X+M)
Product 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Textiles -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.15
Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur -0.49 -0.50 -0.47 -0.48 -0.50 -0.52 -0.54 -0.55
Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.16 -0.20 -0.20 -0.24 -0.24
Wood and of products of wood and cork -0.20 -0.19 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08
Pulp, paper and paper products 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.24 0.17 0.25 0.29
Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.26
Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.16 n.a.
Chemicals and chemical products 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.23
Rubber and plastic products 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.27
Basic metals -0.18 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.07 -0.18
Fabricated metal products 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.17
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.40
Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers -0.47 -0.44 -0.41 -0.42 -0.44 -0.45 -0.41 -0.45
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.12
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus -0.14 -0.18 -0.16 -0.18 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.21
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.08
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.28 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.37
Other transport equipment 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.07
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.13 -0.16 -0.16

























































































































Table 7.7: EU-25 Revealed Comparative Advantage Index
Product 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Food products, beverages and tobacco 1.12 1.08 1.14 1.10 1.13 1.17 1.06 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.05
Textiles 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.66
Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.55
Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage 1.10 1.17 1.13 1.09 1.13 1.21 1.14 1.10 1.08 1.09 1.03
Wood and of products of wood and cork 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.62 0.58 0.65 0.69 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.79
Pulp, paper and paper products 0.95 1.01 1.05 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.10 1.13 1.16 1.14
Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media 1.43 1.47 1.46 1.45 1.46 1.47 1.30 1.35 1.46 1.45 1.46
Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 1.28 1.13 1.30 0.93 0.94 0.92 1.11 1.04 1.05 1.00 1.15
Chemicals and chemical products 1.27 1.29 1.33 1.39 1.45 1.47 1.44 1.53 1.45 1.42 1.41
Rubber and plastic products 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.92
Other non-metallic mineral products 1.57 1.54 1.55 1.56 1.56 1.54 1.47 1.41 1.41 1.39 1.34
Basic metals 0.82 0.86 0.84 0.76 0.74 0.86 0.81 0.78 0.73 0.76 0.80
Fabricated metal products 1.17 1.16 1.14 1.13 1.15 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.10 1.12 1.10
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.50 1.49 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.48 1.49 1.48
Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers 0.46 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.45
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.94
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 0.51 0.56 0.53 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.56 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.53
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 1.03 1.02 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.20 1.14 1.13 1.10
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.09 1.12 1.10
Other transport equipment 1.42 1.33 1.17 1.25 1.34 1.35 1.28 1.35 1.24 1.22 1.23
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 1.09 1.07 1.10 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.03 1.00 0.94 0.87 0.83
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Châpitre 7. Microeconomic Data Country Fiches
Italy
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Lithuania
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Châpitre 7. Microeconomic Data Country Fiches
Luxembourg
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Latvia
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE


























ld711576Int.indd   174 ld711576Int.indd   174 19/12/07   13:17:38 19/12/07   13:17:38175
Châpitre 7. Microeconomic Data Country Fiches
Malta
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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The Netherlands
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Châpitre 7. Microeconomic Data Country Fiches
Poland
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Portugal
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Châpitre 7. Microeconomic Data Country Fiches
Romania
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Sweden
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Châpitre 7. Microeconomic Data Country Fiches
Slovenia
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Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Slovakia
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Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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Châpitre 7. Microeconomic Data Country Fiches
United Kingdom
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Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
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E: List of background studies 
to the European Competitiveness Report 2007
Some parts of the European Competitiveness Report 
2007 are based on, or use, material prepared by a 
consortium led by WIFO, the Austrian Institute for 
Economic Research:
−   Chapter 2 Section 3 – Spillovers across Member 
States and across policy areas in the context of the 
Growth and Jobs strategy is based on “Interna-
tional spillovers from domestic reform” by Ray 
Barrell and Simon Kirby, National Institute for 
Economic Research (NIESR) and Arjan Lejour and 
Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, the Netherlands Bureau 
of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), (2007).
−   Chapter 3 – Skill problems in European Industrial 
sectors is based on “Skill problems in European 
Industrial sectors”, by Michael Landesmann 
(coordinator), Sebastian Leitner, Robert Stehrer 
and Hermine Vidovic, Vienna Institute for Inter-
national Economic Studies (wiiw), Terry Ward 
and Lydia Greunz (Applica) and Dinand Webbink, 
CPB, (2007).
−   Chapter 4 – Analysis of the performance of European 
Industries, is based on “Sectoral Growth Drivers: 
Part I – Sectoral performance” by Michael Peneder 
(coordinator), Martin Falk, Ina Matt, Susanne Sie-
ber and Maria Silva Porto (WIFO), Peter Loveridge 
and Ana Rincon-Aznar, NIESR and John Barrett, 
Global Insight Corp., (2007).
−   Chapter 5 – The Future of manufacturing in Europe 
– a survey of the literature and modelling approach, is 
based on “The Future of Manufacturing in Europe” 
by Felix Brandes and Frans van der Zee, TNO, and 
Arjan Lejour and Gerard Verweij, CPB, (2007).
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